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What is the relationship between elections and repression? How do voters evaluate
repression, and what causes them to change their beliefs about rights violations? In this
dissertation, I examine patterns of repression across democracies. I theorize that individuals’
reactions to human rights violations vary based on their perceptions about the group that
has been targeted by state violence. When the public perceives a target to threaten domestic
security and stability, they are more likely to support leaders who perpetrate repression in
order to provide (real or perceived) security. Yet individuals are also likely to feel threatened
by repression that targets their in-group members, which can inhibit their own safety and
well-being. In such cases, voters may punish their leaders for repression at the ballot box.
In a series of three papers, I explore the implications of this argument at several different
levels of analysis. In the first paper, I examine whether leaders shift their repressive behavior
over election cycles, presumably to gain electoral benefits. In cross-national analysis of
democratic elections from 1995-2019, I find that leaders increase repression of threatening
groups as elections approach, but only during periods of domestic violence. In the second
paper, I evaluate decision-making at the individual level using a conjoint experiment in the
United States. I find that only individuals who identify as an in-group with recent repression
victims incorporate repression into their vote choice by punishing repressive candidates.
Finally, in the third paper I assess whether the international community can intervene to shift
individual attitudes about human rights and repressive leaders. Using a vignette experiment
in the United States, I find that only those who view repression targets as non-threatening
and do not share a party with the repressive leader increase their opposition to repressive
leaders as a result of international naming and shaming. Taken together, these three papers
provide novel theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence to evaluate the effectiveness of
elections for constraining repression in democratic countries.
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Why do democratic leaders repress? How do repressive actions influence leaders’ elec-
toral prospects? The literature on the domestic democratic peace reveals a strong correlation
between regime type and repression. Democratic institutions, like free and fair elections, in-
dependent judiciaries, and strong legislatures, are associated with relatively low levels of
rights violations. In general, each these institutions introduce checks on leaders’ behavior,
which raise the cost of committing human rights abuses. However, while institutional con-
straints undoubtedly curb overall repression, the cost they impose on leaders varies across
political contexts depending on various actors’ willingness to hold leaders accountable. To
better understand the strengths and weaknesses of democratic institutions for preventing
repression, it is important to study the mechanisms through which each institution facili-
tates human rights protections, and the moments when they may fall short. To further this
research agenda, this dissertation explores the limitations of one foundational democratic
institution, elections, for keeping leaders from repression.
Across three papers, I focus on a core factor that moderates the effectiveness of elections
for constraining repression: the threat that voters perceive from repression targets. Drawing
from literature on the security-civil liberties trade-off, which explores how individuals make
difficult choices between rights protections and security, I argue that individuals in democ-
racies react differently to repression perpetrated against non-threatening groups and groups
that put domestic security at risk. Specifically, I anticipate that voters will support leaders
who repress threatening groups in an effort to provide domestic security, particularly in con-
texts of political crisis. This argument has implications for leaders’ behavior over the course
of election cycles, individuals’ decision-making at the ballot box, and international organi-
zations’ ability to persuade democratic citizens to shift their support for human rights and
rights-abusing leaders. I explore each of these issues in the three papers of the dissertation.
To begin, the first paper analyzes how leaders’ incentives to target particular groups
with repression vary over the course of an election cycle. Building from the expectation that
voters reward leaders who repress threatening groups, I expect that leaders will engage in
1
higher levels of targeted repression against domestic threats as elections approach. Further,
I theorize that these tendencies will be especially strong in countries in the midst of domestic
violence, when security is likely to be a salient election issue. Using cross-national data on
democratic elections from 1995-2019 and a novel measure of repression, I find support for
this theory. However, I find no evidence that leaders’ probability of winning reelection shifts
as a result of their repressive behavior. In the second paper, I turn to the individual level of
analysis, assessing whether and when voters consider repression in their vote choice. Using a
representative conjoint experiment in the United States, I find that individuals who identify
as in-groups with recent victims of repression punish candidates who support repression of
their group. However, all other subsets of voters remain indifferent to repression at the ballot
box, and no group of voters rewards repressive candidates. In the third paper, I evaluate
whether international advocacy organizations can shift individuals’ support for repression.
The results of a representative vignette experiment in the United States indicate that threat
perception influences individuals’ susceptibility to naming and shaming. Specifically, I find
that international advocacy increases opposition to repression leaders only among voters
who perceive repression victims to be non-threatening and do not share a party with the
repressive leader.
Taken together, the three papers of the dissertation provide unique insight into the
interaction between elections and patterns of repression across democracies. I find that
repression does shift during electoral cycles, but only in countries embroiled in domestic
conflict. Further, I uncover greater indifference to repression on the part of voters than may
have been expected by previous research. While some voters who have personal experience
with repression are likely to consider repression in their vote choice, many others privilege
issues like economic policy, party identification, and candidates’ demographic features when
choosing between candidates. Finally, the dissertation helps ascertain whether and how
members of the international community can shift these individual-level tendencies. The
results show that some individuals are amenable to even short informational treatments
about human rights violations. Others, however, remain intransigent in their beliefs about
human rights protections in the domestic sphere. These findings in particular have strong
relevance to policymakers and human rights advocates who hope to increase domestic support
2
for human rights. Overall, the theories and findings presented in this dissertation have broad
implications for the relationship between democratic institutions and human rights, as well
as the individual-level choices that shape patterns of repression across democracies.
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2.0 Paper 1: Election Timing and Targeted Repression
On October 14, 2019, Spain’s Supreme Court found nine Catalan independence leaders
guilty of sedition and misuse of public funds for their role in organizing the 2017 Catalan
independence referendum (BBC News, 2019). After the leaders were sentenced to nine to 13
years in prison, it did not take long for protesters to fill the streets. By week’s end, 350,000
people had gathered to protest the ruling throughout Catalonia, resulting in the closing
of the Barcelona-El Prat airport, blockages of major roadways, and the postponement of
the clásico match between Real Madrid and FC Barcelona (The Sydney Morning Herald,
2019; The Local, 2019). In reaction to the uprising, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez assured
the country that he would uphold the rulings, stating that “the government would work to
guarantee public order” (Rolfe and McAuley, 2019). One means of securing public order was
violent repression, as the police used foam bullets, batons, and other crowd control tactics to
subdue the protesters, resulting in injuries to 593 people (BBC News, 2019). Even following
the use of these repressive tactics, the Prime Minister maintained public support. Public
opinion for the ruling party stayed the same throughout the fall (Politico, 2021), and Sánchez
won an easy reelection in November with a strong plurality of 28% of the vote (Gutiérrez,
2019).
Spain’s violent repression of Catalan protesters raises important questions about the
relationship between elections, dissent, and repression.1 How do elections shape leaders’ in-
centives to respond to domestic threats with repression? When leaders do turn to repression,
how do these tactics shape their performance in elections? On the one hand, research on the
domestic democratic peace finds that democratic institutions – like elections – lead to rela-
tively low levels of repression (Davenport, 2007b).2 Yet this research provides limited insight
1Repression or rights violations are “coercive actions political authorities take to inhibit the will or
capacity of people within their jurisdiction to influence political outcomes” (Ritter, 2014, 145). I focus
on specific acts of repression that can be attributed to elected leaders, while recognizing that leaders often
repress covertly (Colaresi, 2014; Krcmaric, 2019), that delegation problems can obscure leaders’ responsibility
for repression (DeMeritt, 2015; Tiberiu Dragu, 2018; Eck, 2015), and that repression is often embedded in
political systems.
2I use a minimalist definition of democracy : “a regime in which those who govern are selected through
contested elections” (Przeworski et al., 2000, 15). Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows patterns of repression
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into how incentives to repress vary over the course of an election cycle and how repression
changes leaders’ likelihood of winning reelection. Further, numerous bodies of research – on
the civil liberties - security trade-off, counterterrorism, and group-based conflict, for instance
– suggest that individuals and groups often support the use of violence against threatening
groups, particularly during periods of conflict (Conrad et al., 2018; Conrad, Hill Jr and
Moore, 2018). Anecdotally, cases like Spanish repression in Catalonia demonstrate that re-
pression might not always carry electoral costs. In light of these patterns, existing literature
needs a cohesive account about how leaders’ incentives to repress particular groups wax and
wane over the course of an election cycle and how repression influences leaders’ likelihood of
staying in power.
This paper evaluates – theoretically and empirically – whether and how impending elec-
tions shift leaders’ incentives to repress. I argue that leaders have increasing incentive to
repress threatening groups as elections approach based on two mechanisms. First, because
individuals and groups have a preference that leaders respond to threatening outgroups with
repression, leaders face pressure from the electorate to repress threatening targets as elec-
tions approach. These preferences are further entrenched in countries facing violent domestic
conflict or sustained threat. In such cases, security is especially likely to be a pivotal issue
in elections, resulting in increased incentive for leaders to highlight their ability to provide
security as elections approach. In a second causal mechanism, the leader can also increase
the loyalty of their winning coalition by using repression. Especially in conflict-prone so-
cieties, targeted repression against threatening outgroups can prime in-group identification
with the leader, increasing the likelihood that in-group members will support the leader by
turning out to vote during elections. Two observable implications of these dynamics are that
leaders should be increasingly likely to use targeted repression against threatening groups as
elections approach and that voters should recognize these efforts, meaning that leaders who
repress threatening groups should be more likely to win reelection than those who do not.
These relationships should be especially strong during periods of elevated societal threat,
when security is highly likely to be a critical election issue.
by regime type, revealing that repression is more frequent in autocracies but not uncommon in democracies.
See also Haschke (2018).
5
To analyze the implications of this theory, I create a new measure of repressive events us-
ing data from the International Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS). This data is uniquely
suited to my interest in the relationship between election timing, targeted repression, and
leaders’ probability of winning reelection. Unlike standards-based measures of repression,
which provide countries with a score of respect for various political and physical integrity
rights in each year, events data captures the precise timing and target of specific repressive
actions taken by governments. The analysis reveals that, during conflict, leaders’ probability
of repressing threatening groups increases as elections approach, particularly societies under
threat. However, there is only limited evidence that pre-election repression of threatening
groups increases leaders’ probability of winning reelection, regardless of conflict status.
The first major contribution of this study is to generate a theoretical and empirical
account of patterns of repression over the course of an election cycle in a large cross-national
sample for an extended time series. Such an effort is crucial for understanding not only how
democratic institutions influence patterns of repression at the aggregate level, but also when
countries (and particular groups) are most vulnerable to repression. Another contribution
is to introduce a new measure of repression using comprehensive events data, as captured in
ICEWS. Standards-based measures help to identify general trends in patterns of repression
across countries and over time. However, events data is necessary to isolate the precise
timing and targeting of repressive actions. My measure thus contributes to growing efforts
to disaggregate the study of repression (Bhasin and Gandhi, 2013; Conrad, Haglund and
Moore, 2014; Cordell et al., 2021; Salehyan et al., 2012; Sullivan, 2015). Finally, this study
identifies how threats – from particular groups and in particular contexts – change the
relationship between elections and repression. While past work theorizes that elections
provide less effective constraints against repression during conflict, it has not analyzed the
moments at which this relationship breaks down and the groups that are most affected by the
weaknesses of elections. In contrast, this study identifies the precise limitations of elections,
generating critical insight that can help protect vulnerable groups from repression.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the existing literature linking
elections to repression. The second section reviews several bodies of literature which suggest
that individual- and group-level preferences provide leaders with motive to repress as elec-
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tions approach. The third section outlines a theoretical framework to explain how impending
elections shape patterns of repression and how repression changes a leader’s probability of
winning reelection. The fourth section presents the research design and the fifth section tests
the hypotheses. The last section concludes.
2.1 Elections and Repression
Democratic institutions, including elections, are associated with relatively low levels of
repression (Davenport, 2007a; DeMeritt, 2016). Domestic democratic peace theory proposes
that democratic institutions provide institutional constraints that raise the cost of repression
vis-a-vis alternative governance strategies.3 Regularly held free and fair elections mean that
voters have the option to cast out leaders with disagreeable attributes. Assuming that
voters prefer their leaders refrain from repression (Beer and Mitchell, 2004; Cingranelli and
Filippov, 2010; Gurr, 1986; Richards, 1999; Richards and Gelleny, 2007), democratic leaders
who repress should expect electoral sanctions. The implication of these arguments is that
leaders in countries with regularly-held elections should repress less than those in countries
without elections.
Existing literature adopts two empirical strategies to evaluate the relationship between
elections and repression. First, some researchers analyze the correlation between the presence
of the institution of elections and levels of repression. These studies typically find a negative
association between indicators of electoral democracy and rights violations. For instance,
Davenport (2007b) finds that countries with higher levels of “voice,” operationalized as levels
of electoral competition and participation, have lower levels of repression. In Mexico, Beer
and Mitchell (2004) find a negative relationship between competitive elections and repression
at the sub-national level. Electoral institutions that increase voters’ ability to hold leaders
accountable are also associated with lower levels of repression (Cingranelli and Filippov,
3Repression always carries costs, due to the need to employ and monitor coercive agents, for instance
(Davenport, 2007b). I focus only on the institutional and electoral costs that may vary, considering these
other costs to remain constant across cases. Democracies have many other options to deal with threats,
including diversion, concessions, and illiberal tactics like censorship and surveillance (Cope, Crabtree and
Lupu, 2018; Davies, 2016).
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2010). Yet there is also ample evidence that this relationship is subject to limitations.
Specifically, during periods of societal threat, “repression can be supported by at least part
of the citizenry” (Davenport, 2007b, 27). As a result, the dampening effect of elections on
repression diminishes in the presence of various kinds of conflict, including dissent, civil war,
and interstate war (Davenport, 2007b). Democratic leaders are also less likely to stop torture
spells during periods of violent threat (Conrad and Moore, 2010), and elections are likely to
be less effective at constraining torture of threatening groups (Conrad et al., 2018; Conrad,
Hill Jr and Moore, 2018).
Another empirical strategy is to assess whether repression increases or decreases in the
periods surrounding the events of elections. This approach assesses the possibility that
leaders’ incentives to repress shift over the course of an election cycle. If it is the case
that elections increase the costs of repression, then perhaps leaders experience these costs
most acutely in the immediate proximity of an election. The evidence for this relationship,
however, is mixed. For instance, Davenport (1997, 1998) finds in a sample of 49 countries
(1948-1982) that national elections are associated with reduced repression during election
years. However, these results are driven primarily by authoritarian countries (Davenport,
1997). Examining the country-month level of analysis among 12 consolidated democracies,
Davenport (1997) further finds that national elections are not associated with any change
in levels of repression in the 12 months preceding or following the election. Again focusing
on national level trends, but disaggregating by election type, Richards and Gelleny (2007)
find that legislative elections are associated with reduced levels of repression in the two
years following an election, but that repression actually increases in the year following an
executive election. Finally, in a sample of 74 randomly-chose countries over a three-year
period, Richards (1999) finds no relationship between national election year and levels of
repression.4 In the most recent evaluation of this question, Bhasin and Gandhi (2013) find
that leaders are increasingly likely to target opposition groups as elections approach, but
their study is limited to autocratic countries.
Overall, the literature on the domestic democratic peace indicates that elections gener-
4These two branches of literature share similarities with research on election violence, which finds that
elections generally reduce violence while causing spikes of violence in the period immediately surrounding
an election by both the opposition and the incumbent (Harish and Little, 2017).
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ally reduce repression, but this relationship is tempered by political context. In times of
conflict, elections are less effective at constraining violence. Beyond these aggregate-level
relationships, however, there remain many unanswered questions about how patterns of re-
pression wax and wane over the course of an election cycle. For one, existing research on
these dynamics tends to be limited in spatial and temporal scope. As a result, researchers
lack generalizable insight about how patterns of repression vary as elections approach. Sec-
ond, existing studies tend to use aggregate, standards-based measures of repression as their
dependent variable. However, accurate identification of the sequencing of repressive events
and electoral contests requires data that captures the precise timing and intensity of repres-
sive actions. Further, studies on the timing of elections should analyze heterogeneous effects
of the relationship between election timing and repression based on the threat of the target
group. Given that elections prove to be less effective at deterring repression during conflict,
it is worth evaluating whether this relationship is driven by spikes in repression at particular
moments during the election cycle. Finally, one lingering question across all of these studies
is how repression affects the outcomes of elections. To assess the degree to which elections
constrain repression, if is important to consider the effect of repression on electoral success.
Ultimately, research on the effect of elections on repression would benefit from a more
detailed account of how electoral contests influence leaders’ incentives to repress over time.
To understand this relationship, it is important to identify individual- and group-level pref-
erences about repression. The next section reviews existing literature on these preferences.
2.2 Incentives to Repress
It is crucial to understand individual- and group-level preferences about repression in or-
der to theorize leaders’ incentives to utilize repression as elections approach. Several branches
of literature provide insight into these preferences. First, research on the domestic democratic
peace tends to assume that voters universally oppose repression (Beer and Mitchell, 2004;
Cingranelli and Filippov, 2010; Gurr, 1986; Richards, 1999; Richards and Gelleny, 2007).
However, more recent research at the individual level adds nuance to these assumptions.
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In particular, the security-civil liberties trade-off demonstrates that individuals evaluate re-
pression and civil liberties as competing goods (Davis and Silver, 2004; Davis, 2007). The
trade-off suggests that, while individuals may value civil liberties in the abstract, they are
often willing to sacrifice rights protections in order to guarantee security. In particular,
individuals are willing to sacrifice an outgroup’s liberties for the security of ingroup mem-
bers or society as a whole (Waldron, 2003). Given that repression can provide security by
inhibiting the ability of threatening groups to mobilize, these theories indicate that many
individuals will support repression that generates security benefits. Recent survey research
provides some empirical support for these ideas in showing that individuals are more willing
to support torture of ethnic minority groups (Conrad et al., 2018; Kearns and Young, 2020;
Piazza, 2015) and more willing to support rights restrictions during periods of high societal
threat (Dietrich and Crabtree, 2019). The implication of these individual-level studies is that
leaders may expect support from voters when they repress threatening groups, particularly
during periods of high societal threat.5
One case that highlights these dynamics is the U.S. internment of Japanese Americans
during World War II. In 1942, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized regional
military commanders to designate military zones on the West Coast and remove any in-
dividuals deemed threatening from these areas. Soon after, commanders removed nearly
120,000 Japanese Americans from Western states to internment camps. Enacted only two
months after the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and two days preceding the bombing
of Santa Barbara by Japanese submarines, the measures reflected public pressure to take
action to protect them from a suspected fifth column of Japanese Americans who (they
feared) could facilitate a Japanese invasion.6 Indeed, a month after the order was signed,
59% of Americans supported the interment of American citizens of Japanese descent and
93% of Americans supported interning American residents (non-citizens) of Japanese de-
scent (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, N.d.). In this case, voters preferred their
5The literature on political tolerance also demonstrates that individuals are often less willing to support
civil liberties protections for groups they dislike or perceive to be threatening as a result of their ideological
beliefs, ethnic identity, or past behavior (Gibson and Gouws, 2000, 2003; Hajnal, Lajevardi and Nielson,
2019; Stouffer, 1955).
6Originating in the Spanish Civil War, a fifth column is a group within a country at war which is
sympathetic to or working for its enemies. Note that there was no evidence, at the time or in the years since,
that Japanese Americans were participating in activities to support Japanese war efforts (Reeves, 2015).
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leaders repress given the context of security crisis (World War II) and the perception that
the repression target (Japanese Americans) was a domestic threat.
Research on counterterrorism suggests similar mechanisms linking individual preferences
for security to leaders’ behavior around elections. Several such works build theories based
on the assumption that voters support counterterrorism strategies because, even though
such tactics may violate civil liberties, they increase security for society as a whole. For in-
stance, Bueno de Mesquita (2007) use a formal model to demonstrate that electoral pressures
push governments to increase observable counterterrorism measures as elections approach,
for which they can expect to receive credit from voters. Similarly, in empirical analysis of
Western European governments’ counterterror strategies, Aksoy (2018) finds that right-wing
governments increase their counterterrorism activities as elections approach. The theoretical
underpinning for this finding is that counterterrorism is a public good that boosts electoral
performance among demographics with hawkish values. Much like repression, counterterror-
ism measures often result in violations of the civil liberties of particular targets. Yet voters
are typically willing to support violations of the rights of terrorists (or suspected terrorists)
in order to avoid the possibility of an attack.
These findings generate interesting puzzles about other means that leaders may use to
provide security to voters, including repression. Many counterterror strategies could be con-
sidered to be types of repression. In Aksoy’s 2018 study, for example, counterterrorism is the
number of government actions taken to combat terrorism in a particular month. Such actions
include making arrests or taking armed action against designated terrorist organizations like
the ETA in Spain and the IRA in Ireland. However, there are many other actions that lead-
ers can take to combat threats in the pre-election period, including restrictions on freedoms
of assembly, speech or physical integrity rights violations like torture or even targeted killing.
Further, existing research on counterterrorism is limited to independent actions governments
take to counter terror threats. But leaders also have incentive to respond to ongoing threats
with repression. Finally, voters likely desire security from threatening groups that are not
terrorist organizations. While terrorists certainly represent one salient threat, voters are
also likely to be threatened by rebel groups, violent protesters, or even marginalized groups
merely perceived to be threatening. Savun and Gineste (2019) provide evidence for the lat-
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ter relationship, by showing that leaders face increasing incentives to use violence against
refugees – a group often believed to be threatening – in order to demonstrate their ability
to provide security in the wake of terrorist attacks. Similarly, Whitaker (2005) shows that
leaders in Africa increasingly call into question the citizenship status of opponents during
election cycles, fanning the flames of xenophobia and exclusionary nation-building strategies.
In this study, I build on these previous works to evaluate leaders’ incentives to target a wider
range of repression targets and asses how leaders’ incentives to provide security vary over
the course of an election cycle.
Finally, group-level dynamics also influence leaders’ propensity to repress as elections
approach. Research on civil conflict demonstrates how a range of identity cleavages, sustained
horizontal inequality, and ethnic discrimination can fuel violence between groups (Buhaug,
Cederman and Gleditsch, 2014; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013; Horowitz, 1985;
Kalin and Sambanis, 2018). Far from preferring that leaders always protect individual rights,
voters in divided societies often prefer that leaders enact repression and violence against rebel
groups that pose a threat to the status quo. The aforementioned case of Spanish violence
in Catalonia underscores some of these mechanisms. Part of the reason that Prime Minister
Sánchez did not suffer loss of reelection as a result of repression against Catalan protesters
was likely because the median Spanish voter did not support the cause of the protests:
polling from 2014 suggested that only 12.3% of Spaniards favored Catalonian independence
(Hernández, 2014). It is likely that the identity-based cleavage separating the median Spanish
voter from the average Catalan protester shaped Sánchez’s performance in the subsequent
election. The quintessential case of group-based ethnic conflict, between Israel and Palestine,
also demonstrates how democratic leaders can enact consistent repressive tactics without
suffering electoral defeat (Amnesty International, 2021; Human Rights Watch, 2021). Indeed,
research at the individual-level shows how Israelis and Palestinians have historically been
unwilling to compromise (Shamir and Shikaki, 2002) and how Israelis who perceive greater
threat from Palestinians are less likely to support protections for this outgroup (Maoz and
McCauley, 2009). Overall, conflict typically serves to exacerbate group-level cleavages and
increase hostility throughout society. Together, these dynamics have the potential to shift
leaders’ propensity to repress for electoral gain in response to individual- and group-level
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pressures. The malleability of identity, particularly during periods of group-level strife,
also introduce incentives for leaders to manipulate the loyalty of in-group members during
elections. I discuss these bottom-up and top-down incentives to repress around elections in
the next section.
2.3 Pre-Election Repression and Reelection
This section explains how leaders shift their patterns of repression as elections approach
and how repressive tactics shape leaders’ reelection prospects. Although elections produce
relatively low levels of repression in democratic countries, elections also introduce incentives
for leaders to target threatening groups, particularly when conflict heightens the importance
of security provision to leadership selection.7 Two mechanisms support the theoretical ex-
pectations. First, individual- and group-level preferences for security put pressure on leaders
to target threatening groups with repression as elections approach. Because the median voter
is likely to support repression of threatening groups, leaders should be increasingly likely to
demonstrate their commitment to this preference as elections draw closer. Second, leaders
can utilize repression against threatening outgroups to increase the loyalty of ingroup mem-
bers during elections. Both of these mechanisms are intensified during conflict or societal
threat, when security is a highly salient and consequential leadership attribute. In what
follows, I present further details about each of these mechanisms and identify testable hy-
potheses about leaders’ propensity to repress around elections and the effect that pre-election
repression will have on leaders’ reelection prospects.
First, leaders can face pressure from the electorate to utilize repression against threaten-
ing targets. Literature on the security-civil liberties trade-off shows that voters often prefer
leaders use repression to protect them from threatening targets, rather than prioritizing civil
liberties protections for all groups. When threatened, voters should reward leaders who pro-
7It is possible that leaders who utilize especially high levels of repression will face electoral backlash.
However, I expect that leaders will generally not cross this threshold in democratic countries. Descriptive
evidence of patterns of repression in this sample reveals that leaders in democracies do use far less repression
than autocrats. Empirically, a negative relationship between election timing and repression would indicate
some support for this possibility.
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tect them by using repression to provide security. Considering group-level dynamics, when
leaders’ ingroup members face a sustained threat from an outgroup, these voters will also
react favorably to a leader who provides them with security against an outgroup threat. To-
gether, these preferences mean that leaders who are beholden to voters’ interests via regular
elections have an incentive to demonstrate policies that provide security even if these policies
violate the civil liberties of some groups. One policy that can demonstrate this ability is
repression. Specifically, repression targeted at threatening groups can reveal to voters that
leaders have both the capacity and the will to provide them with security. The nature of
the target is crucial to this assertion. The median voter is unlikely to support leaders who
use widespread repression – which could inhibit their own security – or arbitrary repression,
against groups that are not believed to pose a threat to aggregate-level security, as domestic
democratic peace theory suggests. However, when leaders target repression against specific
groups that pose a threat to society, repression demonstrates security without threatening
the median voter’s own rights.
It is important to recognize that voters’ perception of the threat of particular groups is
what matters for leaders’ incentives to provide security via repression. Voters may prefer that
leaders repress a specific group either because that group represents a real or perceived threat
to society. On the one hand, there are a number of violent groups that actually pose a threat
to the average voter’s security. Some examples would be the threat of targeted Palestinian
violence for the median Israeli voter, the threat of violence or kidnapping from rebel groups
in Colombia, or the threat of targeted ethnic violence from aggrieved minority groups, as
perpetrated by the Kurds in Turkey, for instance. In all of these cases, voters are likely to
place a premium on security provision by leaders because such actions can protect their safety
and well-being from ongoing violence. Various forms of repression, like arbitrary arrests,
killings, or restrictions on free movement and assembly, can inhibit the ability of threatening
groups to mobilize and, at the very least, increase voters’ perceptions that leaders are able
to keep them safe. In other cases, leaders may face bottom-up pressure to provide security
against groups that are merely perceived to be threatening. The example of perceived threat
from refugees provides one example of these dynamics. Savun and Gineste (2019) explain how
voters support leaders who use targeted repression against refugees because they believe that
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such actions provide them with security, even as refugees pose little real threat to domestic
security. Conrad, Hill Jr and Moore (2018) summarize these dynamics: “leaders subject to
removal via the ballot box can have positive incentives to (permit their coercive agents to)
pursue visible ‘security’ measures vis-a-vis members of marginalized groups deemed to be
threatening outsiders” (4).
Admittedly, voters’ perceptions of the threat posed by different groups varies across
countries and time periods. Here, I define repression targets as threatening groups based
on two factors. First, for a target to be a threatening group they must be identifiable as a
group. In other words, repression should be discriminate, based on identifiable membership
in a particular coalition or class of people.8 This feature distinguishes targeted repression
from indiscriminate or widespread repression, which could presumably affect every voter and
would be unlikely to be rewarded at the ballot box. Next, I categorize a group as threatening
based on the perception of that group by the median voter. For perceptions of threat to
influence a leader’s behavior leading up to an election, it must be the case that the median
voter perceives the group to be threatening. A group could be perceived as threatening by
the median voter based on the group’s behavior or identity. The first factor encompasses
dissident groups, like protesters, rebels, gangs, or criminal organizations. The median voter
is likely to believe these groups to be threatening because they utilize tactics that challenge
domestic security (as when they use violence) or the status quo. The second encompasses
marginalized groups, like refugees, which are often believed to be threatening due to their
minority status (Horowitz, 1985; Savun and Gineste, 2019; Tajfel and Turner, 1979).
While preferences for security imply consistent pressure for leaders to target threatening
groups with repression, the utility of repression for leaders varies over the course of an elec-
tion cycle. This is because voters do not consider all of a leader’s actions when they cast
their ballots. Rather, voters tend to focus only on actions the leader takes in the imme-
diate proximity to an election when evaluating candidates (Bartels, 2008; Clarke, Stewart
and Whiteley, 1998; Fair, 1978, 1996; Kirchgässner, 1985; Kramer, 1971; Lewis-Beck, 1986).9
8Kalyvas (2006) provides a useful distinction between discriminate and indiscriminate violence in the
context of civil war.
9There are many mechanisms that explain voters’ propensity to focus on recent events: either they simply
cannot remember conditions early in a leader’s term (Sarafidis, 2007), they may believe that more recent
indicators are more informative about a leader’s capabilities (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992), or they
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The literature on retrospective voting has primarily evaluated voters’ tendency toward my-
opia with regard to economic performance in the United States, though there is also some
evidence that this pattern applies across democracies (Duch and Stevenson, 2006) and policy
areas (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011). In one of the most recent evaluations of this ques-
tion, for instance, Achen and Bartels (2016) find that economic growth in the last quarters
of the leader’s term provide the best explanation for election outcomes. In more conservative
estimates, Wlezien (2015) finds that a correlation between economic indicators and incum-
bent victory may extend as far as two years before the election. Regardless of the precise
amount of time, a striking empirical regularity is that more recent economic factors have the
strongest impact on incumbents’ chances of reelection (Franzese, 2002, 375).
The literature on retrospective voting has not extensively evaluated whether these pat-
terns apply to security provision policies.10 However, it is likely that voters’ tendency to
focus on recent events should be especially pronounced with regard to repression. For one,
although it is the case that recent economic indicators are more readily available than infor-
mation about the through the whole of a leader’s tenure, it is not too difficult for voters to
gain access to aggregate economic indicators. Further, statistics marking economic success,
such as GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment, are readily agreed upon. This universally
accepted standards make it easy for voters to gather information about a leader’s perfor-
mance over the course of their full tenure. In contrast, coverage of repression is typically
more limited. Though news outlets may evaluate a leader’s patterns of repression as they are
perpetrated, the media is unlikely to dwell on a leader’s record of repression for long. Fur-
ther, it is difficult for voters to evaluate repression even if they are able to access information
about a leader’s actions over the full course of their term. Unlike economic indicators, there
are not commonly accepted standards for leaders’ ability to provide security. As a result,
voters should consider recent repression, rather than repression from the leader’s full term,
when casting their ballots. Another dynamic to consider is that the mechanisms driving
voters’ desire for security operate in the short-term. If voters perceive a threat from a par-
substitute information that is readily available for a full picture of a leader’s performance (Anderson, 2007;
Healy and Lenz, 2014; Huber, Hill and Lenz, 2012; Kahneman, 2003).
10One exception would be from Aksoy (2018), who finds that right-wing leaders in Western European
countries have increasing propensity to utilize counterterrorism tactics as elections approach.
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ticular group, the real or perceived danger from this target results in immediate feelings of
insecurity. The provision of security in the short-term also provides immediate relief from the
threat of violence, which is likely to shape voters’ decision making at the ballot box. Overall,
the implication of all of these factors is that voters are more likely to consider repression
perpetrated closer to an election than repression perpetrated further from an election when
they are voting.
Voters’ preference for security from threatening groups and their tendency to focus on
the immediate pre-election period when casting their ballots means that only repression per-
petrated in the run-up to an election is likely to influence a leader’s electoral performance.
If repression carried no costs, then these dynamics would not necessarily link election timing
to patterns of repression. Leaders could utilize repression whenever they needed to, without
changing their behavior as elections approached. However, repression is costly. For one,
repression carries material costs: leaders must employ and monitor coercive agents in or-
der to perpetrate repressive actions (Carey, 2006; Davenport, 2007b). Additionally, leaders
recognize that extensive repression has the potential to trigger backlash effects. Aggrieved
groups could double down in their opposition if the government utilizes tactics that are dis-
proportionate to a target’s offenses. Together, these factors mean that a leader has a limited
repression budget and must act strategically when deciding whether or not to respond to
threats with repression. Keeping office is the primary goal of all leaders, and democratic
leaders achieve this goal by winning reelection (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2005). So, leaders
should take costly actions that voters favor when they are most likely to receive credit for
those actions. This logic guides leaders’ decision to repress: leaders should be more likely
to repress threatening groups (a costly action favored by voters) when they are most likely
to receive credit for this action (in the immediate pre-election period). In other words, as
elections approach, leaders should become increasingly likely to target repression against
threatening groups.
These dynamics should shape leaders’ behavior across a range of countries and time
periods. However, the mechanisms that guide the relationship between election timing and
targeted repression of threatening groups should also intensify during periods of societal
threat. In such contexts, candidates’ ability to provide security is especially salient to vote
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choice. Consider again two cases of ongoing civil conflict and societal threat: Colombia
and Israel. In both cases, candidates’ position on security policy is one of the driving forces
behind candidates’ appeals to voters. Security is more likely to be on the electoral agenda for
a given election when there is a lack of security for the country as a whole, as during conflict.
As a result, candidates should be more likely to demonstrate their ability to provide security
through repression. Another factor to consider is that a context of high societal threat –
as occurs following a recent terrorist attack or during civil and interstate war – increases
the salience of group-based divisions. During conflict, voters tend to divide society into “us
versus them” categories, making it easier to identify outgroups and increasing the likelihood
that they will perceive outgroups to be threatening. When these group-based divisions are
primed by conflict, leaders will find it easy to identify targets that the median voter will
believe to be threatening that they can repress. Further, because violence is more common
in societies under threat, voters are increasingly willing to trade rights protections for security
as compared to contexts of peace.11
The discussion so far has focused on one mechanism linking election timing to repres-
sion: individual- and group-level preferences for security against threatening groups should
increase leaders’ likelihood of repressing as elections approach. Yet another mechanism orig-
inates with the leader’s behavior. There is a possibility that leaders can shift the attitudes
of voters by using repression. Targeted violence tends to highlight cleavages between groups
and, as a result, increases the salience of group-based divisions. Research in political psy-
chology, for instance, demonstrates that individuals who are exposed to targeted repression
identify more strongly with their ingroup and experience higher levels of polarization (Nu-
gent, 2020). Because polarization facilitates outgroup antipathy (Brewer, 1999), repression
can facilitate a cycle in which individuals view those who have been targeted as threatening
– and therefore deserving of repression – after leaders commit repression. The result of this
cycle is that repression can increase the loyalty of in-group members by increasing animosity
toward out-group members.12 As Dickson and Scheve (2006) explain, “politicians can raise
11Carey (2010) also expects that state terror, one form of repression, will be more common during political
instability given that governments will “be particularly sensitive to perceiving any dissent activities as
threatening” during these periods (174).
12Mele and Siegel (2019) outline a similar mechanism, finding that governments at times have an incentive
to hinder minority groups’ attempt to assimilate in order to facilitate their ability to identify minority groups
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the salience of social identities via campaign rhetoric to shore up support among voting mem-
bers of favorably disposed social groups. Priming identity can offer candidates greater slack
in selecting a political platform that diverges from the material interests of some voters, who
privilege the concerns of the invoked social identity” (quote from (Kalin and Sambanis, 2018,
244).). One implication of these patterns is that leaders can use repression to increase the
salience of identity, which could also increase the loyalty of the winning coalition that iden-
tifies the leader as an ingroup. Repression of outgroup threats can be an effective strategy
to mobilize support from voters. As with bottom-up pressure, leaders’ personal incentives
to target threatening groups to mobilize supporters will also intensify during conflict. In
these circumstances, voters have heightened perceptions of group-based cleavages and are
especially susceptible to leaders’ efforts to manipulate their loyalty to their ingroup. Taken
together, both mechanisms increase the likelihood that leaders utilize targeted repression
against threatening groups as elections approach.
Hypothesis 1: Leaders become increasingly likely to repress threatening groups as elec-
tions approach, particularly in contexts of high societal threat.
The first hypothesis captures the strategic incentives for leaders. If it is the case that
elections increase leaders’ incentives to repress out of electoral concerns, then patterns of pre-
election repression should also shape the outcomes of elections. If the median voter is likely
to prefer the leader target threatening groups with repression, particularly during conflict,
then leaders who take such actions should be more likely to win reelection than those who
do not. There is some existing research linking patterns of repression to election outcomes.
First, Cordell (2021) studies how the revelation of a countries’ involvement in the United
State’s extraordinary rendition program influences electoral outcomes in subsequent elec-
tions. She finds that left-wing governments face electoral sanctions when this information is
revealed, but right-wing governments face no cost. Cooperation in extraordinary rendition
can perhaps be considered support for one kind of repression, since the program entailed
torture of suspected terrorists. However, there is reason to believe that voters will react
differently to support for foreign torture as protection against domestic threats. Domestic
threats are likely to be more salient to vote choice, since they represent immediate threats to
to target with repression.
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voters’ safety and well-being. Repression of these groups provides clear and immediate ben-
efits to voters, while past cooperation in extraordinary rendition programs has less obvious
benefits for domestic constituencies. Bryant and Esarey (2019) also examine the influence
of repression on voting behavior in the United States. In a vignette experiment, the authors
find that repression has no effect on electoral outcomes. However, this experiment does not
differentiate across different repression targets and does not consider how voters’ preferences
may shift as elections approach.
In contrast to these works, the repression of interest in this paper occurs in the pre-
election period against groups that represent a threat to security. I expect that the median
voter will have favorable attitudes toward such repression, particularly during periods of
societal threat, which explains why leaders should be more likely to use targeted repression
as elections approach. The downstream consequence of these preferences is that leaders who
respond to these interests should increase their likelihood of winning reelection. Leaders
boost their reelection prospects when they enact favorable policies during the period preced-
ing an election (Franzese, 2002; Healy and Malhotra, 2013). I expect the same dynamic to
hold for leaders’ efforts to increase security by targeting threatening groups.13
Hypothesis 2: Leaders who repress threatening groups are more likely to win reelection
than those who do not, particularly in contexts of high societal threat.
2.4 Research Design
To test the hypotheses, I analyze patterns of repression and reelection across democratic
countries from 1995 to 2019. I focus on a sample of democratic countries given that voters
do not hold sway over the outcomes of elections in autocratic regimes. Since I am interested
in the effectiveness of the electoral constraint on repression and not the effect of other insti-
tutions associated with democracy, I adopt a minimalist definition of democracy.14 I restrict
13These hypotheses to apply to the low- and medium-intensity repression that is commonly observed in
democracies.
14My account intentionally differs from previous theories that posit that a country that represses cannot be
a democracy (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)). I find it problematic both empirically and conceptually
to define as a democracy as a country that does not repress, mostly because it would render the set of true
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my sample to countries coded as liberal democracies or electoral democracies according to
the Regimes of the World (RoW) index in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset
(Coppedge et al., 2020). The RoW measure classifies regimes based on overall competitive-
ness of access to power as well as liberal principles. Electoral democracies are countries that
have “de-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl’s institutional
prerequisites for polyarchy,” but lack full liberal guarantees. Liberal democracies are coun-
tries that meet Dahl’s criteria for polyarchy and guarantee “access to justice, transparent
law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and
judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied.”
I also restrict my analysis to executive elections. While authority over national security
is typically divided between legislatures and executives (Damrosh, 1995), the executive holds
control over the armed forces as well as the agencies that implement security policy. As such,
constitutions primarily task executives with ascertaining the appropriate balance between
civil liberties and security (Luban, 2007; Posner and Vermeule, 2007). Further, most consti-
tutions allocate a broad set of emergency powers to the executive (Ferejohn and Pasquino,
2004; Gross and Aoláin, 2006). These powers provide executives with both the means and
justification to restrict individual rights to protect citizens against real or manufactured
threats (Dragu and Fan, 2020; Lührmann and Rooney, 2020). Given this broad control
over the security sector, I expect that voters are most likely to hold executives accountable
for repression, as compared to other political leaders. Executive elections include presiden-
tial, semipresidential, and parliamentary elections as defined by the Democratic Electoral
Systems Around the World data (Bormann and Golder, 2013).15
2.4.1 Repression and Target Identity
I measure repression using data from the International Crisis Early Warning System
(ICEWS), which tracks a variety of socio-political events from over 6,000 international, na-
tional, regional, and local news sources in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and Arabic (Boschee
democracies empty. See Przeworski et al. (2000) for a similar discussion (14).
15I extend Bormann and Golder’s coding for 218 elections that (1) were considered democracies by V-Dem
but not DES and therefore not coded in DES or (2) occurred after 2016. This data and coding justifications
for each election is available upon request.
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et al., 2015). Most commonly-used data sources on repression, like the Cingranelli and
Richards (CIRI) human rights data project (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, 2014) and the
Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney et al., 2019), create an ordinal score to measure each
country’s respect for human rights in each year. These measures are inappropriate for this
project, however, given that theory refers not to a country’s overall human rights perfor-
mance, but to the specific timing and target of each human rights violation.
There is a long debate about the relative merits of standards-based and events-based
measures in human rights research (Chenoweth, Perkoski and Kang, 2017; Fariss, 2014;
Schoultz, 1981; Stohl, Carleton and Johnson, 1984; Stohl et al., 1986). The main weakness
of events data to study repression is the likelihood that not all events will be captured by
the data. Events data use information provided by newspapers and typically skew to cover
larger events from urban areas in English-speaking democracies (Chenoweth, Perkoski and
Kang, 2017). In light of this bias, many propose that standards-based indicators, which place
countries into broad categories of respect for human rights, are more reliable. In this study,
however, the biases associated with events data reflect the theoretical focus. This paper
explores leaders’ propensity to utilize repression for electoral gain, which is repression that is
observable to voters. Further, in order to react to repression at the ballot box, as predicted
in the second hypothesis, individuals must be aware of whether or not repression has taken
place. In light of these conditions, it is appropriate to utilize data from newspapers, which
reflects the information that is readily available to voters. It is also the case that the sample
of countries used in this analysis (democracies) are likely to have regular coverage of events
features in the news sources analyzed by ICEWS. Finally, it should be noted that ICEWS
improves upon past events data sources by analyzing a wide array of national and regional
newspapers in multiple languages.
To utilize the ICEWS data, I parse the full data set of 18 million political events to
collect events that represent repressive actions. I use several coding decisions to extract
repressive events, drawing from classical conceptions of repression from Davenport (2007a),
Goldstein (1978), and Ritter (2014). To qualify as repression, an event must be a coercive
action that is perpetrated by political authorities who represent the executive branch of an
independent state. Further, repressive events must take place in the perpetrator’s territorial
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jurisdiction and must be targeted against individuals or groups that belong to the same
state as the perpetrator. In Section A.2 of the Appendix, I include a thorough description
of the coding rules for this measure. Section A.3 of the Appendix provides an empirical
comparison between my new measure and existing standards-based metrics of repression.
Overall, there is a strong correlation between the ICEWS measure and existing measures of
repression in the sample of interest.
The hypotheses refer to repressive actions targeted against threatening groups. Threat
perception can be subjective and likely varies by country, making it admittedly difficult
to measure. However, I propose that the median voter is likely to perceive some groups
to be threatening across cases and that leaders can more easily persuade the public that
certain targets are threatening. To categorize repression as targeting threatening groups, I
utilize ICEWS’ sector dictionary, which assigns the target of each event to one or more of
591 sector categories (Schrodt and Yilmaz, 2007). I consider repression to be targeted at a
threatening group if the target was a dissident, national ethnic minority, refugee or displaced
group, religious minority, international dissident, immigrant, illegal immigrant, or exile. In
all of these instances, I expect that median voter to perceive that the target of repression
in threatening, while acknowledging that it is difficult to measure perceptions of threat in a
purely objective way.16 See Table A.2 for the frequency of types of repression perpetrated
against threatening groups and Figure A.3 for the relative frequency of repression against
each of the threatening targets. By far the most common target type identified as threatening
was dissidents, making up 98% of the target types.
This measure of repression serves as the dependent variable in the tests of Hypothesis 1
and the independent variable in the tests of Hypothesis 2. To test the first hypothesis, I use
a count measure of the number of repressive events perpetrated against a threatening group
in a given month. To test the second hypothesis, I aggregate the full count of repressive
actions in order to link them to specific elections. I code the number of repressive events
occurring in the months preceding each election, aggregating by targets who are likely to be
16Note that each target can belong to multiple sectors. In cases where the target belongs to both a non-
threatening and a threatening sector, I code the target as threatening. For example, if a minority ethnic
group also represents a political party, this group would be coded as threatening. I expect that threat
perception for the groups I have identified as threatening will outweigh the other sectors to which the group
belongs.
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perceived as threatening. The main measure counts the number of events in the five months
preceding the election, but the results are typically robust to other aggregations within the
6-month pre-election period. I focus on a relatively short pre-election time span given that
research on retrospective voting finds that voters tend to focus on current conditions when
casting their votes rather than the incumbent’s performance over their full tenure (Bartels,
2008; Fair, 1978, 1996; Kirchgässner, 1985; Kramer, 1971; Lewis-Beck, 1986).
2.4.2 Other Variables
The independent variable in the first hypothesis is the time to election. I operationalize
this variable as the number of months until an executive election. Recall that the sample
includes only executive elections in regimes classified as democracies. I restrict the sample
to the 2 years preceding an election to account for variation in the length of election cycles
across countries.
The dependent variable in the second hypothesis is incumbent party win. I operationalize
this variable as the incumbent’s party rather than the incumbent himself given that most
democracies enforce term limits on the executive office. I utilize V-Dem’s coding of turnover
in the executive office for my dependent variable (Coppedge et al., 2020). The coding
for this variable depends on the system of government in place and the type of election
at hand. In presidential and semipresidential elections, there is executive turnover when
the new president is a different person representing a different party or an independent
candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems, turnover is when the ruling party or the
ruling coalition of parties lost the election and the prime minister represents a different
party or coalition. My dependent variable is a dummy variable coded as “1” when there is
no turnover (the incumbent’s party stayed in office) and “0” otherwise. Figure A.4 shows
descriptive information for the ratio of wins and losses in each election type in my sample.
Note that because I am interested in whether a leader’s party survives in office, I measure
the outcome as whether the party stays in office, not whether the party increases their vote
share compared to previous elections. In other words, my outcome of interest is survival,
not change in vote share over time.
24
Both Hypothesis 1 and 2 expect that the relationships of interest will be moderated
by the level of societal threat. In the first hypothesis, I expect that leaders will be more
likely to target threatening groups with repression as elections approach when society is
undergoing threat in order to demonstrate their capacity to provide security to voters. In
the second hypothesis, I expect that voters will be particularly likely to reward these efforts
in contexts of elevated societal threat. I use three variables to measure different types of
ongoing domestic threat. Each of these variables are used as interaction terms to evaluate
whether societal threat moderates the relationships of interest.
The first variable, intrastate conflict is coded “1” if there is an active intrastate or in-
ternationalized intrastate conflict in a given month according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict Dataset, Version 20.1 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson and Öberg, 2020).17 The
second measure, insurgency, is coded “1” for country-months when there is an ongoing vio-
lent campaign according to the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO)
Data Project, Version 2.0 (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). Campaigns are coded as violent
when the primary method of resistance for the insurgency is violent in a given year. The third
variable, attack, is coded as “1” in country-months in which a terrorist attack took place
in a given country according to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the Univer-
sity of Maryland. I only code attacks where the nationality of the perpetrator matched the
location of the attack, given that the government can only use repression against domestic
threats.
I include a number of control variables to account for confounding factors that may
influence the relationship between elections and repression in both models. I first control for
the regime type of each country, using V-Dem’s polyarchy measure.18 I also control for the
quality of the approaching election (free/fair election), to account for the fact that executives
are likely to behave differently in anticipation of unfair compared to fair elections. For this
17This coding is based on the start of each conflict episode (when the 25th battle-related death is identified)
and the end of an episode (the date of the end of hostilities in the year preceding the end of the conflict
episode). I code the end date as December 31 of the last year of conflict if no specific date is listed.
18The results are robust to substituting this measure for V-Dem’s liberal democracy measure (v2x libdem)
and polity2. I prefer to include a minimalist measure of democracy, given that liberal categorizations of
democracy typically include levels of repression in the categorization of regime type.
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measure I use V-Dem’s primary measure of electoral integrity (v2elfrfair). I also control for
a country’s population, given that larger countries tend to exhibit higher levels of repression,
as well as GDP per capita and GDP growth, since wealthier countries tend to have lower
levels repression. These variables come from the Maddison Project (Bolt et al., 2018) and
the World Bank’s Development Indicators.19 Next I control for the number of protests each
month, using a measure from the ICEWS data which counts the number of events involving
peaceful protest, violent protest, or threats of protest.20 Excluding the measure of election
quality, all of these variables are lagged by one month to avoid post-treatment bias. Finally,
I include a one-month lag of the number of repressive events targeted against threatening
groups, to account for the path-dependent nature of repression. Tables A.3 and A.4 provides
summary statistics for all the variables utilized in the tests of the first and second hypotheses.
In the tests for the second hypothesis, I add additional control variables that could in-
fluence leaders’ patterns of repression as well as their likelihood of winning reelection. First,
I control for two election-specific variables, which influence the likelihood that a leader will
win reelection. These include the margin of majority, which is a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether the executive had control of the relevant houses of congress, taken from the
Database on Political Institutions (DPI) (Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini, 2018). Leaders with
more strength in the legislature are less likely to be voted out of office and more likely to ex-
ecute their preferred policies. I also include the number of years that the incumbent’s party
has stayed in office (years in office), given that parties who have won before are more likely
to win again (Ashworth, 2012), also from the DPI. Given the importance of executive sys-
tems in ascribing accountability to particular leaders, I also control for the executive system
(presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary), given that past research indicates that
voters are likely to evaluate leaders differently across different executive systems (Anderson,
2007; Franzese, 2002; Powell and Whitten, 1993; Tufte, 1978). I include dummy variables for
presidential and semi-presidential elections and omit the category for parliamentary elec-
tions. Finally, I consider constraints on the executive from other branches, including judicial
19I merge these variable’s from V-Dem’s data, Version 10.
20Specifically, this measure counts events with the following CAMEO codes: threaten with political dissent
(133), engage in political dissent (140), demonstrate or rally (141, 1411, 1412, 1413, 1414), conduct hunger
strike (142, 1421, 1422, 1423, 1424), conduct strike/boycott (143, 1431, 1432, 1433, 1434), obstruct passage,
block (144, 1441, 1442, 1443, 1444), and protest violently, riot (145, 1451, 1452, 1453, 1454).
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constraints and legislative constraints, using data from V-Dem (v2x jucon and v2xlg legcon,
respectively). These parallel institutions may affect the electorates’ likelihood of holding the
executive accountable for his actions at the ballot box (Franzese, 2002; Tufte, 1978).
2.5 Analysis and Discussion
To test the first hypothesis, I regress the count of repressive actions taken by the gov-
ernment on the months until the subsequent election and the battery of control variables
discussed previously. The sample for these hypothesis tests is democratic country-months
in the 2-year period preceding each election. This time-frame allows for some consistency
across countries, which all have different lengths in their electoral cycles. Further, while two
years is long enough to track variation in patterns of repression, it is not so long as to include
time periods for which elections would not be expected to have an effect. I use a Poisson link
given that the outcome variable is a count measure and cluster standard errors by country.
Table 2.1 presents the main results. In Model 1, which presents the bivariate relationship
between months to election and repression, there is a positive and statistically significant
relationship. In contrast to my first hypothesis, this model demonstrates that the count
of repressive actions decreases as an election approaches. Since the independent variable
counts the number of months until an election, the positive coefficient suggests that levels of
repression against threatening groups are significantly higher with further distance from the
election. In Model 2, however, we see that this significant effect dissipates with the inclusion
of confounding variables that also drive patterns of repression. In general these variables
behave as expected: more democratic countries repress less, countries with economic growth
repress less, leaders repress more when there are higher levels of protest the preceding month,
and repression is highly path-dependent, with a strongly significant predictor of repression
being the lag of number of repressive events perpetrated in the previous month.21
21Some surprising coefficients were the positive effect of the quality of elections (countries with more free
elections used higher levels of repression) and GDP per capita (countries with higher levels of wealth used
higher levels of repression). It is possible that these results reflect my theoretical expectations, in that leaders
beholden to fairer elections are more likely to repress threatening groups to demonstrate their capacity to
provide security. The positive relationship between GDP per capita and repression might reflect the capacity
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While the results of Model 1 and Model 2 did not conform to my theoretical expectations,
part of the reason for these results could be that these models do not account for the
presence or absence of ongoing conflict. I expected that leaders would be especially likely to
repress threatening groups in the pre-election period when conflict is underway, in order to
demonstrate their ability to provide security to voters. Models 3-5 test this possibility using
three measures to assess different forms of domestic security threats: civil conflict, violent
insurgency, and terrorism. In these models, I interact each of the dummy variables with the
number of months to an election to evaluate whether leaders’ propensity to repress varies as
elections approaches and whether this likelihood shifts when conflict is ongoing. The first
thing to note from these interactions is that all three interaction terms (which measure the
effect of the time to election during conflict) are negative and statistically significant. These
coefficients indicate that, during conflict, leaders are increasingly likely to repress threatening
groups as elections approach. In contrast, the coefficients on the constituent term for the
number of months to an election are positive and statistically significant. These coefficients
show the effect of election timing on repression in times of peace, and demonstrate that
leaders are less likely to target repression against threatening groups as elections approach.
To better visualize these interaction effects, Figure 2.1 shows the predicted levels of
repression as the time to an election decreases, based on whether conflict is ongoing or not.22
The important takeaway from these figures is that, in times of peace (represented by the
blue line), there is a significant decrease in levels of repression as elections approach. These
results reflect the conventional wisdom from domestic democratic peace theory about the
deterrent effect of elections. Even for repression targeted against threatening groups, leaders
seem to be less willing to repress during election periods in times of peace. Whether or not
domestic audiences are actually willing to punish repression, it does seem that leaders are
hesitant to utilize repressive tactics when they may be held accountable for this behavior
in a subsequent election. In contrast to this seeming deterrence during peacetime, leaders
are increasingly likely to repress threatening groups as elections approach during conflict
of leaders to maintain a coercive apparatus.
22I reverse the x-axis to better visualize the relationship between time to election (counting down) and
repression. As a result, the direction of the coefficients in the tabular results is opposite to the visualized
slope in the figure.
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Table 2.1: Election Timing and Repression
Bivariate Controls Conflict Insurgency Terrorism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Months to Election 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Conflict (UCDP) 1.23∗∗∗
(0.30)








Months to Election * Attack −0.03∗
(0.02)
Polyarchy −4.91∗∗ −4.04∗∗ −7.20∗∗∗ −4.58∗∗∗
(1.92) (1.87) (1.22) (1.62)
Free/Fair Election 0.60∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
Population 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per Capita 0.46∗∗ 0.43∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗
(0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21)
GDP Growth −5.93∗∗∗ −5.53∗∗∗ −3.85∗ −5.37∗∗∗
(1.94) (1.96) (2.06) (1.89)
Protests 0.01∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Repressiont−1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −0.82∗∗∗ −2.44∗ −2.87∗∗ −3.06∗∗ −2.75∗∗
(0.23) (1.25) (1.25) (1.56) (1.22)
Observations 14, 121 10, 701 10, 701 5, 248 10, 701
Notes: Dependent variable is the count of the number of repressive actions in each month. Standard errors clustered
by country. Sample is the 24 months before an executive election (presidential, parliamentary, semipresidential) in a
democracy. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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(represented by the red line). The slightly positive effect of election timing in these models
is striking when compared to the negative effect during peacetime. The deterrent effect of
elections on repression evaporates across a wide range of conflict conditions, and elections
even increase the likelihood of targeted repression of threatening groups during these periods
at the margins. Of course, the coefficients for the relationship between election timing and
repression are relatively small, especially in comparison to the other confounders included in
the model. However, given that the outcome variable is the number of repressive actions in
a given month, even one added act of repression (imposition of a curfew, an act of torture,
or a physical assault, for instance), has substantive importance.
























































Notes: Predicted levels of repression based on the months to the next executive election and the presence of ongoing conflict.
95% confidence intervals. All control variable set to means. Outcome variable: count of repressive actions perpetrated by the
government in each month.
Turning to the second hypothesis, Table 2.2 shows the results of the regression of whether
a party won a particular election on the levels of pre-election repression targeted against
threatening groups. These models use a logit link function given the dichotomous nature
of the dependent variable and include clustered standard errors by country. Models 1 and
2 both show a positive relationship between repression of threatening groups and a party’s
likelihood of winning reelection. These results do lend support to the second hypothesis that
targeted repression of threatening groups would increase a leader’s likelihood of winning
reelection in general. However, as with the first set of hypothesis tests, the more interesting
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quantity is the relationship between repression and election outcomes when interacted with
the presence of ongoing conflict. In Hypothesis 2, I expected that targeted repression of
threatening groups would have an even stronger effect on a party’s probability of winning
reelection in the presence of elevated societal threat. However, the results for the interaction
terms in Models 3-5 do not tell a clear story.
Considering first Model 3, both the interaction term and the constituent term for conflict
are statistically significant. The constituent term on conflict represents the effect of civil con-
flict on the probability of reelection when a leader has not used pre-election repression. This
coefficient is negative and large, indicating that leaders are less likely to win reelection dur-
ing conflict, as might be expected. Considering the interaction term, predicted probabilities
plots in Appendix Figure A.5 reveal that pre-election repression has a positive effect on the
likelihood of winning reelection in both conflict and peacetime, but this effect is statistically
significant during conflict and indistinguishable from zero during peacetime. So, Model 3
does lend some support for Hypothesis 2 in that the positive effect of pre-election repres-
sion on reelection seems to be driven by leaders’ behavior during conflict. Models 4 and 5
however, provide mixed evidence. In Model 4, which interacts insurgency with pre-election,
none of the constituent terms are significant predictors of leaders’ probability of reelection.
Model 4 yields a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the constituent term
for repression, showing that pre-election repression has a slight positive effect on reelection
prospects when there has not been a terrorist attack, in contrast to the predictions of the
second hypothesis. The constituent term for attack is negative and statistically significant,
showing that leaders are less likely to win reelection when there has been a recent terrorist
attack compared to when there has not been a recent terrorist attack and the leader has not
used repression. The interaction term in this model is insignificant.
Together, Models 3-5 suggest that leaders’ baseline probability of winning reelection is
relatively low during conflict and when there has been a recent terrorist attack compared to
when there is no conflict and there has not been a recent terrorist attack. These findings in-
dicate that leaders’ tenure is more unstable when they face domestic violence. Theoretically,
I expected the pre-election repression would increase the likelihood of winning reelection for
leaders embroiled in such conflict. Model 3 provides some support for this idea: pre-election
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Table 2.2: Repression and Reelection Prospects
Bivariate Controls Conflict Insurgency Terrorism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Repression 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.03 0.01 0.03∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Conflict −2.25∗∗
(0.94)








Repression * Attack 0.01
(0.03)
Polyarchy 3.64 2.88 0.30 3.37
(2.37) (2.46) (3.43) (2.31)
Free/Fair Election −0.74∗∗ −0.72∗∗ −0.58 −0.70∗∗
(0.34) (0.35) (0.48) (0.33)
Population −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per Capita 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02
(0.20) (0.21) (0.31) (0.20)
GDP Growth −0.58 −0.98 −3.59 −1.18
(3.41) (3.46) (5.10) (3.31)
Protests −0.00 −0.01 0.01 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Margin of Majority 0.31 0.29 0.67∗ 0.34
(0.23) (0.23) (0.38) (0.23)
Years in Office −0.04 −0.04 −0.06 −0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Presidential Election 0.03 0.06 0.24 0.05
(0.35) (0.37) (0.50) (0.34)
Semi-presidential Election −0.82∗∗ −0.82∗∗ −0.49 −0.85∗∗
(0.35) (0.35) (0.51) (0.33)
Judicial Constraints 2.47∗∗ 2.82∗∗∗ 6.14∗∗∗ 2.49∗∗
(1.00) (1.03) (2.05) (1.03)
Legislative Constraints −1.45 −1.51 0.19 −1.51
(1.28) (1.28) (1.30) (1.21)
Constant −0.26∗∗ −2.56 −2.39 −5.32∗∗ −2.45
(0.11) (1.67) (1.76) (2.61) (1.56)
Observations 590 452 452 226 452
Notes: Dependent variable is whether the incumbent party won reelection. Standard errors clus-
tered by country. Sample is executive elections (presidential, semipresidential, and parliamentary) in
democracies. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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repression of threatening groups has a positive effect on the likelihood of reelection during
conflict that is distinguishable from zero. However, Model 4 yields no clear evidence about
the relationship between insurgency, repression, and reelection, while Model 5 indicates the
pre-election repression increases reelection, but this effect does not seem to be conditional
on the presence or absence of conflict. One possible interpretation of these findings is that
the dichotomous outcome variable is too rough to capture the true relationship between
repression and reelection. To evaluate this possibility, in supplemental analysis I assess the
results using an alternative dependent variable – vote share – on a sub-sample of elections.23
However, the results from this analysis are also null. It is possible that there may be some
observable implications of the theory with a larger sample or with a finer-grained measure
of leader support like public opinion polling. Ultimately, though, while there do seem to
be some general trends linking repression to reelection prospects, this relationship is fairly
weak.
To summarize the results of this analysis, the strongest findings support the first hypoth-
esis. In periods of peace, elections function as domestic democratic peace theory expects,
deterring targeted repression in the pre-election period. In contrast, this deterrent effect
disintegrates during various forms of conflict. In such times of elevated societal threat, ap-
proaching elections have a positive and weakly significant effect on leaders’ propensity to
repress threatening groups. In contrast to the support for the first hypothesis, the results
for the second hypothesis are relatively weak. In general, targeted repression of threatening
seems not to have a consistent effect on leaders’ probability of keeping office. While there
is some evidence that repression of threatening groups has a positive effect on the likeli-
hood of reelection, the significance of this relationship varies, and there does not seem to be
consistent heterogeneous effects based on the presence of absence of high levels of societal
threat. One question that emerges from this analysis is how to make sense of these two
sets of results. While it seems that leaders are more likely to repress threatening groups as
elections approach during conflict, it is not necessarily the case that leaders are rewarded
for this behavior. Two main explanations could explain these results. First, it could be that
23I collect this data from Erdem Aytaç (2017), who codes candidate vote share across democratic countries
up to 2014, omitting post-communist countries. In total, the overlap between this sample and my sample is
213 elections.
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leaders seek to repress threatening groups for electoral gain, but that these efforts go unno-
ticed by voters. Leaders cannot perfectly predict whether and the electorate will respond to
their behavior, and all of their efforts to win reelection might not result in higher reelection
prospects. Second, it is possible that leaders are rewarded by voters for repressing threaten-
ing groups during conflict, but that the effect of this behavior is not large enough to change
leaders’ probability of winning reelection, a relatively noisy outcome measure. Again, future
research should evaluate how other indicators of leaders’ popularity, including vote share
or public opinion polling, vary as a result of pre-election repression targeted at threatening
groups.
2.5.1 Additional Analysis
In this section, I undertake several analytical strategic to increase confidence in the
strongest results from the empirical analysis: the findings in support of Hypothesis 1 from
Models 3-5 of the main results table. First, I re-run the analysis with additional control
variables. I first control for two variables that provide added insight into the economic state
of a country. It is possible that the leader’s pre-election repressive strategies will vary along
with their confidence in their job performance and the success of the economy. To account
for this possibilities, I add control variables for unemployment and inflation. Unemployment
is the percentage of the total labor force that is unemployed but searching for work. Inflation
is the percent change in the consumer price index, which is the annual change in the cost to
the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. Data for these economic
indicators comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2019).
I also control for the average years of education among citizens 15 years and older,
aggregated by V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2020). If the population is more educated, they may
be less accepting of human rights violations or less persuaded by the leader’s justifications
for repression. Finally, I add a control variable for freedom of expression, an index which
includes the availability of alternative sources of information. This variable measures expert
responses to the following question from V-Dem: “to what extent does government respect
press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at
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home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?”
(Coppedge et al., 2020). I include this variable given that Eck and Fariss (2018) demonstrate
that information about variation varies heavily across countries and that (Ashworth, 2012)
has shown that leaders are more likely to be responsive to voter preferences when voters
have access to more precise information about leaders’ performances (184). All of these
variables are lagged one year. For the most part, the results in Table A.5 and Figure A.6
reveal substantively similar results with these additional control variables.
In the next set of analyses, I limit the sample to pre-election periods that precede elections
categorized as free and fair by V-Dem. One benefit of the first set of hypothesis tests is that
the time to the election is for the most part exogenous: in democratic countries, elections
are typically planned in advance and recur on a set schedule. For this reason, leaders do not
typically manipulate the time until the election based on their preferences for repression,
increasing confidence that the analysis reveals the true relationship between election timing
and pre-election repression. However, it is also the case that leaders could manipulate the
quality of the election, even in a democracy, to reduce the likelihood that they would be
punished or rewarded for their repressive behavior. To account for this possibility, I re-run
the analysis with only elections that were considered to be free and fair in V-Dem’s ordinal
measure of election quality. The results, in Table A.6 and Figure A.7, are robust to the
reduction of the sample to including only these elections.
The final analytical strategy I present in this section is to analyze whether the relationship
between election timing and repression varies based on a leader’s ideological values. There
is some evidence that liberal leaders are more likely to be punished for utilizing repression,
or that liberal leaders would have a lower baseline propensity to repression (Cordell, 2021).
In contrast, ideologically conservative leaders may reap increased electoral benefits as a
result of repressive strategies from voters who prefer a hard-line stance against threatening
groups (Aksoy, 2018). To evaluate whether the result are driven by incumbents from a
particular political ideology, I re-run the analysis in two different sub-samples, one for right-
wing leaders and one for left-wing leaders. I use the classification from the Database of
Political Institutions (DPI) (Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini, 2018) which codes incumbent
parties as left, right, or center based on their economic policies. Right-wing parties are
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conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing, while left-wing parties are communist,
socialist, social democratic or left-wing. Respect for human rights may not perfectly correlate
with economic policy preferences, but these values do tend to align within parties.
The first set of results, in the sample of countries with a right-wing incumbent, can be
found in Table A.7 and Figure A.8. Here the results are almost the same as the results in
the full sample: the interaction terms are negative and highly statistically significant for
conflict and insurgency, though the interaction term for domestic terrorist is insignificant.
The predicted probability plots reveal similar trends compared to the main analysis, though
the confidence intervals are larger at lower levels of repression, likely due to the smaller
sample size. The results in the sub-sample of countries with left-wing incumbents can be
found in Table A.8 and Figure A.9. Here the results are more mixed. The constituent terms
are not significant in the tabular results, but the predicted probabilities plots do reveal
similar trends to the main analysis: a slight negative effect of time to election on repression
during peacetime, and a higher level of predicted repression during conflict, without a clear
relationship between time to election and repression. Overall, the results suggest that right-
wing leaders may align their behavior more closely with the theoretical framework provided
in this paper, but that left-wing leaders do not behave too differently in their pre-election
patterns of repression.
Another possible interpretation of the results for the first hypothesis relates to bias in
media reporting. It is possible that the media is more likely to cover repressive events as
elections approach, and this increased amount of coverage could lead to an increase in reports
of repression by ICEWS. In this case, the observed results would stem from an increase in
reporting of repressive events rather than an increase in the occurrence of repressive events.
If this interpretation is correct, one would expect to see an increase in reports of all repressive
events, regardless of the target type, around elections. In contrast, my theory anticipates
that only repression of threatening groups should increase around elections: voters have no
reason to reward repression of non-threatening groups. To evaluate these dynamics, I re-
analyze my hypotheses using the alternative dependent variable of the count of repressive
events against non-threatening groups in each month. These results are shown in Table A.9.
What they reveal is that there is no statistically significant relationship between time to
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election and repression of non-threatening groups during periods of conflict, adding support
to the theoretical underpinnings of the findings in the main analysis. In some models, there
is a small negative effect of election timing on repression of non-threatening groups during
peacetime, indicating that reports of repression of non-threatening groups increase as elec-
tions approach in non-conflict periods. These results contrast with the main findings, which
show that, in peacetime, reports of repression of threatening groups decrease as elections
approach. If anything, the potential media bias during peacetime means that the results for
this sub-sample of countries are understated in the main analysis.
Another possible interpretation of the results is that domestic opposition groups are more
likely to utilize violence as elections approach (Harish and Little, 2017). Then, an observed
increase in repression as elections approach could be a result of leaders’ reaction to the
presence of insurgency during this time periods, rather than an increase of repression due to
electoral concerns, as I theorize in the paper. To analyze this possibility, I conduct analysis
with separate outcome variables for each of the types of conflict that I utilize as interaction
terms in the main analysis: civil conflict, violent insurgency, and domestic terrorist attacks
with the standard battery of lagged controls, which are also predictors of conflict onset.
These results are shown in Appendix Table A.10. They show that there is not a statistically
significant effect of election timing on any of the types of conflict used in the main analysis.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper considers how elections shape leaders’ propensity to utilize repression and
their performance at the ballot box. Theoretically, I propose that leaders are increasingly
likely to target repression against threatening groups in the run-up to elections. Particularly
during periods of elevated societal threat, leaders have an incentive to demonstrate their
capacity to provide security to voters. The analysis of the relationship between election
timing and patterns of repression, which uses a novel measure of targeted repression from
the ICEWS dataset, supports this theory. While elections deter targeted repression during
periods of peace, leaders are increasingly likely to repress threatening groups as elections
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approach during civil conflict, in the presence of a violent insurgency, or in the aftermath
of a domestic terrorist attack. I also expected that leaders’ performance in elections would
vary with their use of pre-election repression and the status of ongoing conflict. For the most
part, however, the results did not substantiate this hypothesis. Targeted repression seemed
to have little effect on leaders’ propensity to win reelection, regardless of the presence of
ongoing threats.
The theory and empirical results lend important insight into the relationship between
democratic institutions and repression. While previous studies find a positive correlation
between democracy and human rights, this paper focuses on the effectiveness and limita-
tions of one particular democratic institution: elections. I explain why elections are likely
to provide ineffective constraints against some targeted repression: leaders have strategic
incentives to repress threatening groups to demonstrate their capacity to provide security
during conflict. The results support this idea. While elections deter targeted repression
during peacetime, they increase repression of threatening groups during conflict. In contrast
to the micro-foundations of the domestic democratic peace, the second main finding is that
even leaders who utilize relatively high levels of targeted repression do not seem to suffer
electoral consequences. Overall, this paper supports the idea that elections enact relatively
weak constraints against targeted repression, given that electorates evaluate repression based
(in part) on the security that it can provide them against threatening groups. Instead, paral-
lel institutions, such as strong legislatures and independent judiciaries, are likely to provide
the primary bulwarks against targeted repression in democracies.
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3.0 Paper 2: Why Voters (Sometimes) Punish Repression
Each year, democratic leaders use a variety of repressive tactics against those within their
borders: they arbitrarily arrest dissidents, employ violence against protesters, torture, kill,
and limit basic freedoms of speech, press, and movement.1 Though such actions are certainly
more prevalent in autocracies, they are not uncommon in democracies (Haschke, 2018). This
behavior can be puzzling in light of the robust literature linking democratic institutions to
relatively low levels of repression (Davenport, 2007a), defined as “coercive actions political
authorities take to inhibit the will or capacity of people within their jurisdiction to influence
political outcomes” (Ritter, 2014, 145). In spite of the range of institutional constraints
against repression in democracies – from independent judiciaries, legislative bodies, and the
electorate – leaders often believe that the benefits of repression outweigh its potential costs.
One way to understand these patterns is to evaluate when and why democratic institu-
tions break down in keeping leaders from repressing. Under what conditions are the costs
imposed by democratic institutions too low to deter leaders from utilizing repressive tac-
tics? To shed light on this question, this paper evaluates the strengths and weakness of
the foundational democratic institution – elections – for keeping leaders from repression.
A common assumption in the literature on the domestic democratic peace is that voters
prefer their leaders refrain from repression and are willing to punish repression in future
elections (Cingranelli and Filippov, 2010; Gurr, 1986; Richards, 1999; Richards and Gelleny,
2007). The major implication of this assumption is that elections can keep candidates from
repressing for fear of losing office. However, there is little research at the individual level to
anticipate whether and when voters actually behave in this way. For elections to impose a
cost on repression, and thus counteract leaders’ incentives to repress, individuals must both
be averse to repression and be willing to punish candidates who utilize repressive tactics.
1For some examples of these patterns see Aytaç, Schiumerini and Stokes (2017); Easterly, Gatti and
Kurlat (2006); Haschke (2018); International Network of Civil Liberties Organizations (2013); Rejali (2007)
and Varieties of Democracy Institute (2021). The experimental design in this paper was approved by the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh’s Institutional Review Board (Study 20070262) and pre-registered with the Open Sci-
ence Foundation (https://osf.io/kvsyt/?view_only=2eed643d73354b30926616ceb9d8360e) before data
collection. I acknowledge financial support for this project from the School of Arts and Sciences at the
University of Pittsburgh, the Richard Cottam Prize, and the Hayek Fund.
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Without knowing when and how these conditions take effect, however, researchers are left
with limited insight about the effectiveness of elections for curtailing repression.
This paper introduces a theoretical framework to understand when individual attitudes
toward repression influence vote choice. It proposes that voters vary in their propensity to
consider repression based on the target of repression and their perceptions about the threat
that target poses to domestic security. I argue that voters are primarily self-interested when
it comes to considering repression at the ballot box. As a result, they should punish repres-
sion perpetrated against groups to which they belong and reward repression that generates
security benefits against groups they perceive to be threatening. Alternatively, if repres-
sion is targeted against an out-group that poses no threat, voters will privilege other issues
in their vote choice. The implication of these individual-level tendencies is that candidates
should experience electoral losses among groups that have been targeted by repression, while
they should experience electoral gains among groups who perceive the targets of repression
to be threatening.2
To evaluate this theory, I conduct a conjoint experiment that isolates the causal effect of
repression on candidates’ vote share and generates insight into the importance of repression
vis-a-vis other salient issues. Using the United States as a test case, I find in a representative
sample of registered voters that repression does at times lower candidates’ expected vote
share. However, only certain groups punish repression. In particular, only those who identify
as an in-group with Black Lives Matter (BLM) – a frequent target of repression in the
United States – incorporate repression into their vote choice. Among this group, candidates
can expect their vote share to decrease by 5.2% when they support repression of BLM
compared to when they support everyone’s right to protest. Substantially, this treatment
effect mirrors the influence of candidates’ partisan identification, their stance on gun rights,
and their position on COVID-19 restrictions. Among other groups, however, repression
consistently has a null effect on candidates’ vote share.3 While the results do not suggest
2There is individual-level research about the conditions under which individuals will oppose various forms
of human rights abuses n the abstract (Conrad et al., 2018; Davis and Silver, 2004; Edwards and Arnon,
Forthcoming; Gibson and Gouws, 2003; Kearns and Young, 2020; Piazza, 2015). However, this paper is one
of the first to explain how these attitudes translate into voting behavior (see Bryant and Esarey (2019) for
an exception).
3For the most part, power analysis rules out the possibility that these results are the result of a small
sample size. See the discussion in the analysis and Section B.5 in the Appendix.
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that any group will reward repression, they do show consistent indifference to repression
among all demographics except BLM supporters.
These findings yield important insight into the strength of elections for curbing repres-
sion. In the simulated elections of this experiment, candidates can expect electoral losses
for repression only among a group that has been the frequent victim of past violence. Prob-
lematically, however, candidates are not punished by other demographics for supporting
repression. The result is that candidates can repress with impunity if they are not account-
able to the groups that do punish repression. Extrapolating beyond the U.S. case, these
results indicate that, absent other institutional constraints, elected leaders have little reason
to avoid targeting groups that do not belong to their winning coalition. Such dynamics might
help to explain why leaders in electoral democracies – like India, Brazil, Turkey, or Mexico –
often repress marginalized groups with seeming impunity at the ballot box. This paper also
extends existing knowledge on the domestic democratic peace, by bolstering past studies
which suggest that the strongest institutional constraints are not elections but rather hor-
izontal institutions like an independent judiciary that can prosecute repressive actions and
legislatures that can balance out the power of the executive to implement repressive policies
(Conrad and Moore, 2010; Conrad, Hill Jr and Moore, 2018; Conrad et al., 2018; Davenport,
2007b). This paper’s results indicate that strengthening these parallel institutions is crucial
for promoting rights protections for all groups.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the literature on the security-
civil liberties trade-off, which generates insight into the drivers of individual support (and
opposition to) rights protections in the abstract. The second section explains how these
individual-level attitudes influence voting behavior and derives testable hypotheses about
the probability that repression will shape candidates’ expected vote share. The third section
introduces the conjoint experiment, sample characteristics, and randomization scheme. The
fourth section tests the hypotheses and explores alternative explanations for the relationship
between repression and vote share. The last section concludes.
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3.1 The Security-Civil Liberties Trade-off
The protection of individual rights and maintenance of collective security often represent
conflicting goals (Davis, 2007). It is common for governments of all regime types to restrict
rights and liberties for the sake of promoting the security of the country as a whole. Such
restrictions vary in intensity. At one end of the spectrum, governments routinely implement
boundaries on rights to free speech. It is well understood that one cannot yell “fire” in a
crowded theater and many forms of hate speech are not tolerated in democracies. During
the Covid-19 pandemic, governments required the use of masks in public spaces to promote
collective health, one kind of security. Governments also invoke more extreme violations
of physical integrity rights to protect against perceived or actual threats. The interment of
Japanese Americans during World War II provides one such example, as the U.S. government
enacted harsh repression to the threat of a fifth column of Japanese support following the at-
tacks on Pearl Harbor (Reeves, 2015). In a similar vein, violent action to disperse protesters
and torture of individuals suspected of facilitating terrorist attacks represent rights restric-
tions to ensure order and stability for the community as a whole. Overall, the trade-off
between collective security and individual freedoms is one of the major dilemmas of modern
governance (Waldron, 2003).
Individuals vary in their attitudes about the use of various forms of repression to promote
increased collective security. In general, those with more liberal political ideologies are
less likely to support civil liberties restrictions, as are those who have low levels of trust
in the government (Davis and Silver, 2004; Jenkins-Smith and Herron, 2009; Mondak and
Hurwitz, 2012) and those who have been victimized by crime (Bateson, 2012). Similarly,
demographic features like education, gender, religiosity, age, and race influence the extent
to which individuals value civil liberties or security when asked to trade one value for the
other (Davis, 2007; Malka and Soto, 2011; Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, 1982; Wemlinger,
2013). Personality features like right-wing authoritarianism also influence preferences for the
security-civil liberties trade-off (Crowson and DeBacker, 2008).
Beyond these individual-level factors, however, the context in which governments repress
also influences the extent to which individuals will support rights violations in the abstract.
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As Davis (2007) explains, few see civil liberties or security as absolute goals. Rather, “support
for civil liberties should be seen as situational, with people picking and choosing which values
they are willing to concede and the type of security it might provide” (220). A variety of
contextual factors influence attitudes toward the security-civil liberties trade-off, including
the effectiveness of rights restrictions in promoting security (Garcia and Geva, 2016; Kearns
and Young, 2020), the kinds of rights restrictions that are implemented (Richards, Morrill
and Anderson, 2012), and the levels of sociotropic threat a country is experiencing when
governments implement repressive policies (Davis and Silver, 2004; Davis, 2007; Dietrich
and Crabtree, 2019). The latter factor is especially salient: threat perception helps explain
why individuals are willing to support repressive leaders in countries plagued by civil conflict
and terrorist attacks.
One important contextual factor is attitudes toward the group that has been targeted by
rights restrictions. Individuals typically have supportive attitudes toward rights restrictions
of groups they dislike or perceive to be threatening compared to the rights of groups they
like, respect, or belong to. In the context of the security-civil liberties trade-off, one can
understand individuals’ desire to restrict the rights of out-groups as relating to their interest
in increasing their own security and the security of their in-group members, broadly speaking.
Individuals are willing to trade away the rights of groups that could threaten their physical
safety, but also the dominance of their group’s ideals and values. For instance, respondents in
Russia, South Africa and the United States supported rights restrictions of disliked groups,
including homosexuals, atheists, communists and political extremists (Gibson, 1998, 2008;
Gibson and Gouws, 2003; Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, 1982). Each of these groups can
be perceived as threatening in one way or another, at times to domestic security, but also to
traditional understanding of gender roles and some religious values.
Individuals are also willing to restrict the rights of groups who do not share their ethnic
or racial identity, both because of dislike and increased threat perception. For instance,
respondents in the United States are more likely to support arbitrary detention (Piazza,
2015) and the use of enhanced interrogation techniques against people with Arabic-sounding
names (Conrad et al., 2018) or foreign nationalities (Kearns and Young, 2020), in part
because they are more likely to see such individuals as threatening than in-group members
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(Huddy et al., 2005). Recent survey experiments in Israel and the United States also find
that respondents were more likely to support repression of those who did not belong to their
identity group (Edwards and Arnon, Forthcoming). In India, respondents are less likely
to support the civil liberties of out-groups when primed to consider the threat of electoral
violence (Deglow and Fjelde, 2020). Similarly, in post-war Sri Lanka, Tamils and Sinhalese
Sri Lankans were less likely to grant an out-group member the right to protest compared to
a member of their own ethnic group (Kijewski and Rapp, 2019).
As a whole, past research provides important insight into the determinants of individual
preferences about repression. However, there exists little evidence for the link between
attitudes about repression and political behavior in the form of vote choice. The next
section provides a theoretical framework to understand how voters evaluate repression at
the ballot box.
3.2 Repressive Leaders at the Ballot Box
How do attitudes about repression affect voters’ evaluations of political candidates?4 Past
research provides only suggestive evidence to answer this question. Theoretical work on the
domestic democratic peace, for instance, often assumes that voters are willing to punish
repression in elections (Beer and Mitchell, 2004; Cingranelli and Filippov, 2010; Davies,
2016; Gurr, 1986; Richards, 1999; Richards and Gelleny, 2007). Yet this assumption has
not been empirically tested, and it fails to consider literature on the security-civil liberties
trade-off, which complicates our understanding of attitudes toward repression. In the latter
body of research, individuals often tacitly support repression against threatening groups.
Research examining abstract attitudes about repression does at times extrapolate its findings
to hypothesize about the effect that attitudes may have on voting behavior. However, it has
not explicitly considered – theoretically or empirically – how attitudes shape vote choice.
Such an examination is critical given that individuals cannot consider all of their prefer-
4This framework diverges from literature on authoritarian governance, in which autocrats often use re-
pression to intimidate voters and fix election results (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). It applies only to
democratic elections, where election results are not pre-determined.
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ences when they vote, meaning that abstract attitudes rarely translate directly into voting
behavior (Achen and Bartels, 2016; Anderson, 2007; Healy and Malhotra, 2013; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974). Instead, voters must decide how to weigh their support for (or opposition
to) rights protections in comparison to other salient issues. This process is consequential for
our understanding of the effectiveness of elections for constraining repression. If voters react
favorably to certain kinds of repression at the ballot box, then leaders have an incentive
to undertake repressive action in the run-up to the election. On the other hand, if voters
are willing to punish leaders for some kinds of repression, then elections will serve to keep
leaders from engaging in rights violations. Ultimately, existing literature lacks a coherent
account for the influence of repression not just on attitudes, but on voting behavior and,
consequentially, leaders’ electoral performance.
The next sections remedy these gaps by introducing a cohesive account of the influence
of repression on individuals’ voting decisions. I propose that individuals’ evaluations of
repression at the ballot box vary based on the target of repression and their perceptions
about the threat posed by that target. Two mechanisms underscore this argument. First,
voters typically evaluate repression based on its effects on their own and their group’s well-
being. Second, voters are more likely to support repressive candidates when they believe that
repression increases security. As a result, they will reward repression against threatening
groups.
3.2.1 Group-Based Interests
Voters typically evaluate repression based on its effect on their own well-being and the
well-being of other in-group members. Given that it is cognitively difficult to assess a leader’s
overall performance, individuals often vote according to the impact that a leader’s perfor-
mance has on their own welfare (Fiorina, 1981; Key Jr., 1966). As Kinder and Kiewiet (1981)
explain with regard to economic voting: “personal experiences [...] are compelling in ways
that vicarious experiences cannot be” (130).5 Self- and group-focused considerations should
5Admittedly, the empirical support for pocketbook voting is mixed (Healy, Persson and Snowberg, 2017;
Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; Rogers and Tyszler, 2018). In large part this is because it is difficult to distinguish
egocentric and sociotropic motivations for vote choice given that individual and aggregate prosperity are
intimately tied. Yet repression does not have this feature: repressive actions are typically targeted at
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also play a role in how individuals evaluate government repression. All forms of repression
restrict the rights and liberties of a subset of each country’s population. While some restric-
tions affect almost everyone – like surveillance measures that infringe on everyone’s right to
privacy – most repressive actions in democracies are targeted against members of specific
groups. For instance, leaders typically torture members of groups suspected of engaging in
terrorist activity. Similarly, repression of protesters affects those who choose to protest, but
not those who stay home. A variety of other types of repressive actions, including regula-
tions of land-use, temporary detention, and restrictions on patterns of dress, target minority
populations, like indigenous groups in Latin America, Kurdish communities in Turkey, and
Muslim women in France.
The possibility of discriminate repression means that repression affects each voter differ-
ently. While the cost of repression to the immediate victims is often quite high, for many
groups it is negligible. For instance, most voters are unlikely to be tortured during a given
leader’s tenure and are also unlikely to have a personal relationship with someone who has
been tortured. Similarly, those who have never protested and never planned to attend a
protest are unlikely to experience any costs for government violence against protesters. An-
derson (2007) argues that individuals rely on heuristics not only of their personal well-being
but of the well-being of similarly situated individuals in order to form evaluations of the
economy. More recent work also finds that voters act according to self-interest as well as
concern for other in-group members (Haselswerdt, 2020).
When casting their ballots, voters first evaluate repression based on whether it has impact
on their own well-being and the well-being of other in-group members. The immediate
victims of repression, as well as their friends and family, are unlikely to vote for leaders who
support repression of their group. In one sense, this prediction is trivial: leaders are unlikely
to repress their own supporters, so those targeted were not likely to support repressive leaders
in the first place. Yet this paper’s experimental design evaluates more nuance around this
expectation. By holding constant all other policy positions and demographic features, the
conjoint experiment analyzes whether voters would support a candidate who repressed their
own group even if all the candidate’s other attributes were favorable. Given that repression
particular groups, meaning that the costs of repression are carried only by specific populations.
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presents a threat to the safety and well-being of an individual and his or her group, it should
play a strong role in vote choice for victims, similar to other policies that have a direct effect
on the voter’s well-being.
Compared to those who identify as in-group members with the targets of repression,
voters who have not been targeted, do not know those who have been targeted, or do not
fear future targeting are generally less likely to consider repression in their vote choice.
Rather, these voters will tend to cast their ballots based on policies that have a direct effect
on their own lives and the lives of those close to them.6 Kearns and Young (2020) quote one
government official in the United States who provides a revealing reflection on this dynamic
with regard to enhanced interrogation techniques: “people’s support for harsh punishment
would change if someone like them — their in-group member — is impacted by it” (121).7
To summarize the above expectations: voters are unlikely to elect candidates who support
repression of their in-group members, but they will typically be indifferent toward repression
of out-groups. While this discussion accounts for the uneven distribution of the costs of
repression, however, it has not considered the actual or perceived benefits that repression
may provide. The next section evaluates a second mechanism linking repression to vote
choice: voters’ perceptions about the security benefits of repression.
3.2.2 Threat Perception
Individuals are often willing to trade rights protections for security. This trade-off is
driven by the fact that, while repression always imposes costs on its immediate victims, it
can also provide real or perceived security benefits to the collective community. Consider
torture, for instance. Most voters experience no personal costs when the government tor-
tures, but many believe that torture provides collective benefits in the form of intelligence
against terrorist attacks. Similarly, individuals who have not been repressed while protest-
6A counterargument is that voters who hold liberal values may punish repression for ideological reasons,
even if repression does not affect their personal well-being. Cordell (Forthcoming), for instance, finds that
liberal parties are sanctioned for engaging in covert torture in future elections. I discuss the potential for
heterogeneous effects based on political ideology in the results section and in Appendix Section B.8.
7Conrad et al. (2018) also make this assumption: “We do not assume that the electorate inherently values
rights protection for the population at large. Instead, we make the relatively innocuous assumption that
each voter prefer that the state not violate his/her own rights” (7).
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ing experience no cost to repression of other protesters. But, these same individuals may
experience benefits to repression that is targeted against protesters who threaten their safety
and/or ideals. In all of these cases, individuals can choose to trade the rights of out-groups
for the security of their own group (Cole, 2003; Waldron, 2003).
The factor that determines whether or not voters experience benefits to repression is the
perception they have about the threat posed by the target of repression. If voters perceive
the target of repression to be non-threatening, then repression provides no cost but also no
benefits. In contrast, if a voter believes the target to be threatening, then repression can
provide security benefits by defusing an ongoing threat. How do these dynamics link to
voting behavior? All else equal, voters are unlikely to incorporate out-group repression into
their vote choice, instead focusing on issues more salient to their own well-being and the
well-being of their group members. Yet there is an exception to this tendency when voters
perceive a threat from the target of repression. In such cases, voters should favor leaders who
support repression: repression increases security against an ongoing threat while a failure
to act leaves voters vulnerable. In other words, among voters who perceive a threat from
a particular group, candidates who support repression should collect a higher vote share
compared to candidates who do not.
It is important to note that there are many reasons why voters may perceive a group
targeted by repression to be threatening. I define threatening in a broad sense, given that
evaluations of threat vary across identity cleavages across countries and political contexts
(Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Brewer, 1999). Voters may believe specific groups
to be threatening for their use of violence, ideals and values that threaten their own way of
life, or their perceptions about the features of a particular ethnic group. The experiment
measures threat perception directly by asking respondents to rank the threat they perceive
from a variety of groups.
Notably, evaluations of threat need not be based in reality. Media portrayals tend to
amplify negative stereotypes, particularly regarding the level of threat that out-groups pose
to society. Kearns and Young (2020) note that media accounts often capitalize on stereotypes
that highlight racial and cultural differences in coverage of terrorism and mass violence
(31). In the United States, for instance, terrorist attacks receive 357% more coverage when
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the perpetrator is Muslim and this coverage is more likely to mention terrorism (Kearns,
Betus and Lemieux, 2019). Another relevant case is repression of members of the Mapuche
community in Chile. Here, political elites and the media capitalized on acts of violence
perpetrated by some Mapuche members to paint the community as a whole as violent and
threatening. These narratives fueled public perception that the Mapuche posed a threat to
Chilean society, and justified the passage of an anti-terrorism law restricting the rights of
Mapuche citizens and other forms of government repression (Amnesty International, 2018).
Both real and perceived threats can influence political behavior. As Davis (2007) explains,
“that there might be a discrepancy between an actual and perceived threat does not make
the fear of it any less relevant” (10).
3.2.3 Hypotheses
This discussion leads to testable hypotheses about the link between different forms of
repression and individual evaluations of repression at the ballot box. Two individual-level
mechanisms guide the argument: voters will consider the group targeted by repression and
the threat posed by that group when incorporating repression into their vote choice. Hold-
ing all other candidate characteristics equal, voters are less likely to support candidates
who favor in-group repression, equally likely to support candidates who favor repression of
non-threatening out-groups, and more likely to support candidates who favor repression of
threatening out-groups.
One outcome of interest that results from these individual-level decisions is candidates’
performance in elections. Theoretically, I am interested both in how individuals make deci-
sions during elections as well as how these decisions aggregate to shape the likelihood that a
leader will win votes at the ballot box. A conjoint experiment allows for empirical evaluation
of both of these outcomes. Using data on individual-level preferences, the conjoint design
aggregates a series of candidate selections by individual respondents into a generalizable link
between policies and vote share. Specifically, the conjoint design assesses changes in the
probability that an individual will choose a candidate as well as the expected change in each
candidates’ vote share as a result of the attribute of interest (Bansak et al., 2020), averaging
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over all other candidate attributes. In other words, the conjoint design creates a direct em-
pirical link between individual-level choices and the candidate-level outcome of expected vote
share. In light of these design nuances, the following hypotheses make predictions about how
repressive policy positions influence candidates’ vote share. This candidate-level outcome
stems directly from the individual-level theory outlined above.
Hypothesis 1: Candidates who support repression of voters’ in-group members will have
a lower vote share compared to candidates who do not support repression.
Hypothesis 2: Candidates who support repression of non-threatening out-groups will have
no difference in vote share compared to candidates who do not support repression.
Hypothesis 3: Candidates who support repression of threatening out-groups will have a
higher vote share compared to candidates who do not support repression.
3.3 Experimental Design
I use a choice-based conjoint experiment to evaluate my hypotheses. Conjoint experi-
ments have grown in popularity in political science for the insight they provide into multidi-
mensional preferences (Bansak et al., 2019b). A conjoint is especially useful in this case given
that it can assess the magnitude of the effect of repression on vote choice relative to other
candidate attributes. Further, given that social desirability bias likely obscures respondents’
true preferences for repressive candidates, a conjoint design has the advantage of decreasing
the likelihood the respondents will perceive the sensitive nature of survey questions (Hori-
uchi, Markovich and Yamamoto, 2018).
I conduct my experiment in the United States in March-April 2021 using Lucid, a survey
firm based in the United States.8 I survey a representative sample of 750 U.S. registered
voters to approximate the effect that candidate positions would have on actual elections.9
8Recent studies using Lucid have been published in the American Political Science Review (Graham and
Svolik, 2020; Tomz and Weeks, 2020; Williamson et al., 2020), American Journal of Political Science (Costa,
2020), and Journal of Politics (Lajevardi, 2020; Levy, 2020).
9The sample is representative on party identification, race, gender, income, and region. The pre-analysis
plan specified a sample of 500. However, power analysis with this sample indicated that it was too small for
some models to detect significant effects, so I increased the sample size for the final analysis.
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The sample is restricted to individuals who voted in the 2020 elections to maximize external
validity: it is the decision-making of voters that is likely to drive candidate behavior.
The United States represents a compelling case to evaluate the theory. Though it has
been classified as a consolidated democracy, the United States also has a long history of
repression against minority ethnic and ideological groups (Davenport, 2015, 2010; Gibson,
1988, 1989; Goldstein, 1978; Komisarchik, Sen and Velez, 2021). As such, this case ex-
emplifies an important tension: democratic institutions may have limited effectiveness in
constraining repression against groups the electorate perceives to be threatening. Concerns
about the strength of U.S. democracy have also intensified in recent years (Hyde, 2020; Ingra-
ham, 2020; Kaufman and Haggard, 2019; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018) as individuals (Graham
and Svolik, 2020) and party leaders (Lührmann et al., 2020) have become less committed
to democratic principles. Repression has become increasingly relevant to public discourse,
and the experiment evaluates how voters reacted to these tendencies in the 2020 election
cycle. The theory also suggests that voters must perceive some groups to be threatening for
politicians to reap electoral rewards for repression. Because threat perception is often linked
to ethnic identity, the diversity and salience of ethnic cleavages in U.S. politics and society
present an interesting test case. Finally, much recent experimental research on repression
has been conducted in the United States (Bryant and Esarey, 2019; Conrad et al., 2018;
Dietrich and Crabtree, 2019; Edwards and Arnon, Forthcoming; Kearns and Young, 2020;
Piazza, 2015). This study adds important nuance to these previous findings.10
3.3.1 Conjoint Set-Up
Following a standard conjoint design to measure vote choice, respondents must choose
between two candidates for political office, in this case a gubernatorial race. This level of
office is appropriate for two reasons. First, while authority over security policy is typically
10Bryant and Esarey’s (2019) study is the most similar to this experiment, though there are several
distinctions. First, Bryant and Esarey (2019) use a factorial design to randomize candidates’ support for
repression, while I use a conjoint design to randomize all candidate features. Further, while respondents
in Bryant and Esarey’s (2019) study always choose between a Republican and a Democrat, respondents in
this experiment also evaluate pairs of candidates with the same party identification, so they need not defect
from their own party to punish or reward repression. This conjoint design also evaluate a unique form of
repression (restrictions on the right to protest) and the heterogeneous effects of group identification and
threat perception.
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divided between legislatures and executives, the executive holds control over the agencies that
implement security policy and must ascertain the appropriate balance between civil liberties
and security (Posner and Vermeule, 2007). Most executives also have a variety of emergency
powers (Gross and Aoláin, 2006) that provide them with the means and justification to
restrict individual rights to protect citizens against real or manufactured threats. Given these
dynamics, voters are most likely to hold executives accountable for repression as compared to
other political leaders. Further, a gubernatorial race is preferential to a presidential contest,
given the high name recognition and polarization associated with presidential elections.
After first soliciting responses for a standard battery of demographic questions, the sur-
vey reveals a screen with the profiles of two candidates as displayed in Table 3.1.11 The
instructions ask respondents to “consider a choice between candidates for the governor of
your state.” Further, they explain to respondents that “some of these candidates will seem
similar to actual candidates and others may seem unusual. That’s okay. Just make the
best choice about which candidate you would prefer.” I include these caveats given that a
conjoint task inevitably includes unrealistic candidate profiles. In order to hold constant un-
observable features about the candidates’ personalities, the instructions also tell respondents
to “presume that both candidates are equally qualified to hold office in terms of character,
temperament, and other personal and moral qualities.”’ Every respondent will evaluate ten
pairs of candidates, each displayed on a new screen.12 Attribute ordering is randomly varies
across respondents to avoid any ordering effects, but it is consistent across tasks for each
respondent to avoid confusion (Bansak et al., 2019b).
There are thirteen candidate attributes in each conjoint task, well below the threshold
that would result in satisficing (Bansak et al., 2019a). There are two kinds of candidate
attributes: demographic features and policy positions. These include demographic features
that have been shown to influence individual vote choice, including Ideology, Race, Gender,
and Current Job. The design also includes candidates’ positions on several policies salient to
the 2020 election. Preceding the experiment, I reviewed the platforms of all 2020 gubernato-
11I collect demographic information about respondents’ Gender, Income, Education, Age, Race/Ethnicity,
Community (Urban/Rural), State, Party Identification, and Political Ideology. See Appendix Section B.2
for coding rules and Section B.9 for the full survey instrument.
12Bansak et al. (2018) find that respondents can complete up to 30 tasks before the response quality of
the conjoint design degrades.
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Figure 3.1: Sample Choice Task
In the next section, you will consider a choice between candidates for the
governor of your state. Some of these candidates will seem similar to actual
candidates and others may seem unusual. That’s okay. Just make the best choice
about which candidate you would prefer. When making your choice, presume that
both candidates are equally qualified to hold office in terms of character,
temperament, and other personal and moral qualities.
















Current Job State Representative State Representative
Position on
Protests
Deny permits to Black
Lives Matter protesters




Abortion should be safe,
legal, and rare




Support a free market
health care system





No public funding for
private education





out of our communities















Support mask mandates and
limited reopening
On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates that you definitely WOULD NOT vote
for the candidate and 10 indicates that you definitely WOULD vote for the
candidate, how would you rate each of the candidates below?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Tools  Restart Survey  Go to Bookmark  Clear !Mobile view off
Task Instructions: “Consider a choice between candidates for the governor of your state. Some of these candidates will seem
similar to actual candidates and others may seem unusual. That’s okay. Just make the best choice about which candidate you
would prefer. When making your choice, presume that both candidates are equally qualified to hold office in terms of
character, temperament, and other personal and moral qualities.”
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rial candidates (N = 122).13 Table B.1 in the Appendix lists all the issues that were included
in at least five candidates’ platforms and the number of candidates who referenced each is-
sue. From the full sample of issues, the conjoint includes the policies that were included in
at least ten campaign platforms and which had some level of ideological divergence. These
are candidate positions on Education, the Economy, Healthcare, Guns, the Environment,
COVID-19, and Abortion.14 In addition to these frequently-mentioned issues, the conjoint
includes the candidates’ position on Immigration.15
For each attribute listed above, the conjoint tasks include the most common demographic
categories and policy positions. For the substantive issues, I randomize both a liberal and
conservative position, where appropriate. To maximize external validity, the text of each
attribute value draws from the actual campaign platforms of gubernatorial candidates. Table
3.1 lists each of the attributes ascribed to the candidates as well as the values that each of
these attributes can take.
3.3.2 Repression Treatments
The conjoint uses two repression treatments: (1) violence against protesters and (2) de-
nial of protest permits. To maximize external validity, these treatments reflect repression
that is both relevant to the 2020 U.S. gubernatorial elections and prevalent across democ-
racies. Most importantly, repression of protesters was the only form of repression that was
discussed by candidates in the 2020 U.S. gubernatorial race.16 In addition to mirroring ac-
tual candidate positions, the repression treatments represent opposite poles on the spectrum
13Gubernatorial races took place in Delaware, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Car-
olina, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia in 2020. I collect platform information
for all candidates with campaign websites. Appendix Section B.1 discusses in more detail.
14There was not ideological divergence for Jobs (all candidates promised more) and Corruption (all candi-
dates promised less). Positions on Taxes were also eliminated, as they had similar positions to the Economy.
15Although immigration was not a top issue in the 2020 gubernatorial race, this is likely because no states
that border Mexico had gubernatorial elections this year. I include this variable to avoid masking effects,
since a candidate’s stance on immigration may be correlated with their propensity to implement repressive
policies (Bansak et al., 2019a).
16For instance, Dave Bosco (R, Delaware) stated that “when a protest turns to violence or even into looting
and rioting then law enforcement needs to step up and regain control.” Tim Eyman (R, Washington) argued
that “people using violence to advance political ends should suffer the consequences.” Doug Bergum (R,
North Dakota) stated that he was proud to work with those who protested against the Dakota Access
Pipeline. Cairo D’Almeida (D, Washington) argued that the governor should pay greater respect to the civil
liberties of protesters.
54













Position on Education No public funding for private education
Increase parent choice about education
End standardized testing and Common Core
Position on the Economy Create a strong economy for all, not just those at the top
Reduce regulations and restrictions
Position on Healthcare Expand access to affordable healthcare
Support a free market healthcare system
Position on Guns Support commonsense gun safety measures
Everyone has the right to bear arms
Position on the Environment Drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions
Avoid increased regulations
Position on COVID-19 Support mask mandates and limited reopening
Oppose mask mandates and stay-at-home orders
Position on Abortion Proudly pro-life
Abortion should be safe, legal, and rare
Support universal access to abortions
Position on Immigration Create a path to legal residence for residents without a visa
Keep dangerous aliens out of our communities
Position on Protests Support everyone’s right to protest
Deny permits to Black Lives Matter protesters
Use tear gas and rubber bullets against Black Lives Matter protesters
Deny permits to white nationalist protesters
Use tear gas and rubber bullets against white nationalist protesters
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of repression types: violent/nonviolent and proactive/reactive (Davenport, 2007a). The hy-
potheses do not distinguish between the treatment effects for the different types of repression.
However, I expect that individuals are likely to have greater aversion to more egregious hu-
man rights violations, as indicated by some past studies (Heinrich and Kobayashi, 2020;
Putnam and Shapiro, 2017). I discuss the difference in treatment effects across nonviolent
and violent violations in the analysis section.
In addition to providing external validity, the treatment conditions build on previous
studies that examine respondents’ reaction to restrictions of the right to protest (Edwards
and Arnon, Forthcoming; Gibson, 1989, 2008). However, it is worth considering whether the
results would apply to other repression types. On the one hand, voters may be especially
likely to consider repression of protesters in their vote choice, given that this action violates a
first amendment right. Also, because many respondents will likely have protested in the past
or know someone who has, they may be less willing to ignore this rights violation in their
vote choice since it may affect their personal well-being. At the same time, past research
on political tolerance demonstrates that even liberal voters are often willing to restrict the
first amendment rights, including the right to assemble, of disliked and threatening groups
(Gibson and Gouws, 2003; Gibson, 2008). Further, repression of protesters represents a fairly
mild type of rights violation, especially compared to physical integrity rights violations like
extrajudicial killing and disappearances. From this perspective, voters may be less likely
to consider repression of protesters in their vote choice compared to other repression types.
Ultimately, more research will be necessary to understand how voters evaluate different kinds
of repression.
3.3.3 Group Identification and Threat Perception
The experiment identifies two groups as repression targets: Black Lives Matter and
white nationalists. Representing opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, these groups
could be perceived as threatening for a range of reasons, including real/perceived use of
violence, ideological values, and racial identification. Both groups protested around the 2020
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elections across state lines.17 The last section of Table 3.1 includes the text for the repression
attributes for each of these groups. The control condition is that the candidate will “Support
everyone’s right to protest.”
To measure respondents’ identification with these groups, the survey asks respondents
whether they or someone close to them (a close friend or family member) would consider
themselves a member of the group. The question references close relations, rather than
respondents themselves, to mitigate social desirability bias. Further, the theory anticipates
that respondents will punish candidates who support repression of groups to which their
friends and family belong. The survey measures threat perceptions by asking respondents to
rank the threat they perceive from each group on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being not threatening at
all and 10 being the most threatening. For each respondent, the variable Threatening takes a
value of “1” when the respondent codes the group as higher than 7 on the threat scale and “0”
otherwise.18 The survey does not specifically define the term threat for respondents: because
threat perception may cover a range of dimensions, it allows respondents to evaluate this term
for themselves and indicate their own perceptions about group threat.19 In the Appendix,
Figure B.4 shows the correlations between measures of in-group identification and threat
perception. Section B.4.3 discusses the demographic correlates with group identification
and threat perceptions, shown in Table B.9.
3.3.4 Outcome
Following each choice task, respondents must identify which candidate they would sup-
port if they had to choose only one of the profiles. The primary outcome measure, Candidate
Preferred takes a value of “1” if the respondent prefers one candidate and “0” otherwise.
17Beneficially, there are similar groups of focus in a recent study by Edwards and Arnon (Forthcoming),
who examine respondent reaction to repression of Black Lives Matter and white nationalists. By referencing
the same groups, this experiment answers a lingering question from Edwards and Arnon’s study: how does
respondent reaction to repression correlate with voting behavior?
18The meter for threat perceptions starts at 5, so respondents must move the meter two spaces toward a
more threatening position in order to be coded as perceiving the group to be threatening.
19It is possible that social desirability bias hindered respondents from answering honestly about their group
identification and threat perception. To alleviate some concern, descriptive data from the sample reveals
variation on both of these questions, as shown in Appendix Tables B.1, B.2, and B.3. Ultimately, this design
choice captures only those with strong group identification and especially high levels of perceived threat.
These are the individuals who should be most likely to consider repression in their vote choice.
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The forced choice task is advantageous in that it requires respondents to make trade-offs
between the different candidate attributes in the list, as in an actual election (Bansak et al.,
2019b). In the robustness checks, I assess results for an alternative outcome variable, which
asks respondents to rank their favorability toward each candidate on a scale of 1 to 10.
3.3.5 Treatment Assignment
The conjoint design is fully randomized. Since each respondent has an equal probability
of seeing each of the repression treatments (1
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) and these treatments are randomly assigned,
the effect of this variable is causally identified. While the causal identification of the effect of
repression is straightforward, I use a block randomization scheme to identify the causal effects
of group identification and threat perception. Measuring heterogeneous effects of these values
based on raw scores risks subjecting the results to the usual problems of omitted variable
bias (Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2018). Instead, I randomly assign the conjoint tasks
for three blocks of respondents: those who identify as an in-group member with the target
of repression (to test Hypothesis 1), those who perceive the target as a non-threatening
out-group (to test Hypothesis 2), and those who perceive the target as a threatening out-
group (to test Hypothesis 3). Because there are also two groups that are randomized in the
repression treatments (Black Lives Matter and white nationalists), there are a total of nine
blocks (32). The main results combine these categories for each group of interest. Since the
probability of assignment to each treatment condition is uniform across blocks, combining
the blocks does not bias estimates of the treatment effects (Gerber and Green, 2012, 76).20
Section B.3 discusses a range of balance checks to assess balance along in-group identi-
fication, threat perception, and a range of demographic features (listed in Appendix Section
B.2). Specifically, Table B.2 shows that in-group identification and threat perception were
not significant predictors of treatment status, indicating the effectiveness of the block ran-
domization. Tables B.3, B.4, and B.5 indicate which demographic features are imbalanced
20One difficulty with this block randomization scheme is that it requires asking respondents about their
threat perception before they complete the conjoint tasks. While this ordering avoids post-treatment bias,
it may also heighten respondents’ awareness of the threat posed by the groups of interest. To reduce the
effects of priming, I ask respondents about their threat perceptions of groups that will not be included in the
study (refugees, Islamic extremists, anti-mask advocates, animal rights activists, Communists, and illegal
immigrants). Since these questions influence all voters, they will not bias the results of the hypothesis tests.
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in the sub-samples. Tables B.6 and B.7 reveal that the results are robust when controlling
for all respondent demographic features and the imbalanced demographic features.
3.3.6 Estimation
The estimation of treatment effects in a conjoint design is straightforward given that each
attribute is randomized independently of all other attributes. Following the estimation strat-
egy developed by Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014), I use the Average Marginal
Component Effects (AMCEs) of each attribute to identify the effect of each attribute on
respondents’ preferences for a given candidate. The AMCE represents the degree to which
a given value of each attribute increases (or decreases) respondents’ favorability to a candi-
date with reference to the baseline category, after averaging over all possible combinations
of other candidate attributes (Bansak et al., 2019b; Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto,
2014; Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley, 2020). Given that attributes are randomly assigned, profiles
with one value of an attribute will have the same distribution of other qualities compared
to profiles with another value, on average. As such, the AMCE can be estimated using a
regression of the primary outcome variable, Candidate Preferred, on each attribute value,
while omitting a baseline condition for each attribute. The coefficients on each of the other
attribute values represent the change in expected vote share for candidate’s who adopt each
value compared to the baseline condition (Bansak et al., 2020). Note that because each re-
spondent completes ten conjoint tasks observations are not independent. Therefore, I cluster
standard errors by respondent. Because the hypotheses concern treatment effects in three
separate sub-groups, I estimate the conditional AMCE (Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley, 2020) in
separate samples based on respondents’ group identification and threat perception. Again,
the block randomization scheme ensures that these estimates are causally identified.
It is important to take care in interpreting the AMCE. The AMCE does not reveal the
effect of a particular policy on a candidates’ likelihood of winning and does not imply that
a majority of respondents prefer a candidate with one value of an attribute compared to an-
other (Abramson, Kocak and Magazinnik, 2019). Rather, the AMCE takes into account both
the direction and magnitude of respondent preferences and indicates the effect of changing
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the attribute value from the baseline to the value of interest on the candidate’s expected vote
share, averaging over the randomization distribution of the profiles (Bansak et al., 2020).
It is also important to note that the AMCE represents the causal effect of attribute values
with relation to the (arbitrarily selected) baseline category. As such, the AMCE must be
interpreted as a causal effect, not a descriptive representation of each respondent’s level of
support for a candidate contingent on that attribute (Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley, 2020).
To test each of my hypotheses, I regress the outcome variable (Candidate Preferred) on
the four repression treatments in a sample of all candidates.21 I use a logit link function given
that the outcome variable is dichotomous and plot the results for ease of interpretation.22
The omitted baseline category represents candidates who support the rights of everyone
to protest. As such, the coefficients on the repression treatments represent the expected
change in vote share when a particular candidate changes from a non-repressive position to
supporting a particular forms of repression. The model takes the following form:
Y = α + β1 Deny BLM Permits + β2 Violence Against BLM+
β3 Deny White Nationalists Permits + β4 Violence Against White Nationalists + e (1)
3.4 Results
To analyze the hypotheses, I run the above model in different samples based on respon-
dents’ group identification and threat perceptions. Table 3.2 shows the main results for each
of the different sub-samples, with the gray boxes highlighting the coefficients used to test each
of the hypotheses. To test the first hypothesis, I analyze the relationship between different
forms of repression and a candidate’s vote share for those who identify as in-group mem-
bers with Black Lives Matter (Model 1) and white nationalists (Model 2). Here I expected
that in-group members would be less likely to support a candidate who repressed in-group
21Since I have 750 respondents and each respondent evaluates 10 total pairs of candidates, my total sample
for the conjoint analysis is 7,500. This full sample is divided into sub-samples for each hypothesis test as
detailed below.
22The results are substantially similar if I use a linear model, as shown in Appendix Table B.11.
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members, resulting in negative, significant coefficients for the gray boxes in Models 1 and 2.
The results of Model 1 support my hypothesis: candidates who deny permits to Black Lives
Matter protesters and who support the use of violence against protesters are likely to receive
a lower vote share than those who support everyone’s right to protest. Model 1 also reveals
that respondents who identified BLM as an in-group were willing to punish violent repression
of white nationalists, though not denial of protest permits to white nationalists. In other
words, the propensity of BLM to punish repression expands beyond their own group, but
only for the most egregious form of repression. This finding can perhaps be explained by the
fact that Black Lives Matter protesters have been the frequent victims of police violence. As
a result, perhaps these individuals are willing to punish candidates who use violence against
any group, even a group to which they do not belong (and to which they likely have ideo-
logical opposition). Model 1 also reveals some support for the idea that voters are especially
likely to oppose violent repression. While a linear hypothesis test shows that the coefficients
for denial of permits to BLM and violence against BLM are not distinguishable from zero
(p = .568), BLM in-group members are willing to punish violence even against out-groups.
Table 3.2: Effect of Repression on Vote Share
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny Permits to BLM −0.19∗∗ −0.02 −0.10 −0.03 0.11 −0.18∗∗
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.23∗∗∗ −0.06 −0.11 −0.01 0.10 −0.24∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Deny Permits to WN −0.07 −0.06 −0.06 −0.07 −0.15 −0.11
(0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Use Violence Against WN −0.19∗∗ −0.12 −0.05 −0.10 −0.10 −0.14
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09)
Constant 0.14∗∗∗ 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.14∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Observations 6, 120 2, 800 5, 440 6, 140 3, 440 6, 060
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample is BLM
in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group /
non-threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening (M6). ***, **, *
significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively. Gray boxes represent coefficients used for hypothesis tests.
The substantive effects from Model 1 are also interesting. Appendix Table B.8, replicates
Table 3.2 while including controls for all other candidate attributes. These results allow for
comparison between the treatments of interest (repression) and other influential candidate
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attributes. Figure 3.2 shows the treatment effects for repression and the other significant
predictors of vote share from Model 1. The figure demonstrates that the treatment effects
were not only statistically significant, but also substantially important. A comparison of
predicted probabilities reveals that, among BLM in-group members, candidates who repress
BLM can expect their vote share to decrease by about 5.2% compared to candidates who do
not repress BLM. Figure 3.2 reveals that the size of this treatment effect mirrors the influ-
ence of other salient candidate features, including partisanship, and candidates’ positioning
on COVID-19, the 2nd Amendment, border protections, the economy, and the environment.
Perhaps even more interesting, among this sub-sample, the substantive effect of repression
is greater than the effect of candidate attributes like race, gender, abortion, education, and
healthcare policy. Overall, these results reveal that repression is both significantly and sub-
stantially important for BLM in-group members when deciding which candidate to support.



















−0.4 −0.3 −0.2 −0.1 0.0
Effect on Pr(Candidate Selected)
Notes: Coefficients for statistically significant coefficients in model with all control candidate attributes. 90% confidence
intervals. Baseline categories set to 0. Sample is BLM in-group members (N = 6,120). Outcome variable: forced choice
between candidates.
Model 2 shows an alternate test for the first hypothesis using the sample of those who
identify white nationalists as an in-group. In contrast to the results for BLM in-group
members, these results show that repression did not have a significant effect on candidates’
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vote share among white nationalist in-group members. Although the coefficients are negative,
they are small and indistinguishable from zero. There may be some concern that these results
are under-powered, given that the sample of respondents who identified white nationalists
as in-group members was the smallest of the group (N = 280 respondents). Section B.5
of the Appendix uses power analysis to evaluate this possibility. The results in Table B.10
reveal that, when setting power to 0.9 and alpha to 0.10, the required sample size to detect
a significant effect of .05 would be 8,522, far above the observed sample here. However, the
required sample size to detect a significant effect of 0.10 would be 2,099, below the observed
sample size for Model 2. What these results indicate is that it is likely that the coefficient for
violence against white nationalists is not significant, but it may be that the sample size is too
small to detect a significant effect for the coefficient on denial of protest permits. Overall,
it does seem that repression is not as salient in the vote choice of those who identify white
nationalists as an in-group.
One explanation for these results could be that white nationalists have not been regularly
targeted by repression in recent years, meaning that repression may not provide as great of
a threat to the expected well-being of in-group members with white nationalists. Another
issue is the difficulty of identifying those who truly identify as in-group members with white
nationalists. In the Appendix, I plot the number of respondents who identify as in-group
members with various groups (Figure B.1) and model the relationship between demographic
indicators and in-group status (Table B.9). The results of this analysis demonstrate that a
substantial number of respondents do identify white nationalists as an in-group, more than
those who identify Communists, Antifa, and Islamic Extremists as in-groups. However, some
the determinants of in-group identification are surprising. In particular, Republicans were
significantly less likely to identify white nationalists as an in-group than were Democrats.
This could be a true relationship, or it could reflect a tendency for Democrats to be more
likely to apply the label of white nationalist to individuals with racist views, even among
friends and family. If this logic holds, it may be that this sample does not include all of
those who are really in-group members with white nationalists and/or the sample may in-
clude individuals who identify white nationalists as friends and family, but also have strong
ideological opposition to members of this group. Either possibility would dilute the theoret-
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ical relevance of this sample, perhaps explaining the insignificant coefficients for repression
of in-group members in Model 2.
Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.2 show the results for my second hypothesis. Hypothesis
2 predicted that individuals who identify the repression targets as non-threatening out-
groups will not consider repression in their vote choice. Across both models there is strong
support for this hypothesis. Within the samples who perceive Black Lives Matter and
white nationalists to be non-threatening out-groups (Models 3 and 4), repression has no
significant treatment effect on a candidates’ vote share. Instead, other candidate features
have a stronger effect on the selection of candidates, as predicted in my second hypothesis
and theoretical framework. Table B.8 shows that individuals in these sub-samples put a
much greater weight on factors like party identification, COVID re-opening policies, and
economic policy rather than repression. The theorized mechanism – that these policies have
a greater influence on individuals’ well-being in these samples – can certainly explain the
insignificant treatment effects for repression. Further, power analysis in Table B.10 reveals
that the results in Model 3 are not the result of a low sample size, as the smallest relevant
coefficient of 0.09 would be detected in a sample as small as 2,601, smaller than the observed
sample of 5,060. In Model 4 however, both coefficients would be too small to be detected
in a sample of 5,780. As a result, I take Models 3 and 4 to lend tentative support for the
second hypothesis.
Finally, Models 5 and 6 test the third hypothesis, which predicts that candidates who
repress threatening groups will reap electoral benefits. Model 5 shows the results for those
who see Black Lives Matter as a threatening out-group. Though both of these coefficients are
positive, as expected, they are statistically indistinguishable from zero and relatively small.
In Model 6, which samples respondents who perceive white nationalists to be a threatening
out-group, the results are negative but, again, statistically insignificant. Power analysis in
Table B.10 shows that the sample in Model 5 might be too small to detect a significant effect,
but that the sample in Model 6 is large enough to detect significant effects if they were to
exist. Overall, it seems that even those who view the repression targets as threatening are
more likely to react to repression with indifference than support. One caveat to keep in
mind while interpreting these results for Hypothesis 3 is that there are certainly groups that
64
represent a more immediate threat to national security than do white nationalists and BLM.
As a result, those who see these groups as threatening may not be crossing the threshold
to support repression in the form of restrictions of a basic political freedom in the right to
protest. However, perhaps voters would reward repression of even more threatening groups,
like terrorist or rebel organizations. These results do not suggest that voters will never
reward any kind of repression. However, support for the right to protest in the United
States seems to be especially sticky, as even sub-samples of voters who perceive these groups
to be threatening will not cross the line to rewarding repression.
Overall, the experimental results lend the strongest support to Hypotheses 1 and 2, while
demonstrating interesting variation across the different groups of interest. The main take-
away is that Black Lives Matter in-group members are willing to punish in-group repression
as well as violent repression against out-groups. Among most other sub-samples, however,
voters meet repression with indifference, and candidates’ vote share is much more likely to
be influenced by their demographic features and positions on other policy issues other than
repression. Even those who perceive the targets of repression to be threatening tend to priv-
ilege other campaign issues over repression. I interpret the results as reflecting the current
political context, in which Black Lives Matter has been a frequent target of repression and,
as a result, the threat of repression is likely to be especially salient to the individuals who
identify as an in-group with BLM. These individuals will punish repression, but, for others,
other policy issues have a greater impact on their well-being and their vote.
3.4.1 Robustness Checks
This section outlines several empirical strategies to assess the robustness of the main
hypothesis tests.23 First, Tables B.12 - B.20 assess the possibility of ordering effects by
replicating the main results while limiting the sample to only the first task, only the first
two tasks, only the first three tasks, etc. It is important to note a trade-off with this analysis:
while the results in the earlier tasks may exhibit less decision fatigue, they are also smaller
sample sizes. Ultimately, the main significant findings replicate for the first 8 tasks and the
23Appendix Section B.6 provides a more in-depth discussion of these results.
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first 9 tasks, while the negative relationship between violence against BLM and lower vote
share among BLM in-group members in all but three of the sub-samples. The results for
Hypothesis 2 are almost always insignificant, as in the main hypothesis tests. Interestingly,
in the first two tasks there is a positive relationship between viewing BLM as a threatening
out-group and rewarding repression, perhaps because the social desirability bias against
rewarding repression had not solidified in the earlier tasks as respondents are less familiar
with the treatment conditions.
Tables B.21 - B.24 replicate the tests of the second and third hypotheses with alternative
thresholds for threat perception. The cut-off for threat perception at greater than or equal
to 7 in the main analysis is somewhat arbitrary, and these results allow for evaluation as to
whether this decision influenced the results. These results should be treated as suggestive,
given that the block randomization scheme used 7 as the cut-off. The results for Hypothesis
2 are consistently null across these alternative thresholds, as expected, except for the last
cut-off at threatening = 10, where those who view white nationalists as a non-threatening
out-group punished violence against white nationalists. Likely these results are driven by
the BLM in-group members, who would show up in this group that encompasses almost the
full sample of respondents. For the tests of Hypothesis 3, there is never a positive effect of
repression on vote share even with the alternative cut-off points. There are some models
where those who view white nationalists as a threatening out-group punish various kinds
of repression. Likely these results are also driven by the incorporation of BLM in-group
members into the larger samples.
Finally, Table B.25 replicates the main hypothesis tests using an alternative outcome
variables in which respondents must rank the candidates rather than choose between them.
I use linear models to analyze the effect of repression on candidate rankings from 1 to 10,
where 1 means the respondent definitely would not vote for the candidate and 10 means
the respondent definitely would vote for the candidate. These results prove interesting
because many more of the repression coefficients are negative and statistically significant.
What these results reveal is that the forced choice conjoint task achieved its purpose in
eliciting tough decisions from respondents about how to incorporate repression into their
selection of candidates. In the ranking task, which did not involve a trade-off, candidates
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received a lower vote share for at least one type of repression in nearly all respondent sub-
categories. However, when forced to make a trade-off, the main hypothesis tests reveal that
many respondents did not incorporate repression into their evaluation of candidates. The
comparison between these two measures reflects the importance of using a conjoint to assess
to evaluate the role of repression in vote choice. In the abstract, most respondents viewed
repression as an undesirable quality. However, when forced to make decisions about this
quality vis-a-vis other candidate features, all but BLM in-group members made their choice
around attributes other than repression.
3.4.2 Causal Mechanisms
Appendix Section B.7 provides analysis of the causal mechanisms that support the logic
of the hypotheses. First, this section evaluates whether respondents who identify as an
in-group with a repression target and/or consider one of the targets to be threatening are
more likely to incorporate repression into their vote choice. Specifically, I ask respondents
to mark which attributes they consider when selecting a candidate, to specify the impor-
tance of each of the repression attributes, and to answer an open-ended question indicating
whether there were any attributes that disqualified a candidate from office. Descriptive data
from these questions (Figures B.5 and Figure B.6) shows that repression ranks similarly to
other salient issues in the 2020 election cycle, like abortion and COVID-19. Table B.26
regresses these measures on respondent’s demographic features, their in-group identification,
and their threat perceptions of the repression targets. Compared to the baseline category
of non-threatening out-group, those who perceived BLM to be a non-threatening in-group
and a threatening out-group were significantly more likely to consider repression and rank
repression as having greater importance in their vote choice, as expected. In contrast, those
who identified white nationalists as an in-group were significantly less likely to consider
repression, but these results may reflect some of the difficulty with the measurement for
in-group identification for white nationalists. Finally, there is a weakly significant positive
relationship between those who view white nationalists as a threatening out-group and con-
sideration of repression and likelihood that repression disqualified the candidate. In all,
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there is some evidence across these models that, at least with relation to Black Lives Matter,
in-group identification and threat perception increase the likelihood that a respondent will
incorporate repression into their vote choice.
In another set of questions, I ask respondents to identify how they typically choose
between candidates. In one question, I ask respondents whether their main consideration
when selecting candidates is (1) how a candidates’ policies affect their own well-being, (2)
how the candidates’ policies affect the well-being of their friends and family, (3) how the
candidates’ policies affect the country as a whole, (4) the candidates’ party, or (5) the
candidates’ position on a specific policy. I also ask respondents to rank these categories
from most important to least important. The theory suggests that voters tend to make
decisions based on how a particular policy affects their own well-being or the well-being
of other in-group members. While not directly evaluating this dynamic, the descriptive
evidence in Figures B.7 and B.8 suggest that a substantial number of voters do privilege the
effect that policies have on in-group members when making their vote choice, even beyond
considerations of party identification and specific issues.
For a third and final set of questions to evaluate causal mechanisms, I ask respondents
about their attitudes toward the civil liberties - security trade-off.24 Table B.27 shows the
relationship between respondents’ group identification, threat perception, demographic fea-
tures and the relative importance of civil liberties versus security. In these models, positive
coefficients indicate relatively higher support for civil liberties relative to the omitted cat-
egory, and negative coefficients represent relatively higher support for security. I expected
that the coefficients for in-group identification would be positive and statistically significant:
those who identify with one of the repression targets should place a relatively higher weight
on civil liberties than security compared to out-group members. In contrast, I expected that
the coefficients for threat perception would negative and statistically significant, signalling
that those who view one of the repression targets as threatening will be more likely to support
security over civil liberties.
The results in Table B.27 do not reflect my expectations. First, there is not significant
relationships between the measures of threat perception and the outcomes. Second, the
24Figure B.9 shows descriptive statistics for these questions.
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results show that those who identify BLM and white nationalists as an in-group are signif-
icantly less likely to mark a response that privileges protection of civil liberties. Rather,
respondents who are in-group members with repression targets are more likely to agree that
the government should protect citizens from threats, even if it means violating civil liber-
ties, and more likely to agree that sometimes the government must violate civil liberties in
order to maintain security. One way to make sense of these relationships is that those who
identified as an in-group with one repression target may feel threatened by the other target.
As a result, they may have had the other group in mind when answering the questions,
particularly if they were unlikely to view their own group as a threat. For instance, someone
who identified white nationalists as an in-group may not see their own group as threatening,
but they may be more likely to see BLM as threatening. In that case, they may answer the
questions with BLM in mind and believe that it is important to protect from threats, even
if it means violating the civil liberties of another group. The last finding is that those who
view BLM as an in-group were more likely to agree that it is important that the rights of
those with unpopular views be protected. Perhaps in the question that specifically measured
protests from unpopular views, BLM in-group members did respond to the question with
their own group in mind.
3.4.3 The Influence of Party Identification
Finally, Appendix Section B.8 examines the relationship between party identification
and the role of repression in vote choice. This paper’s theory focuses on group identification
and threat perception as primary drivers for the incorporation of repression into vote choice.
However, ideology and – in the United States especially – party identification, are also
likely to play a role in how voters evaluate repression at the ballot box. Many past studies
indicate that voters with liberal values are more likely to prioritize human rights protections
over security (Davis and Silver, 2004; Davis, 2007; Finkelstein et al., 2017; Jenkins-Smith
and Herron, 2009; McFarland and Mathews, 2005) and these values may also influence how
repressive policies influence parties’ performance in elections (Aksoy, 2018; Cordell, 2021).
As such, it is important to evaluate the extent to which partisanship may confound the results
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of the main hypothesis tests and/or provide an additional explanation for the relationship
between repression and vote share.
The first takeaway from this analysis is that in-group identification, threat perception,
and party identification are correlated. However, these concepts are not perfectly aligned.
Figure B.10 shows the correlations between these concepts and Table B.9 shows regressions
for in-group identification and threat perceptions on respondents’ demographic features, in-
cluding party identification and ideology. For the most part, these results reflect conventional
wisdom that, compared to Democrats, Republicans are more likely to view BLM as threat-
ening, less likely to identify BLM as an in-group and less likely to view white nationalists
as threatening.25 These results suggest that the relationship between in-group identification
and threat perception in the main hypothesis tests is not purely driven by party identifica-
tion, as there is variation in group membership and threat perception in each of the partisan
sub-samples.
Given the correlation between party identification and the concepts of interest, however,
it is important to identify whether political party is a confounding variable. The balance
checks in B.3 rule out this possibility. In the sub-samples, treatment assignment is balanced
for political party membership in all but three instances.26 Yet, even when controlling for
political party and ideology in all models (Table B.6) and when these variables are imbalanced
(Table B.7), the results for the hypothesis tests are robust.
While party identification does not confound the results, many readers may still be in-
terested to know whether individuals who belong to different parties vary in their propensity
to punish repression. Table B.28 evaluates this possibility by analyzing the influence of
repression on vote share in three partisan sub-samples: Democrats, Republicans, and Non-
Partisans. Interestingly, the results do somewhat align with the hypothesis tests: among
25One surprising finding from this analysis is that, compared to Democrats, Republicans are significantly
less likely to identify white nationalists as an in-group. As mentioned previously, this finding may stem from
variation in each party’s propensity to label the same attitudes and behaviors as exhibiting white nationalist
views.
26In the BLM in-group sample, Independents were more likely to receive the treatment where the candidate
denies white nationalists permits; in the WN in-group sample, Republicans were more likely to receive the
treatment where the candidate denies BLM permits; and in the sample of respondents who view BLM as
a non-threatening out0group, Independents were more likely to receive the treatment where the candidate
supported restricting permits for BLM protesters.
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Democrats, candidates receive a significantly lower vote share for repression of Black Lives
Matter as well as violent repression of white nationalists. The reverse holds in the Republi-
can sample: candidates are only punished for denial of protest permits to white nationalists,
though this relationship is only significant at the .10 level. Repression is not punished among
non-partisans. Overall, these results suggest that Democrats are more likely to punish re-
pression, but this tendency varies by target and repression type.
Finally, it is worthwhile to consider whether the main results are driven by the members
of one particular party. To assess this possibility, Tables B.29, B.30, and B.31 replicate
the main hypothesis tests for sub-samples of Democrats, Republicans, and non-partisans.
These results should be treated as suggestive, given that the treatment is not randomized
along party lines and the sub-samples are quite small. Still, they provide some interesting
insight. Among Democrats, the results are almost identical to the main hypothesis tests,
though even those who identify BLM and white nationalists as non-threatening out-groups
punish some repression. Among Republicans, even BLM in-group members are not willing
to punish repression, but white nationalist in-group members punish violence against white
nationalists, and those who view white nationalists as threatening out-groups punish denial
of permits to white nationalists. Among non-partisans the results are somewhat convoluted
given the heterogeneous nature of the sample and small sample sizes. Here, in-group members
with white nationalists reward denial of permits to white nationalists, though this sample
includes only 16 respondents.
The main takeaway from these analyses is that the primary significant results in the
main hypothesis tests, in which BLM in-group members punish repression of BLM, seems
to be driven by Democratic respondents. At the same time, there is a unique effect of
in-group identification, above and beyond the role of party identification, as demonstrated
in the models with controls to adjust for imbalance along this variable. There is also some
interesting heterogeneity across the parties, as the results suggest that Democrats are not
necessarily universally more supportive of rights protections. In the in-group, partisan sub-
samples, for instance, only Democrats who identified as an in-group with BLM punished
repression of BLM, while only Republicans who identified as an in-group with BLM punish
violent repression of white nationalists. Across the sub-samples, Democrats seemed to be
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more willing to punish repression of BLM, while Republicans seemed to be more willing
to punish repression of white nationalists, suggesting that party identification does seem to
indicate some group-level affiliation. Ultimately, these results do not undermine the strong
influence of in-group identification with BLM as shaping incorporation of repression into vote
choice. However, they do round out our understanding of the role of party identification in
showing that both in-group identity and party affiliation likely play a role in influencing how
a particular individual evaluates repression at the polls.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper provides novel experimental evidence to evaluate a central question in the
literature linking democratic institutions and repression: how does repression shape candi-
dates’ performance in elections? The assumption that voters can and will punish repression
in democracies supports a range of studies arguing for the deterrent effect of elections on
repression. These studies surmise that, if voters are willing to throw repressive leaders out
of office, then leaders accountable to voters will be deterred from repression (Cingranelli and
Filippov, 2010; Gurr, 1986; Richards, 1999; Richards and Gelleny, 2007). My results tell a
different story. Using a unique conjoint design that forces respondents to make trade-offs
between repression and other salient campaign issues – as occurs in actual elections – I find
that only one group of voters is likely to punish repression. In these simulated U.S. elections,
candidates only suffered electoral losses among Black Lives Matter in-group members, and
only for violent repression and targeted repression of BLM. In contrast, among most other
sub-groups of the electorate, candidates fared just as well when they advocated targeted
repression as when they supported the right to protest for all citizens. The implication of
this finding is that elections are likely to provide ineffective constraints against many types
of repression, for many candidates. In particular, for candidates who were not accountable
to BLM, repression had little impact on their expected vote share.
These results have concerning implications for democratic theory. In the context of this
experimental setting, elections are only likely to inhibit leaders from repressing if they are
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beholden to the interests of certain repression targets, in this case, Black Lives Matter. For
candidates who do not count this group as part of their winning coalition, however, repres-
sion likely carries few costs. Optimistically, no candidates are rewarded for repression across
the different sub-groups, even among those who view the repression target as threatening.
However, the indifference of most voters to repression can allow many candidates to support
repression with seeming impunity. These findings are important both for existing research
and for their policy implications. For one, this conjoint design allows me to uncover the ten-
dency toward indifference regarding repression among voters who must evaluate repression
in comparison to other issues at the ballot, providing important insight into the relation-
ship between political attitudes and behavior. The findings reveal that many respondents
who oppose human rights in the abstract (as demonstrated in the rank-choice task) still
refrain from incorporating repression into their vote (as demonstrated in the forced-choice
task). As a result, researchers should take care to extrapolate abstract aversion to human
rights violations to real-life voting behavior. From a policy perspective, my findings suggest
that strengthening norms against repression and horizontal institutions to raise the costs of
repression are crucial endeavors to hold leaders to account for rights violations.
Of course, these results are limited to respondents’ behavior in the experimental setting
of one country at a particular political moment. Repression, particularly of minority groups,
was a salient topic of conversation throughout the 2020 election cycle in the United States.
As a result, one might expect voters to be particularly attune to this issue and particularly
willing to incorporate repression into their vote choice. If anything, given the increased
attention to the protest-repression nexus at this moment in American politics, I expected
the treatment effects to be stronger-than-average. Yet even in this heightened political
context, only Black Lives Matter in-group members incorporated repression into their vote.
The results of this somewhat easy test should invite further caution about the propensity of
voters to consider repression when voting. Beyond this case, more research is certainly needed
to assess whether these treatment effects travel to other democracies. On the one hand, the
United States has strong democratic institutions and strong norms in favor of protecting civil
liberties. On the other, repression of minority communities in the United States has a long
history, and voters may be more reticent to punish repression of out-groups in this political
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context. Ultimately there is a lack of cross-national research to assess variation in baseline
support and opposition to physical integrity rights violations across countries, though some
recent work is making progress on this front (Clay et al., 2018). Future studies should further
analyze the micro-foundations of the domestic democratic peace by identifying the extent to
which voters in other countries incorporate repression into their vote choice.
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4.0 Paper 3: Variation in the Efficacy of International Advocacy
Since the 1970s, transnational advocacy networks (TANs) have engaged in far-reaching
and costly public information campaigns to name and shame leaders who perpetrate human
rights abuses (Clark, 2001).1 At the root of these efforts is the desire to increase govern-
ment respect for human rights. In spite of this clear goal, there is mixed evidence for the
effectiveness of international advocacy. Some studies find that naming and shaming reduces
certain forms of human rights rights violations (Murdie and Davis, 2012), like government
killings (DeMeritt, 2012) and restrictions of political rights (Hafner-Burton, 2008). Other
research, however, finds that naming and shaming is correlated with increased physical in-
tegrity rights violations (Hafner-Burton, 2008) and results in a substitution effect, in which
states reduce some kinds of violations while increasing others (DeMeritt and Conrad, 2019).
Naming and shaming may also result in a backlash, from audiences who view international
advocacy as encroaching on domestic values and traditions (Snyder, 2020; Terman, 2017).
Still other studies find that naming and shaming campaigns can improve human rights, but
only among certain types of countries (Franklin, 2008; Hendrix and Wong, 2013).
In part, the mixed findings in this extant research stem from a lack of consensus about
the mechanisms through which international advocacy decreases human rights violations,
each of which may function effectively only under particular circumstances. Naming and
shaming may directly pressure governments to change their behavior, but it can also shift
third party behavior or the preferences of domestic audiences. Each of these pathways may
have different effects on leaders’ overall respect for human rights. In one recent study, for
instance, Allendoerfer, Murdie and Welch (2020) find that naming and shaming decreases
1Transnational advocacy networks are “forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and
horizontal patterns of communication and exchange. [...] They are organized to promote causes, princi-
pled ideas, and norms and they often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily
linked to a rationalist understanding of their “interests.”” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 8-9). Shaming is
when HROs “use information about human rights abuses in the popular media to pressure or “shame”
a state regarding its human rights record” (Davis, Murdie and Steinmetz, 2012, 204). The experimen-
tal design for this study approved by the University of Pittsburgh’s Institutional Review Board (Study
21060195) and pre-registered with the Open Science Foundation (https://osf.io/rbnya/?view_only=
b281bb47bf20457aa253754bfaf45e95) before data collection. I acknowledge financial support from the
School of Arts and Sciences at the University of Pittsburgh.
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human rights violations in general, but it also spurs third party intervention that can have a
deleterious effect on human rights. As a result of these divergent pressures, recent research
has begun to separately evaluating the myriad links in the causal chain linking international
advocacy to human rights practices. Such efforts provide clarity about how exactly naming
and shaming campaigns function to change leaders’ behavior.
One causal pathway that has gained increased attention in recent years is the effect of
naming and shaming on public opinion. A core function of TANs is to raise awareness among
domestic and international audiences about the presence of human rights abuses and change
the frames through which the public evaluates leaders’ behavior. As Keck and Sikkink
(1998) explain, TANs “[frame] issues to make them comprehensible to target audiences,”
“attract attention and encourage action,” “bring new ideas, norms, and discourses into
policy debates,” and serve as alternative “sources of information and testimony” (2-3). By
highlighting the importance of human rights, TANs can mobilize the public to either pressure
their own government to abandon rights abuses (in the case of domestic audiences) or pressure
foreign states to change behavior (in the case of international audiences).2 Several recent
studies have evaluated whether international naming and shaming is effective at initiating
this bottom-up process of accountability. Ausderan (2014) and Davis, Murdie and Steinmetz
(2012), for instance, find that international naming and shaming has a positive effect on
public perceptions that human rights abuses are occurring. Several other studies examine
variation in effectiveness of advocacy campaigns based on different framing strategies (Arves
and Braun, 2019; Haines et al., 2020; McEntire, Leiby and Krain, 2015, 2017) and the
interaction between human rights campaigns and government counterarguments (Bracic and
Murdie, 2020; Williamson and Malik, 2020).
What is lacking from these empirical accounts, however, is consideration of variation in
how different domestic audiences are likely to perceive human rights campaigns. Existing
theoretical work recognizes that individuals react differently to accusations about human
rights abuses (Snyder, 2020; Terman, 2017; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999). While some
2Certainly, international HROs are not the only organizations that can initiate this process. Domestic
media sources can also provide information about repression and increase the salience of repression in a given
election. However, international HROs – as specialists in human rights abuses around the world – will be
especially effective at shifting public opinion about the justifiability of repression.
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individuals update their beliefs about human rights as a result of informational campaigns,
others may double down in their support for the repressive leader in backlash to perceived
international encroachment. Still others may be persuaded by leaders’ counterarguments
that repression is necessary to protect citizens from ongoing threats (Bracic and Murdie,
2020; Williamson and Malik, 2020; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999). Ultimately, research
on the effectiveness of naming and shaming requires a cohesive theoretical account for these
diverse responses. Tests for the average treatment effect of naming and shaming overlook
the range of individual reactions to new information, masking possible heterogeneous effects
and raising issues for human rights activists who rely on scholarly work to determine where
their limited resources will yield the most benefit.
This paper presents a framework to account for heterogeneity in individual responses to
international advocacy. Individuals filter new information about human rights based on their
preconceptions about and trust in the actors involved in the human rights violations and ad-
vocacy campaign. During advocacy campaigns, individuals hear two competing narratives:
that of the leader, who typically justifies repression with appeals to domestic security, and
that of the human rights advocacy organization, which makes personalist appeals to human-
ize the victims of repression (Bracic and Murdie, 2020; McEntire, Leiby and Krain, 2015).
Individuals will process this dialogue differently depending on their baseline levels of trust
in the competing sources of information. Specifically, individuals’ propensity to update their
opinions about human rights – and their support for repressive leaders – varies based on their
preconceptions about the victims of human rights abuses, their pre-existing support for the
leader, and their trust in the international community. First, individuals who view the vic-
tim of human rights violations as threatening are less likely to be persuaded by naming and
shaming than those who do not. Those who feel threatened by repression victims are more
likely to be persuaded by the leader’s appeals to domestic security and support restrictions
on the mobilization potential of these groups. Second, individuals who are strong supporters
of the leader are more likely to sympathize with the leader’s excuses for their behavior and
less likely to update their beliefs following international advocacy. Finally, individuals with
low levels of trust in international organizations will be less susceptible to cues from the
international community about human rights.
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I use a vignette experiment to test the argument about the heterogeneity of effectiveness
of human rights campaigns. The experiment, conducted with a representative sample of
U.S. adults, first describes a hypothetical leader’s pattern of human rights abuses (violence
against protesters) and the leader’s justifications for this behavior (such efforts are necessary
to increase domestic security). The experiment then randomly assigns further information
about a naming and shaming campaign from Amnesty International that criticizes the leader
for his behavior. This campaign features a personalist appeal from a victim of the human
rights abuse, given that such forms of advocacy have been shown to be the most effective at
eliciting attitudinal change (McEntire, Leiby and Krain, 2015). The experiment uses a block
randomization scheme to assess the causal effect of this treatment among three subcategories
of respondents: those who perceive the victim to be threatening, those who are likely to
trust the leader, and those who are likely to be skeptical of appeals from the international
community. This design allows for internal validity in assessing the effect of international
advocacy among these different populations, revealing whether individuals react differently
to human rights advocacy based on their preconceptions about the actors. The results show
that individuals are unlikely to shift their generalized attitudes about domestic human rights
protections, regardless of their orientation to the victims, leaders, and human rights advocacy
organizations. However, there is a positive effect of naming and shaming on opposition to
repressive leaders among those who do not perceive victims to be threatening and among
those who do not share a party with the repressive leader.
This research makes several contributions to the existing literature on naming and sham-
ing, public opinion, and human rights. First, this research builds on a growing body of
literature evaluating one critical link in the pathway between transnational advocacy and
human rights protections: public opinion. While existing research has empirically evaluated
whether naming and shaming shifts individual attitudes and whether certain messages are
more effective than others, it has not accounted for the variation in whether and how indi-
viduals update their beliefs as a result of transnational advocacy. This paper considers three
important factors that should moderate the influence naming and shaming campaigns on
shifts in public opinion: an individual’s relationship to the victim of repression, the target of
the human rights campaign, and source of the information. In so doing, it integrates diverse
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accounts about the effectiveness of international cues in order to provide a cohesive frame-
work for predicting how individuals will respond to new information about human rights.
The survey experiment then isolates the causal effect of naming and shaming within these
different subgroups, providing critical insight for human rights organizations (HROs) about
which individuals will be most likely to respond favorably to their messages and which indi-
viduals might have a negative reaction. Overall, this theory and findings helps scholars and
activists better understand the process by which international HROs can successfully reduce
state violations of human rights.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, I review two major theoretical frame-
works that link transnational advocacy to changes in human rights practices: the spiral
model and the boomerang model. This section also highlights the role of information and
public opinion in each of these models and reviews existing work that has evaluated this
causal link. The next section presents an original argument to explain heterogeneity in indi-
vidual responses to international advocacy. The following sections present the experimental
design, results, and conclusion.
4.1 Transnational Advocacy and Public Opinion
There are many ways through which non-governmental HROs can pressure rights abus-
ing governments to change their behavior. Two primary theoretical models categorize these
processes. First, in the boomerang model (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 12-13), non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) seek to pressure their own states to stop rights abuses, but lack po-
litical and judicial forums to voice their concerns. In light of these domestic blockages,
NGOs publicize government rights abuses through campaigns that raise awareness in a broad
transnational advocacy network. Such campaigns share information about state behavior,
categorize rights abuses, and provide testimonials from victims to humanize patterns of
abuse. If successful, human rights campaigns mobilize support from foreign NGOs, govern-
ments, and international organizations, who in turn can put pressure on the target state.
This pressure can take the form of appeals to international norms, operating from a logic of
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appropriateness, or material incentives, such as promises of aid or threats to impose economic
sanctions. Overall, the success of these appeals depends on the presence and receptiveness
of international actors, who must place a high enough value on rights protections to mobilize
against the target state.
In the spiral model, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999, 20) add theoretical nuance to the
boomerang model, specifying five phases through which states move toward norm imple-
mentation. The first phase begins with domestic repression and the activation of a network
of domestic activists, who share information with the international community about rights
abuses. In the second phase, international actors recognize these abuses as part of the in-
ternational human rights agenda. Following this spike in attention, states typically deny
that rights violations are taking place, but sustained campaigning from domestic and in-
ternational activists can also shift the attitudes of the public and policymakers in favor of
human rights protections. During the third phase, states make tactical concessions in order
to pacify domestic and international opposition. While material concerns typically drive
changes at this stage, the fourth stage involves larger-scale changes, such as signing inter-
national human rights conventions or institutionalizing human rights into domestic law or
constitutions. Then, human rights norms begin to take root as normative standards, even
if state behavior does not always reach such goals. Finally, respect for international human
rights norms becomes a habitual practice in the fifth phase, and domestic rule of law enforces
these internalized values.
Both the boomerang and spiral models highlight multiple causal pathways through which
different actors can pressure states to respect human rights. Notably, the first step in each of
these frameworks is the provision of relevant and actionable information about rights abuses
from domestic HROs. Without information about what the target state has done, there is
no way to initiate the processes that lead to changes in state behavior (McEntire, Leiby
and Krain, 2015, 408). As Davis, Murdie and Steinmetz (2012) explain, “The theoretical
literature [on naming and shaming] hinges on first convincing an international and domestic
audience that human rights abuses are occurring” (208). Given the pivotal role of infor-
mation in both models, it is important to recognize that different actors and demographics
are likely to react differently to coverage of human rights abuses. While information provi-
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sion is the starting point across all causal pathways, the intended audience of informational
campaigns varies. In both major theories of transnational advocacy, the primary target of in-
formational campaigns is international elites, such as leaders of HROs, foreign governments,
and international organizations. Once members of the international community recognize
the presence of rights abuses, they have many tools at their disposal to put pressure on
abusive governments.3 However, the spiral model also highlights the role of foreign and do-
mestic audiences in initiating long-term behavioral changes. Information campaigns can spur
domestic mobilization, which facilitates pressure from below for leaders to respect human
rights. In democracies, the public has many avenues to pressure the government: through
elections, public protest, the formation of new political parties, etc. However, domestic au-
diences can also threaten leaders’ survival in autocracies (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003;
Kadivar, 2018), and widespread protest is common in many authoritarian countries, partic-
ularly hybrid regimes (Trejo, 2014; Weidmann and Rød, 2019). International advocacy can
also generate international outrage, which increases the pressure on foreign governments to
take action against other states who have abused human rights.
The second phase of the spiral model highlights these processes by emphasizing how
activists can use information to shift the opinion of both policymakers and the public. A
crucial aspect of this precarious phase is that activists must mount a resistance that is large
enough to keep an issue on the international agenda and maintain the focus of the target
government. One way to do this is by enraging a domestic audience that may have been
unaware or indifferent to patterns of rights abuses. By successfully reframing and highlighting
patterns of rights abuses, activists can raise the pressure from domestic audiences. While
many rights abusing states do not have venues for domestic opposition to voice its concern,
even autocratic leaders are susceptible to pressure from widespread protest or disillusionment
from members of their winning coalition (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003; Kadivar, 2018;
Trejo, 2014; Weidmann and Rød, 2019). In rights abusing states with regular elections,
dissatisfaction from the electorate can also put pressure on leaders to shift tactics for fear of
electoral sanctions. In a similar process, international audiences can put bottom-up pressure
3See, for instance Barry, Clay and Flynn (2013); Dietrich and Murdie (2017); Esarey and DeMeritt (2017);
Murdie and Peksen (2013, 2014); Peksen (2009) and Wood (2008).
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on their own leaders to hold foreign governments accountable through threats of electoral
sanctions or widespread protest. For instance, international audiences are more supportive
of foreign aid to countries that do not abuse human rights (Allendoerfer, 2017).
There is some recent research on the causal pathway linking HRO activism to shifts
in domestic and international public opinion. A first branch of empirical work on this is-
sue considers whether sharing information about human rights abuses increases the public’s
awareness that rights abuses are occurring. Given that rights abuses often take place in
obscurity, and repressive leaders may shield the public from their abusive behavior, a first
step in initiating bottom-up pressure is to inform the public of the presence of human rights
violations. Davis, Murdie and Steinmetz (2012), for instance, use survey data to show a neg-
ative correlation between naming and shaming and domestic perceptions about government
respect for human rights. In a similar study, Ausderan (2014) uses both experimental and
observational analysis to evaluate the link between human rights campaigns and awareness of
human rights abuses. Observational analysis in this research shows a positive link between
naming and shaming and perceptions of human rights abuses, while a survey experiment
randomly varying the presence of naming and shaming shows no statistically significant re-
lationship between information provision and perceptions about repression. While this initial
finding casts doubt on the effectiveness of naming and shaming, it evaluates public reaction
to only one kind of human rights abuse using a convenience sample and does not consider
whether certain individuals may be more susceptible to international advocacy than others.
Also, it evaluates awareness of human rights abuses, which may already be high preceding
exposure to the treatment, rather than support for human rights.
Taking this agenda a step further, recent survey experiments have evaluated whether
certain types of information are particularly effective at garnering public support for human
rights. McEntire, Leiby and Krain (2015), for instance, collect information about all of
Amnesty International’s campaigns and create a typology to categorize the organization’s
messaging into informational, personal, and motivational frames. Using a survey experiment,
the authors show that personalist frames are the most effective at initiating attitudinal
and behavioral changes against sleep deprivation torture techniques. In a follow-up study,
McEntire, Leiby and Krain (2017) show that personalist frames used in conjunction with
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the other two frames are just as effective as personalist frames used alone. Adding nuance to
these findings, Bracic and Murdie (2020) also show that personalist campaigns are effective,
but that respondents are less receptive to these efforts when the government has labeled
the victim of human rights abuse a terrorist. Haines et al. (2020) find that personalist
campaigns can increase sympathy for victims while also increasing support for retributive
violence. Finally, Williamson and Malik (2020) use a survey experiment in Egypt to reveal
that HROs can counteract governments’ smear campaigns against human rights victims.
Overall, recent research on the relationship between international advocacy and public
opinion shows that naming and shaming campaigns – particularly those using personalist
appeals – can be effective at garnering support for human rights. They also reveal that the
discursive relationship between governments and HROs impacts individuals’ evaluations of
developing events: governments can reduce support for human rights when they defend their
behavior based on appeals to national security, as Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) predict
in the spiral model. While this research does make important progress in evaluating the
causal link between information provision and attitudinal changes, it also leaves unanswered
questions about how individuals filter new information about human rights and whether
some individuals are more susceptible to HRO targeting than others. The next section
presents a theoretical framework to understand why individuals react differently to naming
and shaming based on their preconceptions about and trust in the different actors involved
in the rights violation and advocacy campaign.
4.2 Heterogeneous Responses to Naming and Shaming
As Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) point out in their spiral model, the phase of infor-
mational advocacy during which international organizations and governments engage in a
back-and-forth dialogue about the justifiability of rights abuses is quite fragile. HROs and
leaders are engaged in a competition to establish the dominant narrative about unfolding
events as rights abuses or necessary efforts to protect domestic security. One reason for
the fragility of this phase is that international advocacy is unlikely to persuade everyone to
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support human rights. Domestic audiences will not have a uniform reaction to human rights
campaigns, and many will maintain their support for the repressive leader even in the face of
allegations of rights abuses. Certainly, individuals’ demographic features explain some vari-
ation in response to international advocacy. While some individuals have a predisposition
to support human rights, others are innately skeptical of international encroachment into
domestic affairs and the broader human rights agenda (Gronke et al., 2010; Richards, Morrill
and Anderson, 2012; Snyder, 2020; Terman, 2017). Research on public opinion about human
rights and civil liberties shows that baseline attitudes toward human rights vary with educa-
tion, wealth, authoritarianism and other demographic features (Carlson and Listhaug, 2007;
Davis, 2007; Gronke et al., 2010; Haider-Markel and Vieux, 2008; Malka and Soto, 2011;
Richards, Morrill and Anderson, 2012). Further, recent experimental research suggests that
personalist frames may only be effective at shifting support for torture among ideological
liberals (Arves and Braun, 2019).
Yet these demographic features do not reveal the full picture. Beyond these factors, indi-
viduals will react differently to new information about human rights based on their baseline
levels of trust, preconceptions, and support for the actors involved in the rights violation and
the informational campaign. Faced with competing messages about government behavior,
individuals will process new information about human rights based on their relation to the
actors involved. After hearing different narratives about human rights, individuals rely on
their pre-existing reservoirs of trust to determine whether to support a repressive leader –
who typically appeals to domestic security to justify repression – or the advocacy of inter-
national actors, who advocate protecting the human rights of all. This section accounts for
these dynamics by reviewing individuals’ relations to the three primary actors involved in
human rights violations and advocacy campaigns: the human rights abuse victims, the re-
pressive leader, and the international community. I expect that individuals’ baseline support
for each of these actors will determine whether they are receptive to naming and shaming
from international organizations. It is important to consider these factors given that the
success of a human rights campaign depends on HROs’ ability to persuade a critical mass
of individuals to support human rights and abandon support for the repressive leader. One
implication of this theory is that the feasibility of this task varies across contexts, depending
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on the population’s preconceptions about victims, leaders, and the international community.
4.2.1 Relation to the Victim
The first factor that moderates the effect of international advocacy is individuals’ relation
to the victim of human rights abuses. One of the central missions of international human
rights advocacy is to build sympathy for victims of government repression. Such efforts are
critical given that governments often successfully characterize human rights abuse victims
as enemies of the state or as terrorists (Bracic and Murdie, 2020; Brysk, 1993; Williamson
and Malik, 2020). As Bracic and Murdie (2020) explain, “HROs are not operating in a
political vacuum; repressive governments often try to spin information about abuses and the
abused to their advantage” (879). As with many foreign policy issues, leaders operate at
an informational advantage regarding the true threat that domestic groups pose to national
security and the policy alternatives that could mitigate these threats (Baum and Groeling,
2010; Davies, 2016; Grieco et al., 2011). Leaders also have private interests in misrepresenting
the necessity of repression to the public (Dragu, 2011). Further, repressive tactics that
restrict the freedoms of threatening groups often do increase security for the country as
a whole (Davis and Silver, 2004; Waldron, 2003). In light of these factors, leaders can
often persuade domestic audiences that there are compelling reasons to support repression,
particularly if they have pre-existing biases against repression victims.
The debate about the effectiveness and justifiability of torture to obtain information
from suspected terrorists provides some insight into these dynamics. In many countries,
there is a widespread belief that torture is effective at eliciting information that will help to
divert a terrorist attack (Amnesty International, 2014; Gronke et al., 2010). Because of its
perceived benefits, some argue that torture, though it would be abhorrent in normal times,
can be morally justified for the sake of providing security (Dershowitz, 2002). Still, evidence
suggests that torture is unlikely to provide such benefits. Rejali (2007) demonstrates that
torture – when it is needed most – hardly ever provides the type of intelligence that is actually
helpful for governments looking to prevent future attacks (478). Brecher (2007) argues that
because it is rarely effective, torture is not morally justifiable, even in extreme cases. So, why
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do so many believe that torture can often be justified to promote security in spite of evidence
to the contrary? One reason why is that most individuals – who will never be tortured – have
few reasons to doubt a leader’s justifications for torture and may readily accept stereotypes
about torture victims. In other words, the information environment surrounding torture
often favors the status quo, which is a leader’s justifications for his own behavior.
These patterns explain why personalist appeals are typically the most effective type
of international advocacy for shifting support toward human rights protections (McEntire,
Leiby and Krain, 2015, 2017). Those who initially have little sympathy for repression vic-
tims can at times be persuaded to view victims with compassion when advocacy campaigns
reframe repressive tactics as rights abuses rather than domestic security initiatives. Still,
these efforts are unlikely to be equally effective for all audiences. Specifically, those who
view repression victims as especially threatening to domestic security are unlikely to shift
their baseline levels of support for human rights as a result of advocacy efforts. Individuals
in this category will be more likely to privilege the government’s justifications for repression
and remain intransigent even in the face of personalist appeals for human rights. Because of
their preconceptions about the threat posed by repression victims, they are more likely to
accept human rights abuses as reasonable efforts to promote domestic security. In contrast,
those who do not view repression victims as threatening may be more amenable to the ap-
peals of human rights groups. Individuals in this category may identify repression victims as
ingroup members, perhaps as result of shared ethnic identity or ideological values, or they
may have no strong opinions about the victims. For these individuals, personalist appeals
from HROs may cut through the government’s justifications of abuse and increase support
for human rights and opposition to repressive leaders.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who perceive a victim of human rights abuses to be threat-
ening are less likely to support human rights and oppose repressive leaders as a result of
international advocacy than those who do not perceive a victim of human rights abuses to
be threatening.
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4.2.2 Support for the Leader
The second factor that drives variation in responses to international advocacy is an in-
dividuals’ baseline level of support for the leader who has perpetrated the rights abuse.
The dialogue between the government and HROs that ultimately guides individual attitudes
about rights protections rests on the persuasive appeal of the leader’s justifications of re-
pression. In turn, individuals’ propensity to trust these justifications depends on the level of
baseline support they have for the leader himself. Those who support the leader for reasons
other than their patterns of repression are more likely to trust the cues that this leader
provides rather than update their beliefs as a result of international advocacy. As Lupia
and McCubbins (1998) emphasize in their work on political endorsements, the effectiveness
of cues depends on the receiver’s perceptions about whether the cue giver is more informed
about the “true” state of the world than they are. Further, cues are particularly effective
when the cue giver and receiver share common interests.
Extrapolating this logic to issues of international security, Grieco et al. (2011) demon-
strate that individuals are more receptive to international endorsements that contradict
domestic foreign policy when they have low levels of trust in the leader himself. Similarly,
Hayes and Guardino (2011) find that Americans were more susceptible to cues from foreign
elites about the Iraq war if they were Democrats or Independents. In contrast, Republicans,
who shared a party with the incumbent, were unlikely to shift their perspectives as a result of
these cues. All of these findings have implications for the influence of international endorse-
ments in the field of human rights. Specifically, those with high levels of trust in the leader
should be less likely to be persuaded to update their beliefs by international organizations
who challenge the leader’s preferred narrative. Instead, they are likely to remain supportive
of the leader and accept an account of repression that emphasizes the importance of domestic
security. Ultimately, those who are most likely to be receptive to the leader’s justifications
are the leader’s supporters. By extension, those privileging the leader’s preferred account
are less likely to increase their support for human rights following a naming and shaming
campaign.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who support the leader who perpetrates human rights abuses
are less likely to support human rights and oppose repressive leaders as a result of interna-
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tional advocacy than those who do not support the leader who perpetrates human rights
abuses.
4.2.3 Trust in the Source
The third factor that influences the appeal of naming and shaming campaigns is individu-
als’ level of trust for the international organizations that initiate these campaigns. A growing
body of literature demonstrates that cues from international endorsements can successfully
persuade individuals to shift their policy preferences in a number of issue areas. Because
there is so much uncertainty around foreign policy issues, the public may be especially willing
to seek out cues from experts or place greater weight to these cues than in other policy areas
(Chapman, 2009, 734). However, these appeals cannot successfully persuade all audiences,
particularly since there is high variation in support for international organizations due to
factors like individual cosmopolitanism (Norris, 2000; Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2011), support for
globalization (Bearce and Joliff Scott, 2019), personality traits (Schoen, 2007), and general-
ized trust (Brewer et al., 2004; Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2015; Torgler, 2008). In light of this
variation, only individuals who have high levels of trust in international institutions are likely
to be persuaded by their appeals (Linos, 2011). For instance, Anjum, Chilton and Usman
(2021) finds conditional effects of United Nations (UN) endorsements for women rights based
on baseline levels of support for the UN. Similarly, Grieco et al. (2011) find that cues from
international organizations should be influential “for individuals who place intrinsic value on
the endorsement of international institutions” (566). Bearce and Cook (2018) also uncover
heterogeneous effects in responsiveness to cues from the World Trade Organization and the
UN Security Council based on levels of support for these two international organizations.
In addition to these studies that reveal increased responsiveness to institutional endorse-
ments from those who have high levels of trust in the institution, other work demonstrates
that those who are skeptical of international intervention may backlash to human rights
messaging (Bloomfield, 2016; Dixon, 2017; Epstein, 2012; Symons and Altman, 2015). The-
oretical work from Terman (2017) suggests that individual perceptions about the credibility
and legitimacy of the organization promoting a particular norm moderate the influence of
international pressure. In particular, she expects that individuals will exhibit a defensive
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reaction to international pressure “when they perceive transnational pressure to constitute
symbolic domination: an illegitimate attempt to undermine the target’s status, integrity, or
interests by antagonistic actors for the purposes of infiltration or control” (6). Drawing from
social identity theory, Terman (2017) expects that those who strongly identify with their
their nation over the international community will be more likely to experience a sense of
threat from the criticism of an outside actor like an international HRO. On the other hand, I
expect that individuals who value international influence and advocacy should be relatively
more likely to respond favorably to naming and shaming campaigns. Though Terman does
not test this argument at the individual level, her theory implies that individuals will react
differently to naming and shaming campaigns depending on their support for (or opposition
to) the source of the campaign.
Hypothesis 3: Individuals with low levels of trust in international organizations are less
likely to support human rights and oppose repressive leaders as a result of international
advocacy than those with high levels of trust in international organizations.
4.3 Research Design
I use a vignette experiment with a representative sample of 758 U.S. adults in July 2021
to test the implications of the theory.4 Compared to other countries, individuals in the
United States have average to below-average support for international organizations (Bearce
and Joliff Scott, 2019; Norris, 2000). Survey data from the International Social Survey Pro-
gramme’s National Identity module in 1995, 2003, and 2013 show that survey respondents
in the United States had similar attitudes to the cross-national mean in three measures of
support for IOs (Bearce and Joliff Scott, 2019). For instance, in response to a question
asking whether international organizations should be able to enforce solutions to certain
problems, 56% of U.S. respondents answered in support compared to an average of 59.6%
4I use Lucid to conduct the survey experiment, a platform that is gaining increasing popularity in political
science survey research. Recent studies using Lucid have been published in the American Political Science
Review (Graham and Svolik, 2020; Tomz and Weeks, 2020; Williamson et al., 2020), the American Journal
of Political Science (Costa, 2020), and the Journal of Politics (Lajevardi, 2020; Levy, 2020). The full survey
instrument can be found in Appendix Section C.2. Appendix Section C.1 outlines a few areas of deviation
from the pre-analysis plan.
89
across all countries in 2013. For this question, responses in the United States ranked within
one percentage point of those from Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Russia, Slovakia, and the United
Kingdom. Given these comparisons, the treatment effects of the survey experiment in the
United States may be considered generally representative, though potentially below average,
compared to the likely effects of naming and shaming across space. Another scope condition
to consider is regime type, given that the effect of information provision about human rights
varies across regimes (Hendrix and Wong, 2013). In democracies, HROs can initiate cam-
paigns to amplify the attention to human rights abuses and influence the narrative through
which individuals process rights violations. In contrast, advocacy in autocratic countries
may provide individuals’ first exposure to human rights violations that are kept hidden by
leaders. Generally, the theoretical discussion, experimental design, and treatment effects in
this paper represent the process of international advocacy in democratic countries, where
citizens are typically aware of rights abuses and where bottom-up pressure is most likely to
shift leaders’ behavior.
To test the effects of naming and shaming, I select a rights abuse that has been the
subject of various international advocacy campaigns targeting the United States over the last
year: police violence against Black Lives Matter (BLM) protesters (Amnesty International,
2020a; Human Rights Watch, 2020; United Nations, 2021). This abuse is appropriate for the
study given that it is both a salient and polarized issue in U.S. politics. Previous research
suggests that international endorsements are most likely to be effective under high levels of
polarization (Guisinger and Saunders, 2017). Further, police violence has been the focus
of relatively little human rights research, which tends to evaluate shifts in attitudes toward
other forms of physical integrity rights, like torture (Bracic and Murdie, 2020; Conrad et al.,
2018; Kearns and Young, 2020; McEntire, Leiby and Krain, 2015, 2017; Piazza, 2015). The
theory focuses on how international advocacy influences perceptions of human rights among
a domestic audience, as well as how naming and shaming campaigns shape individuals’
attitudes about the leaders who have perpetrated rights abuses. Whereas international
audiences can mobilize against their own leaders to pressure foreign governments to abandon
rights abuses, domestic audiences can often exert higher levels of pressure against their own
repressive leaders through domestic mobilization strategies. Evaluation of this aspect of
90
the causal chain linking international advocacy to behavioral changes requires analysis of
shifting attitudes among domestic audiences about their own leaders. As such, I select a
human rights abuse that has occurred in the same country as the experimental setting.
The structure of the treatment vignette reflects the typical way that individuals would
obtain information about domestic human rights abuses. The vignette first asks respondents
to consider a scenario where an unnamed governor orders the police to use tear gas and
rubber bullets against BLM protesters, reflecting a common news headline from the past
year, when protests and police violence were common. Then, the leader issues a justification
for his decision to utilize these tactics, emphasizing how the efforts are meant to prevent
violence and deter future protests. Such language reflects common discourse from leaders
who attempt to explain their patterns of rights abuses with appeals to domestic security
(Bracic and Murdie, 2020; Williamson and Malik, 2020). The treatment is the random
assignment of a second portion of the vignette, which explains how a prominent human
rights organization, Amnesty International, has initiated a campaign to criticize the leader
for his behavior. To maximize the likelihood that individuals will respond to the shaming
treatment, this portion also includes a personalist appeal from one of the supposed victims of
police violence, similar to a recent Amnesty International campaign (Amnesty International,
2020b). Existing research has shown that personalist appeals are most effective at garnering
shifts in attitudes toward human rights (McEntire, Leiby and Krain, 2015, 2017). I include
the vignette below, with the naming and shaming treatment in italics.
Consider the following scenario. Black Lives Matter activists have been actively protesting
in your state for the past several weekends against systemic racism and discrimination. The
governor, a Republican, orders the police to use tear gas and rubber bullets against the
protesters. He argues that the protests have begun to pose a threat to local businesses and
the security of the state. Following a recent escalation in violence as a result of these new
policing tactics, the governor explains in an interview that the measures are necessary to
protect citizens, the local economy, and the safety of the rest of the state. He hopes that
the measures will deter future protests.
In reaction to these events, Amnesty International, an international advocacy organization,
initiates a campaign to criticize the governor. They shame the governor for using violence,
arguing that these actions represent a violation of the human rights of the protesters. The
campaign features accounts from multiple victims, who explain how police violence left them
with welts on their arms and legs and chemical irritants in their eyes. One activist recounted
how she was struck by a flash grenade while distributing food to other protesters. She
was transported via stretcher to a private car, which took her to the hospital because no
91
ambulance would come to help. At the hospital, she suffered multiple cardiac arrests and
was diagnosed with a concussion and whiplash. In the days since, she has had difficulty
breathing while standing and becomes easily fatigued.
The three hypotheses specify that the effect of the naming and shaming treatment will
vary based on individuals’ perceptions about the victims of human rights abuses, their sup-
port for the leader who committed the rights abuse, and their trust in the human rights
advocacy organization. To measure the first variable, the survey includes a question that
asks respondents how threatening they perceive various groups to be to domestic security on
a scale from 1 (not at all threatening) to 10 (very threatening). To avoid priming respondents
to the importance of the group that is the focus of the experiment, and to provide reference
points that ground their rankings, there are 10 total groups included in the question.5 I
code the variable Threatening as 1 if individuals ranked BLM, the victim of repression in the
vignette, as greater than 7 on the threat perception scale.6 I expect that these individuals
will be less likely to react to naming and shaming compared to those who do not perceive
BLM to be threatening. The second independent variable of interest concerns respondents’
trust in the leader who perpetrated the repression. I rely on a proxy measure of shared party
identification to measure trust, given the high salience of party identification in U.S. politics.
I code individuals as a 1 for the variable Trust Leader if they identify as a Republican and
0 otherwise.
Finally, the third hypothesis expects that individuals with high levels of trust in interna-
tional organizations will be more likely to respond favorably to international endorsements
than those who do not trust international organizations. I use three survey questions to
measure individual attitudes about international HROs, and the international community
in general. I adapted these questions from Pew’s 2017 Global Attitudes Survey (Wike and
Bishop, 2017), which capture the degree to which individuals support international HROs.
From these three questions I create a dichotomous indicator for whether respondents Don’t
5The groups in this section are the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, Black Lives Matter, Antifa,
Refugees, Islamic extremists, White nationalists, Animal rights activists, Communists, and Illegal immi-
grants.
6The meter for threat perceptions starts at 5, so respondents must move the meter more than two spaces
toward a more threatening position in order to be coded as perceiving the group to be threatening, so it is
not the case that individuals would fall in this category if they did not move the meter or only moved the
meter slightly.
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Support HROs. Respondents must respond negatively to two of the three questions measur-
ing support for international organizations to be coded as “1.”7 Negative responses include
those who respond in the bottom two categories of the first question (bad, very bad), the
bottom two categories of the second question (not at all important, slightly important) and
answer that “international human rights organizations are primarily dedicated to promoting
the interests of foreign groups” in the third question score a 1 on this indicator, while all
others score a 0.8 The text for the questions is below:
1. What kind of influence are international human rights organizations having on the way
things are going in the United States? (5-point scale from “very good” to “very bad”)
2. How important do you think it is for international human rights organizations to hold
governments accountable for human rights issues? (5-point scale from “very important”
to “not at all important”)
3. Which of the following statements comes closest to your view: (1) international human
rights organizations are primarily dedicated to protecting the rights of people in our
country or (2) international human rights organizations are primarily dedicated to pro-
moting the interests of foreign groups? (respondents choose one of these or can indicate
“neither” or “don’t know”).
I use a block randomization strategy to identify the causal effect of the treatment among
these sub-populations of respondents. The hypotheses predict that individuals will react
differently to naming and shaming based on (1) their threat perception of the victim, (2)
their trust in the leader, and (3) their support for international organizations. I create
dichotomous variables for each of these categories, as detailed above. Given the combination
7I adjusted the coding for this variable following data collection given that only 15 respondents met my
initial criteria to be coded as a “1.” The changes in coding are detailed in section C.1 in the Appendix.
Ultimately, the results are the same with either measure.
8As a robustness check, I use an additional measure based on individuals’ support for Amnesty Interna-
tional. I expect general predisposition toward the international community to guide heterogeneous responses
to naming and shaming campaigns. However, it is also possible that individuals react to new information
based on their attitudes toward the specific organization in the vignette. To evaluate this possibility, I first
ask respondents whether they are familiar with Amnesty International. For those who answer yes, I also
ask them to use a feeling thermometer to indicate their general disposition toward the organization. In
the alternative measure, I code Don’t Support AI as a 1 for individuals who were familiar with Amnesty
International and ranked the organization at or below a 2 on the feeling thermometer. Appendix Figure C.6
shows the results with this alternative measure.
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of potential values of these variables, I randomize the treatment within eight blocks (2x2x2).
In the analysis, I combine these categories for each of the groups of interest. Because the
probability of assignments is uniform across the blocks, I can combine blocks without biasing
the estimates of the treatment effects (Gerber and Green, 2012, 76).
To assess the effects of naming and shaming, I include two categories of outcome variables:
attitudes about human rights and attitudes toward the repressive leader.9 As a first step, I
am interested in whether individuals shift their support for human rights abuses as a result
of shaming as well as their intent to mobilize against human rights abuses in the future.10
In the first of these measures, I ask respondents whether they agree or disagree that the use
of tear gas and rubber bullets is an appropriate policing technique. This question assesses
whether attitudes about the appropriateness of a particular repressive tactic, which could
be considered as a measure to promote domestic security or a human rights violation, vary
as a result of naming and shaming. Second, I ask respondents how upset they feel about the
governor’s use of tear gas and rubber bullets against protesters. Third, I include a general
question about intent to mobilize, asking respondents about their likelihood of participating
in a campaign to ban the use of tear gas and rubber bullets by police officers. Though
this question only gauges hypothetical mobilization, it does elicit some information about
respondent’s intent to support human rights advocacy in a tangible way. Together, these
three primary outcome measures assess both attitudinal changes as a result of international
advocacy.
In the second set of outcome measures, I ask respondents to share how they rate the
leader’s job performance and their likelihood of supporting the leader for reelection. This
analysis assesses a neglected aspect of the causal chain linking international advocacy to
changes in patterns of repression: individuals’ likelihood of shifting their voting behavior
as a result of informational campaigns. In particular, the effect of naming and shaming on
support for repressive leaders demonstrates whether individuals will defect from their party as
a result of repression and/or international advocacy. In the first of these outcome measures,
9Appendix Section C.4 provides descriptive statistics for the outcome measures and independent variables
of interest. It also shows the correlation between the different outcome measures.
10The first set of outcome measures mirror those used in recent survey experiments on attitudes about
human rights as a result of naming and shaming, namely Bracic and Murdie (2020) and McEntire, Leiby
and Krain (2015).
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I simply ask respondents how they would describe their level of support for the Governor’s
reaction to the protests. Next, I ask respondents whether they approve or disapprove of the
way the Governor is handling his job. Finally, I ask respondents how likely they would be
to reelect this Governor in the next election.
I use a series of regressions to evaluate the heterogeneous treatment effects among the
populations of interest. I regress the outcome measures on the treatment, interacted with
the three moderating variables in separate models: Threatening, Trust Leader, and Don’t
Support HROs. I use linear models for all of the regressions, predicting that the treatments
will have a stronger positive effect on human rights attitudes for those coded as 0 in the
interaction variables compared to those coded as 1. Respondents who do not view the target
as threatening, who do not trust the leader, and who support HROs should be more likely
to shift their views in favor or human rights in reaction to international advocacy compared
to those who view the target and threatening, who trust the leader, and who do not support
HROs. Regarding the second set of outcome variables, I expect that the treatments will
have a stronger negative effect on support for the repressive leader for individuals coded
as a 0 in the interaction term compared to those coded as 1. Respondents who view the
victim as threatening, who trust the leader, and who do not support HROs should be less
likely to reduce their support for the leader than respondents who do not view the victim as
threatening, who do not trust the leader, and who support HROs.11
Below I include the regression equation for the tests of the first hypothesis, which in-
teracts the treatment with the indicator for whether the respondent perceives the victim of
repression to be Threatening. In the other hypothesis tests, I simply substitute the indicator
for threatening with the other dichotomous measures of support for the repressive leader and
lack of support for international HROs. The hypotheses specify that the treatment effect of
shaming for those who perceive the target to be threatening will be smaller than the effect
of shaming for those who do not perceive the target to be threatening. In the equation,
α represents baseline attitudes for those who do not perceive the victim to be threatening
11I include only indicators for the treatment and moderating variables in these models. I check for balance
across several demographic features, including gender, income, education, age, race, community, region, and
ideology. Coding for these variables is listed in Appendix Section C.3 and the results of the balance check
can be found in Table C.1. All these covariates are balanced.
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and are in the control group while β1 represents attitudes for those who do not perceive the
victim to be threatening and are exposed to international shaming. So, the treatment effect
for those who perceive the target not to be threatening is β1 - α. Among those who perceive
the victim to be threatening, β2 is attitudes in the control group and β2 + β3 is attitudes
in the treatment group. Then, the treatment effect for those who perceive the victim to be
threatening is β2 + β3 - β2 = β3. Hypothesis 1 expects that the size of the positive treatment
effect for those who perceive the victim to be threatening (β3) is less than the treatment
effect for those who perceive the victim to be non-threatening (β1 - α). Naming and sham-
ing should yield greater improvements in human rights attitudes and greater opposition to
repressive leaders among those who do not perceive the victim to be threatening compared
those who do perceive the victim to be threatening.
Yi = α + β1Shaming + β2Threatening + β3Shaming ∗ Threatening + ei (2)
4.4 Analysis and Discussion
To begin, I analyze the effect of naming and shaming on support for human rights and
opposition to repressive leaders without using any interaction effects. These results can
be found in Table 4.1. This analysis shows that naming and shaming has no statistically
significant effect on support for human rights or opposition to repressive leaders in any of the
models. Not only are these results significantly insignificant, but they are also substantively
small. In contrast, the measures for threat perception of the repression victim and shared
party with the leader are strong predictors of attitudes about human rights and opposition
to the repressive leader. In particular, those who found the repression victim (BLM) to
be threatening were less likely to support human rights in the abstract and less likely to
oppose the repressive leader. Similarly, Republicans, who share a party with the repressive
leader, were less likely to support human rights and more likely to oppose repressive leaders
compared to respondents who belonged to other parties. Respondents who supported HROs
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were more supportive of human rights in general than those who did not, but this variable
did not have an effect on opposition to repressive leaders. In general, these results show the
expected effects of the covariates of interest, but do not show a treatment effect for naming
and shaming.
Table 4.1: Support for Human Rights and Opposition to Repressive Leaders
Support Human Rights Oppose Repressive Leader
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shaming 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.04
(0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
BLM Threatening −1.10∗∗∗ −0.69∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗ −0.94∗∗∗ −1.02∗∗∗ −1.03∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Republican −0.57∗∗∗ −0.73∗∗∗ −0.84∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗ −0.56∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Don’t Support HROs −0.18 −0.53∗∗ −0.89∗∗ 0.01 −0.22 −0.06
(0.34) (0.27) (0.35) (0.32) (0.33) (0.35)
Constant 3.35∗∗∗ 2.92∗∗∗ 3.14∗∗∗ 3.31∗∗∗ 3.43∗∗∗ 3.42∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 758 758 758 758 758 758
Notes: Linear models. Dependent variables are Likert scales for support for human rights and opposition to repressive
leaders. Higher values indicate higher support for human rights and greater opposition to repressive leaders. ***, **, *
significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
One theoretical explanation for the null effects of naming and shaming in these initial
models is that different groups react differently to international advocacy. In particular,
my hypotheses predict that the treatment effect of naming and shaming will vary based
on individuals’ relation to the victim of repression, the repressive leader, and the shaming
organization. Thus, one interpretation of the null results of advocacy in Table 4.1 could
be that the treatment effects in different sub-samples cancel each other out. To evaluate
this possibility, it is necessary to interact the treatment with these different measures of
respondents’ orientation to the actors involved in human rights violations. I first assess these
interaction effects using the outcome measures of support for human rights. Interestingly,
these results show that naming and shaming has no significant effect on generalized attitudes
about human rights among any of the sub-groups of interest. In Figure 4.1, I show these
results with an aggregated measure of support for human rights.12 As predicted, the figure
demonstrates that the sub-groups who identify repression victims as non-threatening, do
12This outcome measure is the sum of the three measures of support for human rights discussed in the
research design. I present results for the aggregated outcome for ease of interpretation, but the results in
models using separate outcome measures are the same.
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not share a party with the leader, and have high levels of support for HROs have higher
levels of support for human rights compared with the respondents that fall outside of these
categorizations. However, there is no significant treatment effect of naming and shaming
within or outside of these sub-samples.







































































































Notes: The effect of shaming on support for human rights by threat perception (panel 1), in-group identification with the
leader (panel 2), and support for international organizations (panel 3). Dependent variable is the combined score of 3
measures of support for human rights. 90% confidence intervals. N = 758.
This first round of results for the hypothesis tests does not support my predictions.
However, it should be noted that generalized attitudes about human rights are difficult to
change, and they may be especially intransigent in an issue area that has been the subject
of high levels of media attention and national debate in the months preceding the experi-
ment. However, while naming and shaming might not change overall beliefs, perhaps it can
influence individuals’ opposition to the leader who has perpetrated a rights abuse. Given
the potentially higher threshold for international advocacy to influence support for human
rights in general, compared to repressive leaders in particular, it is important to also analyze
the effect of naming and shaming on outcome variables measuring opposition to repressive
leaders. Table 4.2 presents results using these outcome measures. Turning first to the results
of the first hypothesis, Models 1-3 show support for the theorized relationships. Specifically,
shaming has a positive and statistically significant effect on opposition to repressive leaders
among those who do not perceive BLM to be threatening. In contrast, those who do view
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BLM as threatening decrease their opposition (increase their support) for repressive leaders
following naming and shaming, as can be seen by the negative and statistically significant
coefficients on the interaction terms. These results show that naming and shaming can
be effective among some sub-populations while resulting in a backlash effect among others.
Models 4-6, which provide the results for the second hypothesis, show similar results. Sham-
ing increases opposition to repressive leaders among respondents who do not share a party
with the leader, but increases support for repressive leaders among respondents who share
a party with the leader. Again, the results show that the effect of shaming varies based
on individuals’ orientation to one of the parties involved in the rights abuse: the repressive
leader.13 Finally, in contrast to my expectations, Models 7-9 do not show support for the
third hypothesis. Shaming does not affect opposition to repressive leaders, regardless of
individuals’ baseline levels of support for HROs.
These results show that the factors of interest in this paper – threat perception of the
victim, shared identity with the leader, and trust in the international community – do shape
attitudes about repression. Across all the models, these variables are strong predictors of
support for human rights and opposition to repressive leaders. Those who viewed the victim
as non-threatening, did not share a party with the leader, and exhibited high levels of support
for international HROs were more likely to support human rights compared to those who
perceived the victim to be threatening, shared a party with the leader, or did not trust the
international community. Regarding the results of the hypothesis tests, however, some of
the results supported my theory while others diverged from my expectations. Specifically,
international advocacy was unable to shift respondents’ beliefs about human rights in general.
However, international naming and shaming did increase opposition to repressive leaders
within two specific sub-populations: those who perceived the victim to be non-threatening
and those who did not share a party with the leader. The takeaway is that international
advocacy can effectively mobilize opposition to repressive leaders, but only among some
populations. Further, they reveal that generalized attitudes may be more difficult to shift
through information sharing compared to attitudes about specific leaders.
13Linear hypothesis tests demonstrate that the effect of naming and shaming across sub-groups in Models
1-6 are statistically distinct from each other, as expected in the hypotheses.
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Table 4.2: Effect of Shaming on Opposition to Repressive Leaders
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Shaming 0.20∗ 0.21∗ 0.20∗ 0.21∗ 0.17 0.22∗ 0.08 0.04 0.03
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
BLM Threatening −0.94∗∗∗ −0.99∗∗∗ −0.96∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
Shaming * BLM Threatening −0.33∗ −0.43∗∗ −0.44∗∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Republican −0.64∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Shaming * Republican −0.45∗∗ −0.40∗ −0.61∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.21) (0.22)
Don’t Support HROs −0.71∗∗∗ −0.77∗∗∗ −0.76∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.24) (0.25)
Shaming * Don’t Support HROs −0.21 −0.07 −0.08
(0.33) (0.35) (0.36)
Constant 3.13∗∗∗ 3.23∗∗∗ 3.24∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ 3.10∗∗∗ 3.07∗∗∗ 2.87∗∗∗ 2.95∗∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Observations 758 758 758 758 758 758 758 758 758
Notes: Linear models. Dependent variables are Likert scales for measures of opposition to repressive leaders: support of the governor’s reaction (M1, M4, M7), job




A growing body of recent research evaluates how (and whether) international actors
can shape public attitudes about human rights. One core activity through which the in-
ternational community can influence individual beliefs is by utilizing international advocacy
campaigns that name and shame leaders for committing acts of repression. These efforts
may be especially useful in democratic countries, in which citizens have many institutional
mechanisms to hold leaders accountable for abuse. In this study, I evaluate whether these
international efforts vary in their efficacy across different groups of respondents. Specifically,
I assess whether individuals are more amenable to human rights advocacy depending on
their preconceptions and trust in the actors that were involved in the human rights viola-
tions: the victims, the repressive leader, and the international community. Using the United
States as a test case, I find that naming and shaming does not change individual attitudes
about human rights in general among any sub-population of respondents. In contrast, hu-
man rights advocacy can increase opposition to repressive leaders among those who do not
see abuse victims as threatening and who do not share a party with the leader. Further, the
experimental results show that those who do view the victims as threatening and share a
party with the leader backlash to international advocacy. These individuals increase their
support for repressive leaders following naming and shaming.
Overall, the results of the study suggest that international organizations may face diffi-
culty when trying to change generalized attitudes about domestic repression. However, their
campaigns may be effective at changing support for repressive leaders among some sub-sets
of the populations who already sympathize with repression victims or are skeptical of re-
pressive leaders. These findings are especially interesting when considered in comparison
to other recent survey experiments that evaluate the effect of advocacy on human rights
attitudes. Some of the studies have found a null result of naming and shaming on awareness
of human rights abuses (Ausderan, 2014) and support for the human rights of domestic ter-
rorist organizations (Williamson and Malik, 2020). Others show that international advocacy
can increase support for human rights for victims of state killings (Haines et al., 2020) and
sleep deprivation (McEntire, Leiby and Krain, 2015, 2017). One takeaway from this study is
101
that researchers should evaluate whether naming and shaming campaigns are more effective
among different groups of respondents, as a null effect in the full sample could mask het-
erogeneous effects across groups. The mixed results across studies could also indicate that
respondents react differently to new information about different types of abuses and that
individuals in some countries are more receptive to human rights messaging than others.
Ultimately, there is much room for future research to evaluate the conditions under which
international naming and shaming campaigns change beliefs, as well as behavior.
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5.0 Conclusion
This dissertation has explored the connection between elections and repression by eval-
uating patterns of repression across democracies, individuals’ propensity to incorporate re-
pression into their vote choice, and international organizations’ efficacy at shifting public
opinion about human rights and repressive leaders. Together, the three papers in the dis-
sertation evaluate the extent to which threat perceptions shape individuals’ attitudes about
repression and the likelihood that democratic leaders will incorporate these preferences into
their behavior around elections. The evidence across the papers lends some support to the
theoretical framework while raising important questions for future study.
To summarize the main findings, the first paper shows that leaders increase repression
as elections approach, but only in countries experiencing domestic violence. In contrast to
expectations, the results do not show a significant relationship between pre-election repres-
sion and the likelihood that a leader will win reelection. Turning to the individual level, the
second paper reveals that most voters are indifferent to repression and that even those who
perceive repression victims to be threatening will not reward repressive candidates. Instead,
only voters who identify with the victims of repression punish rights violations at the bal-
lot box, at least regarding repression in the form of restrictions on the right to protest in
the United States. Finally, the third paper shows that threat perception, as well as party
identification, are important moderators for the effect of international shaming on attitudes
about repressive leaders. Generally, the third paper shows that naming and shaming cam-
paigns may be less effective at shifting generalized beliefs about a human rights issue that
has already been the subject of widespread news coverage and debate.
These findings leave ample room for future research to delve deeper into the relationship
between threat perceptions, elections, targeted repression, and voting behavior. To begin,
the results of the first paper lay the foundation for three areas of future study. First, future
research should consider whether patterns of targeted repression during pre-election periods
shape other important outcomes besides leaders’ overall probability of winning reelection.
Survival in office is only one important metric of public support for leaders. Subsequent stud-
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ies should analyze whether repression shapes leaders’ vote share across countries, indicating
the effect of repression on leaders’ performance when they may have already had a high or
low likelihood of winning reelection, and public opinion about leaders. In particular, public
opinion data offers a finer-grained measure of reaction to repression across time. Second,
future research can evaluate whether certain types of leaders are likely to commit repression
based on their expected probability of winning reelection. Perhaps leaders who are secure in
office refrain from resorting to repressive tactics, or, in contrast, perhaps leaders with a high
likelihood of winning have greater freedom to engage in repressive behavior. Evidence for
either of these possibilities would provide important insight into the conditions under which
democracies are at greatest risk of experiencing human rights violations. A final area of
study would evaluate the extent to which electoral considerations shape leaders’ response to
ongoing dissent. Past research has assessed a range of features that influence leaders’ reaction
to domestic challenges. However, further consideration of the electoral dynamics that may
also shape leaders’ response to dissent would add critical insight into the dissent-repression
nexus.
The survey research in the second and third papers generate crucial insight into indi-
vidual decision-making about one important form of repression – restrictions against the
rights to protest – in the context of the United States, an established democracy. In ad-
dition delivering interesting findings, these papers also lay the foundation for a rich body
of research that can further evaluate individual-level beliefs about repression across issue
areas and political contexts. In particular, two areas of study would make important con-
tributions. First, future work should evaluate voters’ propensity to incorporate different
forms of repression, perpetrated against a range of repression targets, into their vote choice.
In particular, this research could examine whether voters react differently to more intense
physical integrity rights violations, such as torture, disappearances, or extrajudicial killings,
perpetrated against a wider range of victims, including members of terrorist groups or other
marginalized communities. The range of repression that may influence vote share is also
likely to vary widely across contexts. Thus, it is important to empirically evaluate the ex-
tent to which these results travel to countries involved in domestic conflict or developing
democracies, in which repression is likely to be more widespread. Regarding the influence of
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international advocacy, it is possible that individuals in the United States are particularly
resistant to naming and shaming, especially in an issue area in which views may be crys-
tallized as a result of widespread debate and media coverage. Future work can assess the
effectiveness of advocacy campaigns in countries that may be more amenable to intervention
from the international community and in issue areas where individuals may be less certain
about the costs and benefits of repression.
Overall, this dissertation generates a research agenda with important contributions to
existing academic debates and public policy. By focusing on one foundational democratic
institution, elections, the dissertation adds nuance to extant findings about the domestic
democratic peace. Prior research demonstrates that democracies are at lower risk for human
rights violations than autocracies. Yet, rights violations in democracies are not uncommon,
particularly against minority communities, protesters, political outsiders, and marginalized
groups. The dissertation highlights one important explanation for this pattern: voters’ ac-
ceptance of, or indifference to, rights violations against those they perceive to be threatening.
The theoretical account highlights the moderating effect of threat perception, often induced
by ongoing domestic conflict, on voting behavior and leaders’ decision to engage in repres-
sion. In so doing, it integrates existing insight about the security-civil liberties trade-off
into a better understanding of patterns of repression across democracies. Taken together,
these contributions pave the way for a deeper understanding of the drivers of human rights
violations across countries and some mechanisms to promote robust human rights regimes
around the world.
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Appendix A Paper 1 Additional Material
A.1 Repression by Regime Type
Figure A.1: Repression by Regime Type































































Notes: Each panel shows the proportion of each category of repression for democracies and autocracies, as defined by
Przeworski et al. (2000). Higher values on the x-axis indicate higher levels of repression. From left to right, data is from Fariss
(2014) (1945-2016), the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project (1980-2011) (Cingranelli, Richards and
Clay, 2014), the Political Terror Scale (1976-2016) (Gibney et al., 2019), and the Social Conflict Analysis Database
(1990-2016) (Salehyan et al., 2012). The last column plots the proportion of protest events to which the government
responded with lethal or non-lethal repression.
A.2 Measuring Repression from ICEWS
I make several coding decisions to extract repressive events from the larger database of all
ICEWS events. These coding decisions are based on accepted definitions of repression from
Davenport (2007a), Goldstein (1978), and Ritter (2014). Following Ritter (2014), repression
is “coercive actions political authorities take to inhibit the will or capacity of people within
their jurisdiction to influence political outcomes” (145). Below, I outline the coding rules
for collecting repressive events.
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1. First, events must be coercive actions that inhibit the will or capacity of people to
influence political outcomes. I identify events that match this definition based on their
CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Event Observations) code, which is a systematized
metric to identify event types (Schrodt and Yilmaz, 2007). The CAMEO codes that I
identify as repressive events are below. More specific descriptions of these categories and
examples of events that meet these criteria can be found in the CAMEO codebook.
• 1233: reject request for rights
• 1241: refuse to ease administrative sanctions
• 132: threaten with administrative sanctions, not specified
• 1321: threaten with restrictions on political freedom
• 1322: threaten to ban political parties or politicians
• 1323: threaten to impose curfew
• 1324: threaten to impose state of emergency or martial law
• 137: threaten with repression
• 1383: threaten unconventional violence
• 151: increase police alert status
• 153: mobilize or increase police power
• 170: coerce, not specified
• 172: impose administrative sanctions, not specified
• 1721: impose restrictions on political freedoms
• 1722: ban political parties or politicians
• 1723: impose curfew
• 1724: impose state of emergency or martial law
• 175: use tactics of violent repression
• 180: use unconventional violence, not specified
• 181: abduct, hijack, or take hostage
• 182: physically assault, not specified
• 1821: sexually assault
• 1822: torture
• 1823: kill by physical assault
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• 185: attempt to assassinate
• 186: assassinate
• 200: use unconventional mass violence, not specified
• 201: engage in mass expulsion
• 202: engage in mass killings
• 203: engage in ethnic cleansing
2. Second, events must be perpetrated by political authorities linked to a specific coun-
try. ICEWS includes a variable that links the source of the event (the perpetrator)
to a specific country, if possible. I first filter out all observations where this variable is
missing. These are cases where the perpetrator could not be linked to a specific country,
such as when the source is an international organization (e.g., Relief International, UN
Women), a multi-national corporation (e.g., Tim Hortons, Netflix, Tesla Motors), or an
individual (e.g., Amara Essy, Ronald Lauder). Next, I exclude all observations where
the source was not a country identified by Correlates of War. These include occupied or
overseas territories (e.g., Palestine, Aruba, Puerto Rico) and land not linked to a state
(e.g., Holy See, Antarctica, Timor-Leste under UN control). Since I later tie repression
to electoral outcomes at the national level, I only include acts associated with a source
country.
3. Third, events must be perpetrated by political authorities. To satisfy this condition, I
omit events that were perpetrated by actors that are associated with a particular country
but do not represent the government. More specifically, because I will look at the results
of executive elections, I only keep events that are linked to the executive branch. ICEWS
uses a nested dictionary to identify the sector associated with each event’s source. The
master dictionary includes 591 sector types belonging to five nested levels. Each event
can be associated with multiple sectors. I keep events that were associated with at least
one of the following sectors: Government (if there are no lower nested categories listed),
Executive (and all nested categories), Police (and all nested categories), Military (and all
nested categories), Legislative / Parliamentary (and all nested categories), Government
Religious (and all nested categories), Government Major Party (In Government), and
Government Minor Party (In Government). I also keep cases where the sector was not
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identified: following a standard unitary actor assumption, I assume that coercive actions
taken by the country in general can be associated with the country’s leader.
4. Fourth, events must be perpetrated within the source country’s jurisdiction. For
this condition I verify that either (1) the source country has the same COW code as
the country in which the event occurred or (2) the location of the event was an overseas
territory of the source country. For instance, I consider coercive actions taken by the
United States both in the United States as well as in American Samoa, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the U.S. Minor
Outlying Islands to be repression. I drop observations where the location is neither a
country nor an occupied territory (Antarctica, Holy See, and Timor-Leste under UN
management).
5. Fifth, the target must belong to the source country. Here I reference expanded def-
initions of repression, which specify that repressive actions must be perpetrated against
those under the source country’s jurisdiction (Fariss, 2014), to control citizens’ behav-
ior (Ritter, 2014), or to “prevent people within the state from participating in their own
governance” (Conrad and Ritter, 2019, emphasis added). These definitions all recognize
that repression is limited to state actions taken against those who in some sense belong to
the state’s jurisdiction, not just events that take place within the state’s territory. After
limiting the sample according to the other coding rules, there remain cases in which the
target country does not match the source/location country. These are cases where:
• The target country is missing. This occurs when the target cannot be linked to a spe-
cific country. There are 713 distinct actors in this category, including international
organizations (e.g., UN, EU, Peackeeping Troops, International Media), individuals
(e.g., Aum Shinrikyo, Kofi Annan, Tom Steyer), NGOs (e.g., Human Rights Watch),
regions (e.g., Latin America, Middle East, South Asia), and international ethnic and
religious groups.
• The target belongs to a country other than the source country. These are coercive
actions taken by one country against actors associated with another country. Many
of these events straddle the line between repression and interstate conflict. Rather
than repression, such events better fit with states’ sovereign right to monopolize
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force in their own territories.
• The target is attempting to join the source country (asylum seekers, refugees, im-
migrants, illegal immigrants, and expatriates). These cases overlap with both of the
above categories: sometimes they are linked to a specific country and other times
not. These events represent a challenging coding decision given that the target does
not belong to the source country but may consider the source country to be their
own.
I keep cases that fall in the third category and eliminate all other cases where the source
and the target do not match. Past definitions do not typically consider coercive action
taken against individuals or groups that do not belong to the perpetrating case to be
repression. Still, it is reasonable to consider immigrants and refugees to fall under their
host country’s jurisdiction. I code four variables to demarcate these categories: refugees
(the target sector is “Refugees / Displaced”), exiles (the target actor is “Exiled Opposi-
tion” or “Exiles”), immigrants (the target actor is “Immigrant”), illegal immigrants (the
target actor is “Illegal Immigrant”).
A.3 Comparing ICEWS to Other Measures of Repression
The result of these coding decisions is a sample of 125,163 unique repressive events. How
does this events-based measure of repression compare to existing standards-based measures?
I briefly compare the measure of repression I have created using the ICEWS data with
existing measures of repression: the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project
(CIRI), the Political Terror Scare (PTS), and Fariss’ continuous measure. Where necessary, I
rescale these variables so that higher values represent more repression. Figure A.2 shows that
there is a positive correlation between each of these variables and my measure of repression.
I also regress each of these measures on my measure, while controlling for variables known
to be correlated with events coverage: whether the country is a democracy (as measured by
Przeworski et al. (2000)), whether the country is a member of the OECD, and the country’s
Population. I use a Poisson link function given that the dependent variable is a count of the
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total number of repressive events.
These results, presented in Table A.1, are promising. First, there is a positive and
statistically significant relationship between each preexisting measure of repression and the
ICEWS event count. Second, the control variables behave as I would expect for events data:
countries that are more democratic, belong to the OECD, and have larger populations are
likely to have more repressive events. Rather than suggesting that these countries are more
repressive per se, these results indicate the well-known biases of events data: richer, larger,
and more democratic countries are more likely to have higher news coverage. It is also
possible that the results suggest something interesting about repression across regime types.
While autocracies are likely to rank low on standards-based measures of repression, their
levels of repression may also be based on a culture of fear that inhibits popular dissent. As a
result, these countries may have fewer repressive events, even disregarding the bias in news
coverage.1 Overall, these results indicate that my sample of free and fair elections will have
good coverage in the ICEWS data and that my measure has face validity in comparison to
existing metrics.






































































1Note that these regression results hold when I use Polity and V-Dem’s polyarchy index instead of
Przeworski’s measure of democracy.
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Democracy 0.342∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
OECD 0.320∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Population 0.411∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant −5.156∗∗∗ −7.609∗∗∗ −5.876∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.032) (0.035)
Observations 2,746 3,745 3,753
Notes: Poisson models. Dependent variable is the count
of repressive events for each country-year. ***, **, *
significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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A.4 Repression of Threatening Groups
Table A.2: Repression of Threatening
Groups
Event Type Count
Use tactics of violent repression 22221
Coerce 3165
Physically assault 1785
Use unconventional violence 1429
Impose administrative sanctions 1415
Assassinate 1115
Torture 599
Abduct, hijack, or take hostage 345
Impose restrictions on political freedoms 344
Threaten with repression 269
Ban political parties or politicians 132
Attempt to assassinate 93
Sexually assault 92
Kill by physical assault 92
Refuse to ease administrative sanctions 89
Engage in mass killings 40
Mobilize or increase police power 31
Threaten with administrative sanctions 30
Engage in mass expulsion 21
Increase police alert status 16
Threaten with restrictions on political freedoms 15
Threaten to ban political parties or politicians 14
Impose state of emergency or martial law 10
Impose curfew 6
Reject request for rights 1
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Notes: Frequency of repressive events perpetrated against groups identified as threatening in all countries (democracies and
autocracies, 1995-2020). Note that by far the most common threatening target was dissidents, making up 98% of observations.
I omit this category to better observe the relative frequency of the other categories.
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A.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table A.3: Summary Statistics (H1)
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Repression 14,121 0.52 2.60 0 141
Months to Election 14,121 11.97 7.00 0 24
Polyarchy 14,121 0.74 0.13 0.50 0.92
Free/Fair Election 11,674 1.35 0.75 −0.93 2.74
Population 11,814 41,026,466.00 136,588,295.00 131,678.00 1,352,617,328.00
GDP per Capita 11,293 9.44 1.03 6.59 11.34
GTD Growth 11,293 0.03 0.04 −0.55 0.21
Protests 14,121 7.47 26.06 0 573
Conflict (UCDP) 13,017 0.02 0.15 0 1
Insurgency (NAVCO) 5,676 0.07 0.26 0 1
Attack (GTD) 14,121 0.07 0.25 0 1
Table A.4: Summary Statistics (H2)
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Party Win 605 0.44 0.50 0 1
Repression 590 2.27 6.95 0 67
Polyarchy 605 0.74 0.13 0.50 0.92
Free/Fair Election 605 1.32 0.76 −0.93 2.74
Population 560 36,641,403.00 121,962,391.00 133,806.00 1,295,604,184.00
GDP per Capita 536 9.42 1.03 6.59 11.34
GDP Growth 536 0.03 0.03 −0.14 0.13
Protests 605 8.63 21.33 0 286
Margin of Majority 490 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Years in Office 518 5.03 3.15 1.00 20.00
Presidential Election 605 0.31 0.46 0 1
Semi-presidential Election 605 0.29 0.45 0 1
Judicial Constraints 605 0.80 0.17 0.12 0.99
Legislative Constraints 605 0.79 0.17 0.10 0.98
Conflict (UCDP) 590 0.03 0.16 0 1
Insurgency (NAVCO) 258 0.08 0.27 0 1
Attack (GTD) 590 0.17 0.38 0 1
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Notes: Ratio of party wins and losses in presidential, semipresidential, and parliamentary elections between 1995 and 2019.
Party win is when the executive’s party kept their position as head of government or head of state as a result of the election.
N = 605.
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A.6 Predicted Probabilities for Hypothesis 2 Analysis























































Notes: Predicted probability of reelection based on the levels of repression in the pre-election period and the presence of
ongoing conflict. 95% confidence intervals. All control variable set to means.
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A.7 Additional Analysis for Hypothesis 1
A.7.1 Additional Control Variables
















Months to Election * Attack −0.02
(0.02)
Polyarchy −3.26 −7.34∗∗∗ −4.57
(3.21) (2.57) (3.67)
Election Free/Fair 0.51∗ 1.21∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗
(0.26) (0.31) (0.24)
Population 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per Capita 0.47 0.41 0.54
(0.32) (0.31) (0.33)
GDP Growth −5.59∗∗∗ −3.46 −5.48∗∗∗
(2.04) (2.78) (2.01)
Protests 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Repressiont−1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Inflation −0.02∗∗ −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Education −0.01 0.06 −0.02
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Freedom of Expression −2.11 −3.62∗ −0.90
(2.08) (2.01) (2.95)
Constant −1.86 1.27 −2.54
(2.24) (2.16) (2.66)
Observations 9, 021 4, 424 9, 021
Notes: Dependent variable is the count of the number of repressive actions in each
month. Standard errors clustered by country. Sample is the 24 months before an
executive election (presidential, parliamentary, semipresidential) in a democracy.
***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
118






















































Notes: Predicted levels of repression based on the months to the next executive election and the presence of ongoing conflict.
95% confidence intervals. All control variable set to means. Outcome variable: count of repressive actions perpetrated by the
government in each month.
119
A.7.2 Free/Fair Elections
















Months to Election * Attack −0.03∗
(0.02)
Polyarchy −4.13∗∗ −7.16∗∗∗ −4.65∗∗∗
(1.89) (1.23) (1.65)
Free/Fair Election 0.58∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.21) (0.21)
Population 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per Capita 0.44∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗
(0.23) (0.23) (0.22)
GDP Growth −5.46∗∗∗ −3.87∗ −5.25∗∗∗
(1.98) (2.05) (1.91)
Protests 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Repressiont−1 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −2.87∗∗ −3.02∗ −2.77∗∗
(1.28) (1.57) (1.25)
Observations 9, 021 4, 424 9, 021
Notes: Dependent variable is the count of the number of repressive actions in each
month. Standard errors clustered by country. Sample is the 24 months before an
executive election (presidential, parliamentary, semipresidential) in a democracy
with free/fair elections. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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Notes: Predicted levels of repression based on the months to the next executive election and the presence of ongoing conflict.
95% confidence intervals. All control variable set to means. Outcome variable: count of repressive actions perpetrated by the
government in each month.
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A.7.3 Heterogeneous Effects by Incumbent Ideology: Right-Wing Leaders
















Months to Election * Attack −0.00
(0.02)
Polyarchy −7.96∗∗ −10.00∗∗∗ −8.41∗∗∗
(3.39) (1.96) (2.56)
Free/Fair Election 0.84∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.29) (0.33)
Population 0.00 0.00 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per Capita 0.82∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗
(0.41) (0.35) (0.39)
GDP Growth −6.60∗∗∗ −8.58∗∗ −6.67∗∗∗
(2.21) (3.47) (2.40)
Protests 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Repressiont−1 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant −4.09 −5.80∗∗ −3.96
(2.55) (2.48) (2.54)
Observations 3, 317 1, 828 3, 317
Notes: Dependent variable is the count of the number of repressive actions in each
month. Standard errors clustered by country. Sample is the 24 months before an
executive election (presidential, parliamentary, semipresidential) in a democracy
with a right-wing incumbent. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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Notes: Predicted levels of repression based on the months to the next executive election and the presence of ongoing conflict.
95% confidence intervals. All control variable set to means. Outcome variable: count of repressive actions perpetrated by the
government in each month.
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A.7.4 Heterogeneous Effects by Incumbent Ideology: Left-Wing Leaders
















Months to Election * Attack −0.02
(0.02)
Polyarchy −2.85 −6.70∗∗∗ −2.78
(2.15) (1.82) (2.06)
Free/Fair Election 0.92∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.32) (0.25)
Population 0.00 0.00 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per Capita 0.30 0.53∗∗ 0.26
(0.26) (0.26) (0.24)
GDP Growth −10.03∗∗ 0.66 −10.09∗∗
(4.27) (3.28) (4.06)
Protests 0.00 0.02∗∗ 0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Repressiont−1 0.06∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Constant −3.24∗ −3.11∗∗ −2.96∗
(1.71) (1.53) (1.65)
Observations 3, 626 1, 972 3, 626
Notes: Dependent variable is the count of the number of repressive actions in each
month. Standard errors clustered by country. Sample is the 24 months before an
executive election (presidential, parliamentary, semipresidential) in a democracy
with a left-wing incumbent. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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Notes: Predicted levels of repression based on the months to the next executive election and the presence of ongoing conflict.
95% confidence intervals. All control variable set to means. Outcome variable: count of repressive actions perpetrated by the
government in each month.
125
A.8 Repression of Non-Threatening Groups
Table A.9: Election Timing and Repression (of Non-Threatening Groups)
Bivariate Controls Conflict Insurgency Terrorism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Months to Election −0.01∗∗ −0.01∗ −0.01 −0.02∗∗∗ −0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Conflict (UCDP) 1.05∗∗
(0.47)








Months to Election * Attack −0.01
(0.01)
Polyarchy −5.89∗∗∗ −5.03∗∗∗ −6.86∗∗∗ −5.69∗∗∗
(1.36) (1.40) (1.65) (1.32)
Free/Fair Election 0.53∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.50∗∗
(0.23) (0.22) (0.25) (0.22)
Population 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per capita 0.64∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.17)
GDP Growth −4.05∗∗ −3.50∗∗ −3.85∗ −3.64∗∗
(1.85) (1.76) (2.23) (1.71)
Protests 0.00 0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Repressiont−1 0.02∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Constant 0.68∗∗ −2.07 −2.70∗ −2.97∗ −2.29
(0.30) (1.40) (1.46) (1.58) (1.40)
Observations 14, 121 10, 701 10, 701 5, 248 10, 701
Notes: Dependent variable is the count of the number of repressive actions against non-threatening groups in each
month. Standard errors clustered by country. Sample is the 24 months before an executive election (presidential,
parliamentary, semipresidential) in a democracy. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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A.9 Effect of Timing on Conflict
Table A.10: Election Timing and Conflict Onset
Conflict Insurgency Attack
(1) (2) (3)
Months to Election −0.01 −0.01 −0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Polyarchy −29.66∗∗∗ −15.96∗∗ −4.26
(5.20) (6.27) (3.18)
Free/Fair Election 0.73 0.84∗ 0.39
(0.88) (0.49) (0.41)
Population 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per Capita 1.00∗∗∗ 0.81 0.36
(0.39) (0.51) (0.27)
GDP Growth −18.18∗∗∗ −6.20 −5.07∗∗
(6.74) (6.52) (2.44)
Protests −0.04∗∗∗ −0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Repression 0.08∗∗∗ 0.02 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
Constant 5.33 −0.24 −3.33
(3.80) (3.44) (2.09)
Observations 10, 709 5, 216 10, 709
Notes: Dependent variable is the presence of civil conflict (M1), vio-
lent insurgency (M2), and domestic terrorism (M3). Standard errors
clustered by country. Sample is the 24 months before an executive
election (presidential, parliamentary, semipresidential) in a democ-
racy. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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Appendix B Paper 2 Additional Material
B.1 Top Issues in the 2020 Gubernatorial Races
Table B.1 shows the results of a survey of all candidate platforms for the 2020 guberna-
torial elections (N = 122). Gubernatorial races took place in Delaware, Indiana, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and
West Virginia. I reviewed every candidate’s website and noted each issue that was featured
in at least one of the candidates’ platforms. The Table shows the issues that were mentioned
in at least five platforms, with the total number of campaigns where the issue was featured
listed in the right-hand column.
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Notes: Issues addressed in at least five
gubernatorial platforms in the 2020
elections (out of 122 total candidates).
Issues in gray included as attributes in
the conjoint experiment.
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B.2 Coding of Demographic Control Variables
• Gender : male, other, female (omitted)
• Income: low (omitted: combines less than $30,000 and $30,000-$50,000), high (combines
$50,000-$74,999 and $75,000 or more)
• Education: less than college (omitted: combines less than high school degree, high school
degree or equivalent, some college but no degree), college (combines Bachelor’s degree
and Graduate degree)
• Age: young (omitted: 18-34), middle aged (combines 35-49 and 50-64), old (65+)
• Race: white (omitted), Black or African American, Hispanic/Latino, other
• Community : rural (omitted), large city, suburb near a large city, small city or town
• Region: Northeast (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Vermont, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania), Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota), South (omitted: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, District of Columbia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas), West (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon,
Washington)
• Party ID : Democrat (omitted), Republican, Independent, other (combines no preference,
other party, and don’t know)
• Ideology : liberal (omitted: combines very liberal and liberal), moderate, conservative
(combines very conservative and conservative), other
B.3 Balance Checks
All of the treatments in the conjoint design are fully randomized across candidate pro-
files. Therefore, on average, one would expect respondents’ demographic features to be
balanced across the treatments. However, there may be chance imbalance along two lines:
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(1) individuals with particular demographic features may be more likely to receive a certain
treatment and (2) some candidate attributes may be more likely to appear with other at-
tributes (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). This section evaluates and addresses
possible imbalance across these categories.
First, Table B.2 uses an ordered probit model to regress the five treatment categories on
demographic features of respondents, using the control condition of support for all protests
as the baseline category. I do not use this full sample for any of the hypothesis tests. How-
ever, the model evaluates whether any of the six blocks used for the hypothesis tests are
significantly correlated with receiving one type of treatment over another. The results rule
out this possibility. Compared to the omitted baseline categories (BlM in-group and WN
in-group), the sub-samples for non-threatening out-groups and threatening out-groups are
not significantly correlated with any of the four treatment conditions compared to the base-
line condition. This analysis confirms the effectiveness of the block randomization scheme,
allowing for sub-sample analysis of the hypothesis tests.
Second, Tables B.3, B.4, and B.5 again use ordered probit models to regress the treat-
ment conditions on demographic features in the sub-samples used for the hypothesis tests:
among in-groups, those who perceive the target to be a non-threatening out-group, and those
who perceive the target to be a threatening out-group. There is some imbalance across a
few demographic features in these samples, as would be expected from the relatively small
sample sizes. To address the possibility that these imbalanced features could bias the results
of the hypothesis tests, in Table B.6 I re-run the results including all demographic covari-
ates. In Table B.7, I re-run the results including only those demographic features that were
imbalanced in each of the sub-samples. Across these models, the results are robust.
Finally, Table B.8 replicates the main hypothesis tests while including indicators for all
candidate attributes. The results also remain unchanged with these controls. This analysis
has the added benefit of indicating the relative strength of the size of the effect for repression
on candidates’ vote share compared to other attributes of interest, as I discuss in the main
paper.
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B.3.1 Treatment Assignment in Full Sample
Table B.2: Balance Check: Full Sample
Anti-BLM Violence Anti-WN Violence Deny BLM Permits Deny WN Permits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BLM out/non-threat 0.94 0.97 0.90 1.07
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
WN out/non-threat 1.01 0.98 1.07 1.05
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
BLM out/threat 0.95 0.93 0.94 1.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
WN out/threat 1.09 1.08 0.99 1.07
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Male 0.99 1.08 0.99 0.93
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Other Gender 0.71 0.90 0.69 0.75
(0.51) (0.49) (0.49) (0.51)
High Income 1.04 0.96 1.00 0.96
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
College 1.02 0.97 1.01 1.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Middle Age 0.88∗ 0.92 0.90 0.84∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Old Age 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.90
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Black 0.82∗∗ 0.90 0.83∗∗ 0.99
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Latino 1.00 0.95 0.98 0.85∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Other Race 0.97 1.05 1.14 0.99
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
City 1.08 1.05 0.97 1.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Suburb 0.94 0.91 0.87∗ 0.94
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Town 1.02 0.97 0.92 1.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Republican 1.01 1.03 1.02 1.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Independent 1.01 1.10 1.17 0.95
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Other Party 1.02 0.89 1.12 0.79
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Moderate 0.99 1.08 0.99 1.05
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Conservative 1.00 1.06 0.98 1.05
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Other Ideology 1.15 1.20 1.05 1.31
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Northeast 1.05 1.10 1.08 1.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Midwest 1.08 1.03 1.03 0.92
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
West 1.03 1.03 1.05 1.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant 1.06 0.96 1.14 1.03
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Notes: Dependent variable is treatment condition with baseline category as “support all protesters.”
Full sample of conjoint tasks for all respondents (N = 15000). Multinomial logit models with relative
risk ratios reported. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively. Omitted category for group
identification is in-group members. Other omitted categories listed in Appendix Section B.2.
132
B.3.2 Treatment Assignment in Sub-Samples
Table B.3: Balance Check: In-Group Samples
BLM In-Group Members WN In-Group Members
Anti-BLM Anti-WN Deny BLM Deny WN Anti-BLM Anti-WN Deny BLM Deny WN
Violence Violence Permits Permits Violence Violence Permits Permits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male 1.04 1.11 1.00 0.97 1.06 0.84 1.30 0.94
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Other Gend. 0.38 0.93 0.82 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.83) (0.63) (0.67) (0.73) (0.00)
High Income 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.94 0.90 1.08 1.08
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
College 0.98 0.94 0.99 1.15 1.41∗ 0.96 1.13 0.99
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Middle Age 0.81∗∗ 0.87 0.80∗∗ 0.78∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.85 0.75∗ 0.84
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Old Age 0.92 0.97 0.99 1.03 0.78 0.86 1.20 0.93
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.40) (0.41) (0.38) (0.40)
Black 0.80∗∗ 0.79∗∗ 0.81∗ 1.09 0.91 0.84 0.77 1.35
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.26)
Latino 0.97 0.89 1.04 0.97 1.50 0.55∗∗ 1.04 0.72
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.25) (0.28) (0.26) (0.28)
Other Race 0.79 1.12 1.10 1.07 0.67 1.00 2.17 1.90
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.64) (0.61) (0.54) (0.56)
City 0.97 0.88 0.99 0.89 0.84 0.94 0.93 0.88
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Suburb 0.91 0.77∗ 0.89 0.81 0.89 0.71 0.93 0.73
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
Town 0.80 0.71∗∗ 0.80 0.92 0.53∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.56∗ 1.15
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.31) (0.34) (0.32) (0.30)
Republican 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.08 1.24 1.19 1.50∗∗ 1.26
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Independent 0.76 0.83 0.92 0.67∗ 0.82 0.86 1.31 0.71
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32) (0.35)
Other Party 0.81 1.07 0.96 1.07 1.08 1.25 1.33 2.30
(0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.78) (0.86) (0.81) (0.78)
Moderate 0.99 1.16 1.11 1.01 1.03 0.99 1.01 1.01
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Conservative 0.94 1.01 1.03 1.04 1.01 1.00 0.95 0.89
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Other Ideol. 1.13 0.89 1.16 0.87 0.92 1.04 1.37 1.95
(0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.33) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.46)
Northeast 1.13 1.07 1.05 0.95 1.17 1.01 0.82 0.83
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
Midwest 0.97 0.99 0.93 0.97 1.06 1.24 1.11 0.89
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
West 1.08 0.91 1.01 1.01 1.21 1.15 0.99 1.06
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Constant 1.36∗ 1.29 1.26 1.18 1.04 1.54 0.83 1.19
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32)
Notes: Dependent variable is treatment condition with baseline category as “support all protesters.” Samples of BLM
in-group members for M1 - M4 (N = 6120) and WN in-group members for M5 - M8 (N = 2800). Multinomial logit models
with relative risk ratios reported. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively. Omitted categories listed in Appendix
Section B.2.
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Table B.4: Balance Check: Out-group / Non-threatening Samples
BLM Out-Group / Non-Threatening WN Out-Group / Non-Threatening
BLM In-Group Members WN In-Group Members
Anti-BLM Anti-WN Deny BLM Deny WN Anti-BLM Anti-WN Deny BLM Deny WN
Violence Violence Permits Permits Violence Violence Permits Permits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male 0.95 1.06 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.14 0.94 0.91
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Other Gend. 0.67 0.55 0.59 0.80 0.56 0.87 0.70 0.87
(0.76) (0.84) (0.79) (0.79) (0.54) (0.51) (0.51) (0.53)
High Income 1.04 1.01 1.05 1.03 1.08 0.96 1.00 1.06
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
College 1.00 0.95 1.06 1.09 1.04 0.96 1.00 0.97
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Middle Age 1.02 1.10 1.02 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.90
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Old Age 1.08 1.22 0.94 0.96 1.09 0.99 0.99 0.89
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Black 0.98 1.12 0.90 0.64∗ 0.85 0.90 0.75∗∗ 0.89
(0.25) (0.24) (0.26) (0.27) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Latino 1.04 0.88 0.83 0.63∗∗∗ 1.06 1.08 0.95 0.84
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Other Race 1.20 1.05 1.15 1.09 1.19 1.17 1.09 1.04
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
City 1.03 1.05 0.83 0.94 1.08 1.06 0.95 1.13
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Suburb 0.94 0.96 0.85 0.97 1.06 1.04 0.89 1.05
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Town 1.03 1.05 0.80 0.85 1.00 1.01 0.89 1.09
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Republican 1.08 1.08 1.17 1.15 0.94 1.06 0.92 0.97
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Independent 1.26 1.37∗ 1.45∗∗ 1.16 1.01 1.17 1.26 0.91
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Other Party 1.23 0.95 1.44 0.75 1.21 1.00 1.42 0.70
(0.24) (0.26) (0.25) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.26) (0.29)
Moderate 0.85 0.89 0.72∗∗∗ 0.90 0.98 0.94 0.93 1.09
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Conservative 0.97 0.95 0.89 0.87 0.98 0.93 1.00 1.16
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Other Ideol. 1.03 1.29 0.91 1.49 1.18 1.10 0.76 1.28
(0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Northeast 1.03 1.07 1.13 1.15 0.97 1.03 1.15 1.05
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Midwest 1.32∗∗ 1.13 1.20 0.99 1.14 0.99 1.06 0.96
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
West 1.31∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗ 1.15 1.07 1.03 0.99 0.96
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Constant 0.87 0.77 1.01 1.08 0.92 0.91 1.26 1.01
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Notes: Dependent variable is treatment condition with baseline category as “support all protesters.” Samples of BLM out-
group non-threatening for M1 - M4 (N = 5440) and WN out-group non-threatening for M5 - M8 (N = 6140). Multinomial
logit models with relative risk ratios reported. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively. Omitted categories listed
in Appendix Section B.2.
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Table B.5: Balance Check: Out-Group / Threatening Samples
BLM Out-Group / Threatening WN Out-Group / Threatening
BLM In-Group Members WN In-Group Members
Anti-BLM Anti-WN Deny BLM Deny WN Anti-BLM Anti-WN Deny BLM Deny WN
Violence Violence Permits Permits Violence Violence Permits Permits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male 0.84 0.93 0.92 0.74∗∗∗ 0.99 1.06 0.96 0.97
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Other Gender 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
High Income 1.08 0.93 1.09 0.87 1.02 0.96 1.03 0.87
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
College 1.12 1.07 0.97 0.89 0.97 1.01 1.03 1.12
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Middle Age 0.83 0.83 0.92 0.76∗ 0.85 0.94 0.82∗ 0.84
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Old Age 0.97 0.77 0.95 0.75∗ 0.90 0.93 0.83 0.95
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Black 0.69 1.03 0.96 0.83 0.79 0.90 0.92 0.91
(0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Latino 1.11 1.19 1.18 0.95 0.84 0.97 0.94 0.87
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Other Race 1.15 1.11 1.23 0.71 0.79 0.96 1.10 0.94
(0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.35) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
City 1.45∗ 1.40∗ 1.07 1.62∗∗ 1.36∗∗ 1.09 1.13 1.05
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Suburb 0.97 0.90 0.80 1.22 0.97 0.90 0.90 0.91
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Town 1.33∗ 1.16 1.14 1.51∗∗ 1.24 1.11 1.04 0.93
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Republican 0.93 1.22 0.96 1.12 0.92 0.86 0.96 0.97
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Independent 1.36 1.59 1.43 1.10 1.04 1.02 0.98 0.95
(0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.35) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Other Party 0.62 0.72 0.80 0.96 0.91 0.76 0.69 0.91
(0.52) (0.56) (0.52) (0.54) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
Moderate 1.32 1.17 1.46 1.95∗∗ 1.05 1.22∗ 1.09 1.05
(0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.30) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Conservative 1.15 1.10 1.13 1.74∗ 1.06 1.23 1.02 1.10
(0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.29) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Other Ideology 1.88 1.01 0.91 2.35 0.93 1.23 1.56 1.11
(0.60) (0.67) (0.66) (0.63) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37)
Northeast 1.07 1.50∗ 1.02 0.96 1.06 1.18 1.09 1.09
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Midwest 0.85 0.84 0.95 0.68∗∗ 0.98 1.03 0.95 0.86
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
West 0.67∗∗ 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.94 1.03 1.08 1.00
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Constant 1.01 0.88 0.98 0.75 1.18 0.96 1.08 1.18
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.34) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Notes: Dependent variable is treatment condition with baseline category as “support all protesters.” Samples of BLM
out-group threatening for M1 - M4 (N = 3440) and WN out-group threatening for M5 - M8 (N = 6060). Multinomial
logit models with relative risk ratios reported. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively. Omitted categories
listed in Appendix Section B.2.
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B.3.3 Controlling for Demographic Features




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.17∗∗ 0.00 −0.10 −0.01 0.14 −0.16∗
(0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.23∗∗∗ −0.05 −0.13 −0.00 0.13 −0.24∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Deny WN Permits −0.06 −0.07 −0.06 −0.07 −0.16 −0.11
(0.08) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Use Violence Against WN −0.18∗∗ −0.13 −0.06 −0.11 −0.09 −0.12
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09)
Male 0.00 −0.01 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Other Gender −0.01 −0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
High Income −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.01∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
College −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Middle Age −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Old Age −0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.01∗ −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Black −0.01∗∗ 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Latino −0.00 −0.01 0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Other Race −0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.02 −0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
City −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Suburb −0.00 −0.01 −0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Town −0.01∗ −0.01 −0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Republican 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Independent −0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Other Party −0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Moderate 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Conservative −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Other Ideology 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Northeast 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Midwest −0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
West 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.01 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Constant 0.14∗∗ 0.06 0.07 0.04 −0.01 0.13∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Observations 5, 960 2, 660 5, 260 5, 880 3, 340 6, 020
Notes: Dependent variable is candidate selection. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample is BLM in-
group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-
group / non-threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening
(M6). ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively. Omitted categories listed in Appendix Section B.2.
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Table B.7: Effect of Repression on Vote Share with Controls for Imbalanced Respondent
Demographics (see Tables B.3, B.4, and B.5 for Variable Selection)
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.17∗∗ 0.00 −0.09 −0.03 0.13 −0.17∗∗
(0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.22∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.12 −0.01 0.12 −0.24∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Deny WN Permits −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −0.07 −0.16 −0.11
(0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Use Violence Against WN −0.18∗∗ −0.12 −0.05 −0.10 −0.10 −0.13





Middle Age −0.01 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Old Age −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Black −0.01∗∗ 0.00 −0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Latino −0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Other Race −0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
City 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Suburb −0.00 −0.01 0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Town −0.01 −0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Republican 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Independent −0.00 −0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Other Party −0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Moderate −0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Conservative −0.00 0.02∗ −0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)








Constant 0.13∗∗ 0.05 0.06 0.04 −0.01 0.13∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Observations 6, 040 2, 680 5, 360 6, 140 3, 360 6, 040
Notes: Dependent variable is candidate selection. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample is BLM in-group (M1),
white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group / non-threatening
(M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening (M6). ***, **, * significant at .01,
.05, .10, respectively. Omitted categories listed in Appendix Section B.2.
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B.3.4 Controlling for Candidate Attributes
Table B.8: Effect of Repression on Vote Share with Controls for Candidate Attributes
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Baseline: Support All Protests
Deny Permits to BLM −0.20∗∗ −0.02 −0.12 −0.04 0.12 −0.18∗∗
(0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.25∗∗∗ −0.07 −0.12 −0.01 0.14 −0.23∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Deny Permits to WN −0.07 −0.07 −0.07 −0.08 −0.10 −0.11
(0.08) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Use Violence Against WN −0.20∗∗ −0.12 −0.06 −0.11 −0.10 −0.14
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09)
Baseline: White
Black 0.05 −0.17∗∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.04 −0.16∗∗ −0.03
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Baseline: Male
Female −0.05 −0.11 0.01 −0.04 −0.00 0.06
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
Baseline: Incumbent
Businessperson 0.05 0.01 0.13∗ 0.10 0.14∗ 0.13∗∗
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
State Representative 0.08 0.08 0.04 −0.00 0.07 0.10∗
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Baseline: Democrat
Independent −0.16∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗ −0.03 0.19∗ −0.03
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07)
Republican −0.18∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ 0.05 0.45∗∗∗ −0.07
(0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07)
Baseline: Pro-Choice
Safe/Legal/Rare −0.04 0.05 0.12∗ 0.10 0.37∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07)
Pro-Life −0.11 0.12 0.03 0.18∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.08
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09)
Baseline: Limit COVID Re-opening
Increase COVID Re-opening −0.22∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.33∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗ −0.08 −0.43∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Baseline: Support Public Schools
No Common Core 0.12∗ 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.14∗∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06)
More Parent Choice 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.00
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07)
Baseline: Gun Restrictions
Pro 2nd Amendment −0.16∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.12∗∗ −0.01 0.38∗∗∗ −0.05
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Baseline: Universal Healthcare
Free Market Healthcare −0.06 0.02 −0.03 −0.01 0.11 −0.03
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
Baseline: Path to Legal Residence
Close Borders −0.17∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.05 −0.00 0.41∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Baseline: Fair Economy
Reduce Econ. Regulations −0.13∗∗ 0.05 −0.11∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.08
(0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Baseline: Reduce Emissions
Reduce Environ. Regulations −0.18∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗ −0.11∗ −0.03 0.10 −0.12∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Constant 0.67∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.09 −1.07∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.12) (0.17) (0.14) (0.13) (0.19) (0.14)
Observations 6, 120 2, 800 5, 440 6, 140 3, 440 6, 060
Notes: Dependent variable is candidate selection. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample is BLM in-group (M1),
white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group / non-threatening
(M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening (M6). ***, **, * significant at .01, .05,
.10, respectively.
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B.4 Group Identification and Threat Perception
B.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
















Notes: Group identification for main groups in experimental analysis. N = 750. Survey question: “Please indicate whether
your or someone close to you (a close friend or family member) would consider themselves a member of the following groups.”












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Threat Perception
Notes: Threat perception for main groups in experimental analysis. N = 750. Groups of interest in bold/blue. Survey
question: “On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being the LEAST threatening and 10 being the MOST threatening, how threatening do
you perceive the following groups to be to U.S. society?” Means / 95% confidence intervals shown.
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Notes: Threat perception for Black Lives Matter and White Nationalists. N = 750. Survey question: “On a scale of 1 to 10, 1
being the LEAST threatening and 10 being the MOST threatening, how threatening do you perceive the following groups to
be to U.S. society?”
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B.4.2 Correlations










































































Notes: “blm” = Black Lives Matter, “wn” = white nationalists, “out” = out-group, “in” = in-group, “nt” = non-threatening,
“t” = threatening. The only correlation coefficient significant at the 0.1 level was the negative correlation between those who
view white nationalists as a non-threatening out-group and those who view white nationalists as a threatening out-group.
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B.4.3 Modeling Group Identification and Threat Perception
In this section, I assess the main determinants of group identification and threat percep-
tion in my sample. Table B.9 shows the results for regressions predicting respondents’ group
identification (Models 1 and 2) and threat perception (Models 3 and 4). I include a range
of demographic features in all models. In the models predicting threat perception, I add
indicators for in-group identification, perceptions of the repression targets’ use of violence,
and perceptions of the illegality of protests for each group.1
Model 1 reveals that older respondents, non-Democrats, and conservatives were less
likely to identify BLM as an in-group than were respondents who were younger, Democrats,
and liberal. Black respondents were more likely to identify with BLM than were white
respondents. In Model 2, we see that men, those with high income, the college educated,
and conservatives were more likely to identify white nationalists as an in-group than women,
low-income earners, those without a college education, and liberals. Also, older respondents,
Black and Latino respondents, and those living in suburbs and towns were less likely to
identify with white nationalists than younger respondents, white respondents, and those
living in cities. Somewhat surprisingly, Republicans were significantly less likely to identify
white nationalists as an in-group than were Democrats. One explanation for this pattern
is that Democrats may be more likely to apply the label of white nationalist to individuals
with racist views, while Republicans may be averse to the label or have a lower threshold for
applying it to those with specific attitudes and behaviors. This puzzling correlation invites
caution for the results in samples of in-group identification with white nationalists.
Model 3 shows the correlates for viewing Black Lives Matter as threatening. First, there
is a strong correlation between perceptions of violence and illegality and threat perception.
These findings suggest face validity for the measure of threat perception. Additionally, those
who are moderate and conservative were more likely to view BLM as threatening and those
who live in the Northeast were less likely to view BLM as threatening compared to those
1The survey questions asked respondents to rank their level of agreement with four statements on 7-point
Likert scales ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”: “Individuals from [Black Lives Matter
/ white nationalists] often use violence at protests,” and “Individuals from [Black Lives Matter / white
nationalists] often protest illegally.” I reverse the measures so higher values represent higher perceptions of
violence and illegality. I ask these questions after the conjoint to avoid priming perceptions of violence and
illegality. As such, these results should be treated as correlational.
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in the South. Regarding perceptions of threat for white nationalists, again there is a strong
positive relationship between perceptions of violence, perceptions of illegality, and threat
perceptions. Interestingly, there is also an inverse relationship between perceptions of BLM
illegality and perceptions that white nationalists are threatening. Finally, older respondents
were more likely to view white nationalists as threatening, while those who identify with
another gender were less so, though there are only 2 respondents in this category. Finally, it
is interesting that in-group identification is not correlated with threat perception for either
group, as might have been expected. This null finding suggests that in-group identity and
threat perceptions, at least as measured in this experiment, are distinct concepts. The
insignificant correlations in Figure B.4 further demonstrate that these group identifiers are
distinct.
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Table B.9: Modeling Group Identification and Threat
Perception
BLM In-Group WN In-Group BLM Threat WN Threat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BLM In-Group 0.19 −0.31
(0.26) (0.26)
BLM Violent 0.50∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.11) (0.11)
BLM Illegal 0.26∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
WN In-Group 0.51 0.52
(0.33) (0.33)
WN Violent −0.06 0.47∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
WN Illegal −0.11 0.22∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
Male −0.17 0.96∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.37
(0.19) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24)
Other Gender 0.66 −10.38 −1.90 −6.63∗∗∗
(2.29) (558.72) (2.18) (2.18)
High Income 0.22 0.81∗∗∗ −0.22 0.38
(0.20) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26)
College 0.17 0.63∗∗ −0.12 −0.17
(0.20) (0.28) (0.26) (0.25)
Middle Age −1.06∗∗∗ −0.33 −0.46 0.44
(0.21) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28)
Old Age −1.92∗∗∗ −2.29∗∗∗ 0.40 1.13∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.57) (0.36) (0.36)
Black 1.44∗∗∗ −0.80∗ −0.20 −0.61
(0.32) (0.42) (0.40) (0.40)
Latino 0.01 −0.77∗ 0.41 −0.06
(0.28) (0.40) (0.38) (0.38)
Other Race 0.22 −1.96∗∗ −0.26 0.13
(0.33) (0.76) (0.45) (0.45)
City 0.15 0.18 −0.24 0.03
(0.26) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34)
Suburb −0.09 −0.63∗ 0.28 0.23
(0.25) (0.35) (0.32) (0.32)
Town −0.34 −1.13∗∗ 0.37 0.25
(0.31) (0.48) (0.39) (0.39)
Republican −0.69∗∗∗ −0.84∗∗∗ 0.20 −0.02
(0.21) (0.28) (0.30) (0.29)
Independent −1.03∗∗∗ −0.67 −0.03 0.42
(0.38) (0.52) (0.48) (0.48)
Other Party −1.49∗∗ −1.57 −0.02 0.29
(0.61) (1.16) (0.76) (0.76)
Moderate −0.56∗∗ 0.35 0.69∗∗ −0.27
(0.23) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32)
Conservative −0.68∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ −0.11
(0.25) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35)
Other Ideology −0.40 1.54∗ 0.58 −0.89
(0.62) (0.84) (0.81) (0.81)
Northeast 0.41 −0.16 −0.89∗∗ −0.25
(0.26) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34)
Midwest −0.19 −0.17 −0.16 −0.27
(0.25) (0.33) (0.31) (0.31)
West 0.15 −0.05 −0.25 0.42
(0.23) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30)
Constant 1.04∗∗∗ −2.18∗∗∗ 2.33∗∗∗ 4.64∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.48) (0.63) (0.63)
Observations 728 728 728 728
Notes: Logit models (M1, M2) and linear models (M3, M4). Dependent
variables are dummies for in-group identification (M1, M2) and continuous
measure of threat perception from least (1) threatening to most (10) threat-
ening (M3, M4). ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively. Omitted
categories listed in Appendix Section B.2.
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B.5 Power Analysis
A major question when interpreting some of the null results in the main analysis is
whether there is sufficient statistical power to detect a significant effect of the repression
treatment if one existed. I use software from Schuessler and Freitag (2020) to verify whether
or not the study is well-powered.2 Table B.10 reports the results, setting values for power to
















2Note that in a previous power analysis based on an M-Turk pilot study, I found that the smallest likely
effect size was 0.10. In these results the effects are much smaller. This may be because almost all respondents
had a high likelihood of punishing repression in my pilot study, inflating effect sizes. Such would be expected




Table B.11: Effect of Repression on Vote Share (Linear Models)
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny Permits to BLM −0.05∗∗ −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 0.03 −0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.06∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.03 −0.00 0.02 −0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Deny Permits to WN −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.04 −0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Use Violence Against WN −0.05∗∗ −0.03 −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Constant 0.53∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Observations 6, 120 2, 800 5, 440 6, 140 3, 440 6, 060
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample is BLM
in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group / non-
threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening (M6). ***, **, * significant
at .01, .05, .10, respectively. Gray boxes represent coefficients used for hypothesis tests.
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B.6.2 Ordering Effects
Table B.12: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Task 1
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.27 −0.18 −0.30 0.03 1.04∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.27) (0.40) (0.27) (0.25) (0.36) (0.27)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.36 0.54 0.07 0.10 0.68∗ −0.26
(0.27) (0.37) (0.28) (0.28) (0.36) (0.26)
Deny WN Permits −0.45 0.10 −0.24 −0.42∗ −0.23 −0.42
(0.28) (0.40) (0.26) (0.25) (0.35) (0.27)
Use Violence Against WN −0.87∗∗∗ −0.91∗∗ −0.32 −0.43 0.11 −0.33
(0.27) (0.42) (0.28) (0.27) (0.32) (0.24)
Constant 0.40∗∗ 0.07 0.15 0.14 −0.30 0.19
(0.18) (0.25) (0.17) (0.17) (0.22) (0.16)
Observations 612 280 544 614 344 606
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respondent.
Sample is BLM in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3),
white nationalists out-group / non-threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists
out-group / threatening (M6). ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
Table B.13: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Tasks 1-2
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.16 −0.15 −0.18 −0.03 0.49∗∗ 0.06
(0.18) (0.29) (0.21) (0.18) (0.24) (0.19)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.39∗∗ 0.30 −0.18 −0.15 0.58∗∗ −0.22
(0.18) (0.24) (0.18) (0.19) (0.25) (0.18)
Deny WN Permits −0.16 −0.00 −0.07 −0.11 −0.13 −0.19
(0.18) (0.28) (0.19) (0.17) (0.24) (0.18)
Use Violence Against WN −0.63∗∗∗ −0.31 −0.11 −0.29 0.09 −0.26
(0.19) (0.28) (0.20) (0.19) (0.23) (0.18)
Constant 0.26∗∗ 0.02 0.11 0.11 −0.20 0.12
(0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11)
Observations 1, 224 560 1, 088 1, 228 688 1, 212
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample is
BLM in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists
out-group / non-threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening
(M6). ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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Table B.14: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Tasks 1-3
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.23 0.04 −0.14 −0.08 0.24 −0.16
(0.14) (0.21) (0.17) (0.15) (0.20) (0.15)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.39∗∗∗ 0.20 −0.18 −0.15 0.32 −0.33∗∗
(0.15) (0.20) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.15)
Deny WN Permits −0.17 −0.09 −0.19 −0.18 −0.25 −0.26∗
(0.15) (0.25) (0.16) (0.15) (0.20) (0.14)
Use Violence Against WN −0.26∗ −0.09 −0.22 −0.24 −0.18 −0.28∗
(0.15) (0.21) (0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15)
Constant 0.21∗∗ −0.01 0.15 0.13 −0.02 0.21∗∗
(0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09)
Observations 1, 836 840 1, 632 1, 842 1, 032 1, 818
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample is
BLM in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists
out-group / non-threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening
(M6). ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
Table B.15: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Tasks 1-4
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.17 0.14 −0.06 −0.00 0.23 −0.18
(0.12) (0.18) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.21 0.34∗ −0.04 −0.07 0.28 −0.18
(0.13) (0.18) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13)
Deny WN Permits −0.06 0.16 −0.08 −0.12 −0.23 −0.24∗
(0.13) (0.19) (0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.13)
Use Violence Against WN −0.20 −0.04 −0.03 −0.13 −0.18 −0.19
(0.12) (0.17) (0.14) (0.12) (0.16) (0.13)
Constant 0.13∗ −0.12 0.04 0.07 −0.01 0.16∗
(0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Observations 2, 448 1, 120 2, 176 2, 456 1, 376 2, 424
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample
is BLM in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists
out-group / non-threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening
(M6). ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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Table B.16: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Tasks 1-5
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.15 0.02 −0.11 −0.04 0.12 −0.16
(0.11) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.12)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.18 0.28∗ −0.08 −0.08 0.18 −0.20∗
(0.12) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11)
Deny WN Permits −0.02 0.14 −0.13 −0.18 −0.25 −0.18
(0.11) (0.17) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.11)
Use Violence Against WN −0.08 0.05 −0.07 −0.13 −0.14 −0.13
(0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.12)
Constant 0.09 −0.10 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.13∗
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
Observations 3, 060 1, 400 2, 720 3, 070 1, 720 3, 030
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample
is BLM in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists
out-group / non-threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening
(M6). ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
Table B.17: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Tasks 1-6
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.17 −0.05 −0.14 −0.03 0.07 −0.21∗
(0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.11)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.23∗∗ 0.15 −0.05 −0.01 0.14 −0.26∗∗
(0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11)
Deny WN Permits −0.06 −0.05 −0.08 −0.11 −0.28∗∗ −0.17
(0.10) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10)
Use Violence Against WN −0.08 −0.02 −0.04 −0.07 −0.18 −0.16
(0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.14) (0.11)
Constant 0.11 −0.01 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.16∗∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
Observations 3, 672 1, 680 3, 264 3, 684 2, 064 3, 636
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample
is BLM in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists
out-group / non-threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening
(M6). ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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Table B.18: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Tasks 1-7
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.16 −0.02 −0.13 0.02 0.10 −0.24∗∗
(0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.25∗∗ 0.02 −0.13 0.01 0.15 −0.30∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10)
Deny WN Permits −0.06 −0.05 −0.09 −0.08 −0.24∗ −0.19∗
(0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10)
Use Violence Against WN −0.15 −0.10 −0.10 −0.10 −0.15 −0.19∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.10)
Constant 0.13∗ 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.18∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07)
Observations 4, 284 1, 960 3, 808 4, 298 2, 408 4, 242
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample is BLM
in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group
/ non-threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening (M6). ***, **,
* significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
Table B.19: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Tasks 1-8
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.17∗ 0.00 −0.12 −0.00 0.09 −0.24∗∗
(0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.21∗∗ 0.02 −0.13 −0.01 0.12 −0.26∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.09)
Deny WN Permits −0.10 −0.04 −0.04 −0.08 −0.22∗ −0.17∗
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09)
Use Violence Against WN −0.18∗ −0.12 −0.07 −0.08 −0.12 −0.18∗
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10)
Constant 0.13∗∗ 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.17∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
Observations 4, 896 2, 240 4, 352 4, 912 2, 752 4, 848
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample is BLM
in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group
/ non-threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening (M6). ***, **,
* significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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Table B.20: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Tasks 1-9
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.20∗∗ −0.07 −0.13 −0.04 0.10 −0.19∗∗
(0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.23∗∗ −0.07 −0.13 0.00 0.10 −0.26∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09)
Deny WN Permits −0.06 −0.08 −0.07 −0.08 −0.15 −0.09
(0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
Use Violence Against WN −0.18∗∗ −0.13 −0.05 −0.12 −0.13 −0.13
(0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09)
Constant 0.14∗∗ 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.14∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Observations 5, 508 2, 520 4, 896 5, 526 3, 096 5, 454
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample is BLM
in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group
/ non-threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening (M6). ***, **,
* significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
151
B.6.3 Alternative Thresholds for Threat Perception
Table B.21: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Threatening > 6
Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.11 0.06 0.08 −0.21∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.06 0.08 −0.00 −0.26∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Deny WN Permits −0.09 −0.06 −0.10 −0.11
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07)
Use Violence Against WN −0.07 −0.05 −0.08 −0.16∗∗
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Constant 0.07 −0.01 0.02 0.15∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 4, 700 4, 720 4, 180 7, 480
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered
by respondent. Sample is BLM in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM
out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group / non-threatening (M4),
BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening (M6).
***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
Table B.22: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Threatening > 8
Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.09 −0.04 0.14 −0.21∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.11 −0.05 0.16 −0.25∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.10)
Deny WN Permits −0.05 −0.10 −0.20 −0.06
(0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.10)
Use Violence Against WN −0.09 −0.08 −0.04 −0.18∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.11)
Constant 0.07 0.06 −0.01 0.14∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
Observations 6, 280 7, 760 2, 600 4, 440
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clus-
tered by respondent. Sample is BLM in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2),
BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group / non-threatening
(M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening
(M6). ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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Table B.23: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Threatening > 9
Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.03 −0.08 0.03 −0.15
(0.08) (0.07) (0.14) (0.11)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.10 −0.07 0.20 −0.27∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.12)
Deny WN Permits −0.07 −0.08 −0.17 −0.11
(0.08) (0.07) (0.14) (0.11)
Use Violence Against WN −0.08 −0.10 −0.06 −0.18
(0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.13)
Constant 0.06 0.07 −0.00 0.14∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07)
Observations 6, 920 8, 840 1, 960 3, 360
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clus-
tered by respondent. Sample is BLM in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2),
BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group / non-threatening
(M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening
(M6). ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
Table B.24: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Threatening = 10
Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.02 −0.10∗ 0.03 −0.15
(0.07) (0.06) (0.14) (0.11)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.03 −0.13∗∗ 0.20 −0.27∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.15) (0.12)
Deny WN Permits −0.09 −0.09 −0.17 −0.11
(0.07) (0.06) (0.14) (0.11)
Use Violence Against WN −0.07 −0.12∗∗ −0.06 −0.18
(0.07) (0.06) (0.15) (0.13)
Constant 0.04 0.09∗∗ −0.00 0.14∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07)
Observations 8, 880 12, 200 1, 960 3, 360
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered
by respondent. Sample is BLM in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM
out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group / non-threatening (M4),
BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening (M6). ***,
**, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively.
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B.6.4 Alternative Outcome Variable: Candidate Ranking
Table B.25: Effect of Repression on Vote Share - Rankings as Outcome
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny BLM Permits −0.43∗∗∗ −0.06 −0.12 −0.03 0.24 −0.34∗∗
(0.13) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.18) (0.13)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.47∗∗∗ −0.25∗ −0.26∗∗ −0.10 −0.16 −0.55∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.19) (0.14)
Deny WN Permits −0.35∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗ 0.06 0.04 −0.25 −0.28∗∗
(0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.10) (0.18) (0.12)
Use Violence Against WN −0.28∗∗ −0.27∗ 0.01 −0.09 −0.23 −0.16
(0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) (0.20) (0.14)
Constant 6.32∗∗∗ 7.34∗∗∗ 5.77∗∗∗ 5.67∗∗∗ 5.58∗∗∗ 5.56∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.11) (0.18) (0.13)
Observations 6, 094 2, 789 5, 415 6, 121 3, 440 6, 039
Notes: Dependent variable is the candidate’s ranking on a scale of 1 (definitely WOULD NOT vote for) to 10
(definitely WOULD vote for). Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample is BLM in-group (M1), white
nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group / non-threatening
(M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening (M6). ***, **, * significant at
.01, .05, .10, respectively. Linear models.
B.7 Evaluating Causal Mechanisms
This section provides analysis to evaluate several of the theoretical claims that underline
the main theory. Specifically, I analyze (1) whether voters who identify as an in-group with
a repression target and/or consider one of the targets to be threatening are more likely
to incorporate repression into their vote choice, (2) self-reported considerations in selecting
candidates, and (3) the effect of group identification and threat perception in evaluating civil
liberties - security trade-offs.
B.7.1 Incorporation of Repression into Vote Choice
First, I analyze one of the causal mechanisms in my theory, which proposes that re-
spondents who identified as an in-group with the repression target and those who perceived
the repression target to be threatening would be especially likely to consider repression in
their vote choice. I predicted that these individuals are more likely to consider repression
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when selecting candidates than voters who perceive the repression target as an out-group
and believe them to be non-threatening. The best evaluation of this dynamic is the conjoint
analysis in the main paper, which mitigates social desirability bias by asking respondents
to select candidates with randomized attributes. However, I also use several post-treatment
questions to probe respondents’ decision-making process.
I ask respondents which attributes they considered when selecting a candidate (they
must mark the attributes they considered from a list of all candidate attributes). From this
question I create the dummy variable Repression Considered, which is coded as “1” if the
respondent marked repression and “0” otherwise. Second, I ask respondents how important
each of the attributes was to their candidate selection, using a four-category scale that ranges
from “not important” to “extremely important.” I use the rankings of the importance of
repression to create the variable Repression Importance, a four-point scale coded from “1”
if repression is not important to “4” if repression is extremely important. Third, I ask
respondents an open-ended question about whether there were any candidate attributes
that made it impossible to support a candidate. Repression Disqualifies is a dummy coded
“1” if the respondent mentioned that repression made it impossible to support a candidate.
Figure B.5 illustrates the number of respondents who marked that they consider a partic-
ular candidate attribute in their choice, while Figure B.6 shows the mean level of importance
for each of the candidate attributes. As suggested in the conjoint results, the importance of
repression ranks similarly with other salient issues for the 2020 election cycle abortion and
COVID-19. In total, 37.6% (282/750) of respondents marked that they considered repression
in their vote choice, and the mean level of importance was 2.97, closest to “very important.”
The last measure asked respondents to describe in their own works whether there were any
conditions that disqualified a candidate from their vote. In total, 3.33% of respondents men-
tioned repression in their response. Some representative comments include the respondents
who wrote that “people who support blm protesters getting tear gas are horrible” and “I
could never vote for someone who approved of using weapons against protesters, or who
would deny permits based on the group.”
To further analyze the drivers of self-reported importance of repression in vote choice, I
regress these measures on two categorical variables measuring group identification and threat
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perceptions. The first measure codes respondents’ orientation to Black Lives Matter in four
categories: BLM in-group / BLM non-threatening, BLM in-group / BLM threatening, BLM
out-group / BLM non-threatening, BLM out-group / BLM threatening. I create the same
measure for white nationalists. I then use separate models to regress Repression Considered,
Repression Importance, and Repression Disqualifying on these group identifiers, omitting
the baseline category for respondents who viewed the repression target as both an out-
group and non-threatening. I use a logistic link function for the dichotomous dependent
variables and a linear link function for the continuous measure of repression importance. I
also control for respondents’ demographic features to mitigate omitted variable bias, given
that the treatment conditions are not randomly assigned (Appendix Section B.2 details the
coding for demographic variables and omitted categories). Table B.26 shows the results of
this analysis.
I expected to find positive and statistically significant coefficients on each of the inde-
pendent variables of interest. Compared to the baseline category of out-group identification
and no threat perception, my theory suggested that in-group members and those who per-
ceive the repression target to be threatening would be more likely to consider repression in
their vote choice. There is some mixed support for this reasoning across the measures of
consideration of repression. Considering first the measures in relation to Black Lives Matter,
those who perceived BLM to be a non-threatening in-group were significantly more likely to
consider repression and rank repression as having greater importance in their vote choice.
There was an even stronger significant relationship between those who perceive BLM to be
a threatening out-group and consideration of repression in vote choice. Regarding white na-
tionalists, as I have already discussed the measure for in-group identification seems perhaps
not to have captured the dynamics I expected. This may explain why those who identi-
fied white nationalists as an in-group were significantly less likely to consider repression
than those who identified white nationalists as a non-threatening out-group. Alternatively,
these results could support the null relationship for Hypothesis 1 based on my previous
reasoning: because white nationalists have rarely been a target of government repression,
this may explain why they are unlikely to consider repression in their vote choice. Finally,
there is a weakly significant positive relationship between those who view white nationalists
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as a threatening out-group and consideration of repression and likelihood that repression
disqualified the candidate.
In all, there is some evidence across these models that, at least with relation to Black
Lives Matter, in-group identification and threat perception increase the likelihood that a re-
spondent will incorporate repression into their vote choice. For white nationalist orientation,
however, there is not robust support for this mechanism.
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Notes: Question text read “Which candidate attributes did you CONSIDER when choosing between the two candidates.”
Respondents were asked to mark all attributes that applied to their choice.














1 2 3 4
Importance
Notes: Question text read “How important were each of the candidate attributes to your choice about who to vote for?”
Respondents were asked to rank each candidate attribute on a four-point Likert scale from “not important” (1) to “extremely
important” (4).
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Table B.26: Self-Reported Consideration of Repression in Vote
Choice
Consider Repression Importance Repression Repression Disqualifies
(1) (2) (3)
BLM in-group/non-threat 0.39∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.22
(0.22) (0.09) (0.55)
BLM in-group/threat 0.44 0.41∗∗∗ 0.62
(0.29) (0.11) (0.91)
BLM out-group/threat 0.76∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ −0.69
(0.23) (0.10) (0.90)
WN in-group/non-threat −0.85∗∗ −0.09 −0.57
(0.34) (0.12) (1.16)
WN in-group/threat −0.90∗∗ 0.28∗∗ −15.89
(0.38) (0.14) (1, 273.46)
WN out-group/threat 0.35∗ −0.09 1.04∗
(0.18) (0.08) (0.58)
Male −0.12 −0.07 −0.27
(0.17) (0.07) (0.49)
Other Gender −12.93 1.29∗∗ −15.60
(378.15) (0.63) (7, 412.96)
High Income 0.05 0.02 0.00
(0.18) (0.08) (0.52)
College −0.03 0.04 −0.30
(0.18) (0.07) (0.51)
Middle Age −0.09 0.09 0.19
(0.21) (0.08) (0.60)
Old Age 0.33 0.13 0.86
(0.26) (0.11) (0.71)
Black −0.34 0.00 −0.29
(0.29) (0.12) (0.73)
Latino −0.20 0.10 −0.31
(0.28) (0.11) (0.76)
Other Race 0.31 0.04 −0.09
(0.32) (0.13) (0.76)
City 0.30 0.20∗∗ 1.51∗
(0.25) (0.10) (0.85)
Suburb 0.21 0.31∗∗∗ 1.03
(0.23) (0.09) (0.84)
Town 0.21 −0.00 0.60
(0.28) (0.11) (0.98)
Republican −0.55∗∗ −0.17∗∗ −1.40
(0.22) (0.09) (0.90)
Independent −0.20 −0.12 1.54∗∗
(0.35) (0.14) (0.68)
Other Party −0.15 0.01 1.45
(0.55) (0.22) (1.10)
Moderate −0.13 −0.34∗∗∗ −1.31∗∗
(0.23) (0.09) (0.63)
Conservative 0.14 −0.01 −0.69
(0.25) (0.10) (0.73)
Other Ideology −0.22 −0.61∗∗∗ −1.34
(0.61) (0.24) (1.48)
Northeast 0.01 0.06 −0.03
(0.25) (0.10) (0.63)
Midwest −0.17 −0.10 −1.32
(0.23) (0.09) (0.87)
West −0.22 −0.06 0.07
(0.22) (0.09) (0.56)
Constant −0.68∗ 2.73∗∗∗ −4.07∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.15) (1.17)
Observations 728 727 728
Notes: Dependent variable is whether repression was considered (M1), the importance of
repression (M2) and whether repression was disqualifying (M3). Logit link functions in
M1/M3, linear in M2. Baseline categories for group identification: BLM or WN is a non-
threatening out-group. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively. Other baseline
categories listed in Appendix Section B.2.
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B.7.2 Evidence of Group-Centric Voting
The second set of analyses considers questions that evaluate how respondents typically
choose between candidates. In the first question, I ask respondents whether their main
consideration when selecting candidates is (1) how a candidates’ policies affect their own
well-being, (2) how the candidates’ policies affect the well-being of their friends and family,
(3) how the candidates’ policies affect the country as a whole, (4) the candidates’ party,
or (5) the candidates’ position on a specific policy. I also ask respondents to rank these
categories from most important to least important. My theory suggests that voters tend
to make decisions based on how a particular policy affects their own well-being or the well-
being of other in-group members. While not directly evaluating this dynamic, the descriptive
evidence in Figures B.7 and B.8 suggest that a substantial number of voters do privilege the
effect that policies have on in-group members when making their vote choice, even beyond
considerations of party identification and specific issues.
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Notes: Question text reads “Which of the following statements reflect how you typically choose which candidate to support?
Please mark all that apply.” X-axis is the count of respondents who marked each of these categories. N = 750.
B.7.3 Civil-Liberties / Security Trade-offs
In a third set of questions to evaluate causal mechanisms, I ask respondents about their
attitudes toward the civil liberties - security trade-off. Specifically, I ask respondents to
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Notes: Question text reads “Now, please rank these statements from MOST IMPORTANT to LEAST IMPORTANT in how
you typically choose which candidate to support.” Respondents then re-ordered the attributes to reflect their preferred
ranking, with 1 being the most important and 5 being the least important. N = 685.
identify on a 7-point Likert scale whether they strongly agree (1) or strongly disagree (7)
that (1) “It is important that the government protect citizens from threatening groups,
even if it means violating civil liberties,” (2) “Sometimes the government must violate civil
liberties in order to maintain security,” and (3) “It is important that the rights of people
with unpopular views be protected, including their right to protest.” Figure B.9 shows
descriptive statistics for the proportion of respondents marking each value of the Likert
scales, with values on the left-hand side representing strong disagreement with each of the
statements. Overall we see variation but coalescence around socially desirable responses,
with the majority of respondents answering that it is important to protect citizens from
threatening groups, sometimes the government must violate rights, and it is important that
the rights of protesters be protected.
These questions push respondents to consider the relative importance of security ver-
sus civil liberties. My theory suggests that respondents who identify as an in-group with a
repression target will place a higher value on civil liberties, but respondents who view one
of the repression targets as threatening will place a higher value on security. To evaluate
this possibility, I code three continuous dependent variables from the questions listed above,
where “1” indicates strongly agree and “7” indicates strongly disagree: Protect from Threats,
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Maintain Security, and Protect Protesters. I invert the score for Protect Protesters to create
Don’t Protect Protesters so that higher values on all three variables indicate relatively higher
support for civil liberties vis-a-vis security. I then regress these measures on dummies for re-
spondents’ group identification, threat perception, and the standard battery of demographic
controls (described in Appendix Section B.2). Across models, positive coefficients indicate
relatively higher support for civil liberties relative to the omitted category and negative
coefficients represent relatively higher support for security.
I expected that the coefficients for in-group identification would be positive and sta-
tistically significant: those who identify with one of the repression targets should place a
relatively higher weight on civil liberties than security compared to out-group members. In
contrast, I expected that the coefficients for threat perception would negative and statisti-
cally significant, signalling that those who view one of the repression targets as threatening
will be more likely to support security over civil liberties. The results in Table B.27 do not
reflect my expectations. First, there is not significant relationships between the measures of
threat perception and the outcomes. Second, the results show that those who identify BLM
and white nationalists as an in-group are significantly less likely to mark a response that
privileges protection of civil liberties. Rather, respondents who are in-group members with
repression targets are more likely to agree that the government should protect citizens from
threats, even if it means violating civil liberties, and more likely to agree that sometimes the
government must violate civil liberties in order to maintain security. One way to make sense
of these relationships is that those who identified as an in-group with one repression target
may feel threatened by the other target. As a result, they may have had the other group
in mind when answering the questions, particularly if they were unlikely to view their own
group as a threat. For instance, someone who identified white nationalists as an in-group
may not see their own group as threatening, but they may be more likely to see BLM as
threatening. In that case, they may answer the questions with BLM in mind and believe
that it is important to protect from threats, even if it means violating the civil liberties of
another group. The last finding is that those who view BLM as an in-group were more likely
to agree that it is important that the rights of those with unpopular views be protected.
Perhaps in the question that specifically measured protests from unpopular views, BLM
162
in-group members did respond to the question with their own group in mind.






Important that the government protect













Sometimes the government must violate












Important that the rights of people with







Notes: X-axis represents Likert scale from strongly disagree (7) to strongly agree (1) with each statement. N = 750 across all
graphs.
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Table B.27: Predicting Importance of Civil Liberties v. Security
Protect from Threats Maintain Security ¬ Protect Protesters
(1) (2) (3)
BLM In-Group −0.40∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.11)
WN In-Group −0.87∗∗∗ −1.07∗∗∗ 0.17
(0.17) (0.18) (0.14)
BLM Threatening −0.01 −0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
WN Threatening −0.00 −0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Male −0.19 0.02 0.25∗∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.10)
Other Gender −1.33 −1.15 0.88
(1.10) (1.18) (0.92)
High Income −0.10 −0.09 0.14
(0.13) (0.14) (0.11)
College 0.03 0.13 0.21∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.11)
Middle Age 0.05 −0.15 0.05
(0.14) (0.15) (0.12)
Old Age 0.20 −0.18 0.20
(0.18) (0.19) (0.15)
Black −0.11 0.12 0.20
(0.20) (0.22) (0.17)
Latino −0.04 0.04 0.28∗
(0.19) (0.21) (0.16)
Other Race 0.06 −0.19 −0.17
(0.23) (0.25) (0.19)
City 0.15 0.13 −0.03
(0.17) (0.18) (0.14)
Suburb 0.09 0.02 0.13
(0.16) (0.17) (0.14)
Town 0.45∗∗ 0.36∗ −0.12
(0.20) (0.21) (0.16)
Republican 0.35∗∗ 0.39∗∗ −0.21∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.12)
Independent 0.02 −0.04 −0.35∗
(0.24) (0.26) (0.20)
Other Party −0.34 −0.07 −0.04
(0.38) (0.41) (0.32)
Moderate −0.13 −0.26 −0.15
(0.16) (0.17) (0.14)
Conservative −0.27 −0.56∗∗∗ 0.23
(0.17) (0.19) (0.15)
Other Ideology 0.28 −0.32 0.10
(0.41) (0.44) (0.34)
Northeast −0.01 −0.04 0.12
(0.17) (0.19) (0.15)
Midwest −0.03 0.04 −0.13
(0.16) (0.17) (0.13)
West 0.06 0.07 0.14
(0.15) (0.16) (0.13)
Constant 3.03∗∗∗ 3.82∗∗∗ 4.81∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.30) (0.23)
Observations 728 728 728
Notes: Dependent variable is importance with protecting against threatening groups (M1),
agreement that the government must sometimes violate civil liberties (M2) and the (reverse
of) the importance of protecting those with unpopular views (M3). Linear models. ***,
**, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively. Baseline categories for control variables listed
in Appendix Section B.2.
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B.8 The Influence of Party Identification
This section examines (1) the relationship between party identification and the main
theoretical concepts (group identification and threat perception), (2) the possibility of het-
erogeneous treatment effects across parties, and (3) whether individuals’ baseline propensity
to punish repression varies by party. I theorize that group identification and threat per-
ception will be significant predictors for how individuals consider repression in their vote
choice. Another factor which may also influence evaluations of repression is partisan identi-
fication, closely linked with political ideology. There is existing evidence that partisanship is
a strong predictor of individuals’ attitudes toward repression (Davis and Silver, 2004; Davis,
2007; Finkelstein et al., 2017; Jenkins-Smith and Herron, 2009; McFarland and Mathews,
2005). Recent research also indicates that political ideology shapes how individuals respond
to repression at the ballot box. Aksoy (2018) finds that right-wing leaders are rewarded for
counterterrorism activities – arguably a type of repression – in elections in Western Europe.
Cordell (2021) finds that left-wing parties are punished for cooperating in the United State’s
torture programs through extraordinary rendition. In general, liberal parties tend to value
rights protections and exhibit less tolerance of overt repression. In light of the influence of
party identification, it is crucial to evaluate the extent to which partisanship may confound
the results of the main hypothesis tests and/or provide an additional explanation for the
relationship between repression and vote share.
I begin by assessing the extent to which in-group identification and threat perception are
correlated with membership in particular parties. While the groups of interest in this study
are unlikely to perfectly correlate with party identification, it is probable that Democrats
are more likely to identify with Black Lives Matter and be threatened by white nationalists,
while Republicans would be more likely to identify with white nationalists and be threatened
by Black Lives Matter. The correlational evidence in Figure B.10 sheds light on these
relationships. Republicans are more likely to view BLM as threatening, less likely to identify
BLM as an in-group, less likely to view white nationalists as an in-group, and less likely to
view white nationalists as threatening. Democrats are more likely to identify BLM as an
in-group, less likely to view BLM as threatening, and more likely to view white nationalists
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as threatening. Surprisingly, Democrats are also more likely to identify white nationalists
as an in-group. As mentioned in the previous section, it may be that Democrats are more
likely to apply the label of white nationalist to others. For the most part, the results of this
correlation table reflect the regression results predicting in-group identification and threat
perception in Table B.9. There, Republicans were less likely to identify with BLM and white
nationalists than Democrats, but there was not a significant relationship between political
party and threat perception. Overall, the correlational evidence across Figure B.10 and Table
B.9 suggest that political party, group identification, and threat perception are correlated.
At the same, these concepts are not synonymous. Therefore, one should not interpret the
main results as reflecting purely the influence of political party.
I next consider whether political party is a confounding variable to the hypothesis tests.
Holding political party constant, would we still expect to see the treatment effects in the
main analysis? Or, would the relationship between in-group identification, threat perception,
and incorporation of repression into vote choice disappear after incorporating the influence of
political party? The results from the balance checks rule out the latter possibility. Treatment
assignment is balanced for political party membership in all but three instances.3 Further,
even when controlling for political party and ideology in all models (Table B.6) and when
these variables are imbalanced (Table B.7), the results for the hypothesis tests are robust.
Partisanship can safely be ruled out as a confound.
Though in-group identification with Black Lives Matter is a strong and significant predic-
tor of punishment of repression, it is still possible that those who belong to different parties
have varying propensity to punish repression. Table B.28 evaluates this possibility by ana-
lyzing the influence of repression on vote share in three partisan sub-samples: Democrats,
Republicans, and Non-Partisans. Among Democrats, both non-violent and violent repres-
sion of Black Lives Matter is associated with a reduced vote share, as well as violence against
white nationalists. However, there is not a significant effect for denial of permits to white
nationalists among Democrats. Among Republicans we see the reverse dynamics: only de-
3In the BLM in-group sample, Independents were more likely to receive the treatment where the candidate
denies white nationalists permits; in the WN in-group sample, Republicans were more likely to receive the
treatment where the candidate denies BLM permits; and in the sample of respondents who view BLM as
a non-threatening out0group, Independents were more likely to receive the treatment where the candidate
supported restricting permits for BLM protesters.
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nial of permits to white nationalists is punished, and this is only at the .10 significance level.
Among those who do not identify with one of the major parties, there is not a significant re-
lationship between repression and vote share. These results do have commonalities with my
hypothesis tests, as Democrats and Black Lives Matter in-group members seem to have simi-
lar patterns of punishing repression. Interestingly, the results for Democrats continue to hold
when controlling for in-group identification, threat perception, and the other demographic
covariates, though the significant coefficient for denial of permits to white nationalists among
Republicans evaporates with the inclusion of these controls (results not shown). Overall, the
results in Table B.28 suggest that Democrats generally have a higher baseline propensity to
punish repression, but that this tendency varies across repression targets. These findings
should be interpreted as providing an additional explanation for the relationship between
repression and vote share, rather than negating the influence of Black Lives Matter in-group
identification.
The above discussion rules out political party as a confounding variable and illuminates
the role of party identification in linking repression to candidates’ vote share. However, it is
still worthwhile to consider whether the results of the hypothesis tests are primarily driven
by members of one particular party. To evaluate this possibility, Tables B.29, B.30, and
B.31 replicate the results in partisan sub-samples for Democrats, Republicans, and those
not belonging to a major party, respectively. These results should be treated with caution
given the smaller sample size across many of the models and the fact that the treatment is
not block randomized along party lines. Still, these results provide insight into the influence
of party on considerations of repression in vote choice.
Turning to Table B.29, which replicates the results among Democrats, the results across
all the models are quite similar to the main hypothesis tests, with several distinctions: (1)
Democrats who identify BLM as an in-group do not punish violence against white nation-
alists, (2) those who identify BLM and white nationalists as a non-threatening out-group
punish denial of permits to BLM, and (3) those who view white nationalists as a non-
threatening out-group punish violence against white nationalists. The main take-away from
these results is that the propensity to punish repression increases in some sub-samples but
decreases in others. It does not seem to be the case that Democrats across the board are more
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willing to punish repression, and there are still variations across the different sub-categories.
Next, Table B.30 replicates the results among Republicans. The distinctions in these
models are as follows: (1) there is no longer a significant negative effect for repression of Black
Lives Matter among BLM in-group members, (2) those who identify with white nationalists
punish repression of white nationalists in the form of denial of protest permits, (3) those who
view white nationalists as a threatening out-group no longer punish repression of BLM, and
(4) those who view white nationalists as a threatening out-group punish repression of white
nationalists in the form of denial of protest permits. Overall, these results demonstrate that
the bulk of the treatment effect for in-group punishment of repression for BLM members
was driven by those who also identified as Democrats. On the other hand, these results
yield some support for Hypothesis 1 in that white nationalist in-group members now punish
repression against white nationalists. Part of this finding could be driven by the fact that the
measure of in-group identification with white nationalists may be more effective at capturing
true in-group identification in the Republican sub-sample. Finally, and in contrast to my
predictions, there is some punishment of repression against white nationalists even among
those who view the group as threatening. Perhaps even Republicans who view the group as
threatening highly privilege respect for the rights of this group, though the explanation for
this finding is somewhat uncertain.
Finally, Table B.31 replicates the results in the sample of respondents who do not identify
with one of the major parties. These results are by nature difficult to interpret given that
this sample is likely to be extremely heterogeneous, including both left-wing and right-wing
individuals who are disillusioned with the parties as well as those who truly have no party
identification or are moderates. These results should also be treated with caution given
that the sample sizes are so small, encompassing responses from only 16 to 80 respondents
depending on the model (recall that respondents complete ten conjoint tasks). Perhaps as a
result of these dynamics, there are many differences to these results compared to the main
hypothesis tests: (1) among BLM in-group members, there is no punishment of repression,
(2) those who identify as an in-group with white nationalists reward repression in the form of
violence against BLM and denial of permits to white nationalists, (3) those who view white
nationalists as a non-threatening out-group reward repression in the form of denial of permits
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to BLM, and (4) those who identify white nationalists as a non-threatening out-group no
longer punish repression against BLM.
What are the overall takeaways from the results broken down by sub-samples? Generally,
it seems the primary significant results in the main hypothesis tests, in which BLM in-group
members punish repression of BLM, are driven by Democratic respondents. At the same
time, there is a unique effect of in-group identification, above and beyond the role of party
identification, as demonstrated in the models with controls to adjust for imbalance along this
variable. There is also some interesting heterogeneity across the parties, as the results suggest
that Democrats are not necessarily universally more supportive of rights protections. In the
in-group, partisan sub-samples, for instance, only Democrats who identified as an in-group
with BLM punished repression of BLM, while only Republicans who identified as an in-group
with BLM punish violent repression of white nationalists. Across the sub-samples, Democrats
seemed to be more willing to punish repression of BLM, while Republicans seemed to be
more willing to punish repression of white nationalists, suggesting that party identification
does seem to indicate some group-level affiliation.
Ultimately, these results do not undermine the strong influence of in-group identification
with BLM as shaping incorporation of repression into vote choice. However, they do round
out our understanding of the role of party identification in showing that both in-group
identity and party affiliation likely play a role in influencing how a particular individual
evaluates repression at the polls.
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B.8.1 Correlations





















































































Notes: Cells in white are not significant at the .05 level. N = 749 respondents. Variables for party and group identification
are dummies coded “1” if the respondent belongs to the group of interest. Threat perception measured on a scale of 1 to 10
(least to most threatening).
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B.8.2 Treatment Effects by Political Party
Table B.28: Treatment Effects by Party Identification
(1) (2) (3)
Democrats Republicans Other
Deny Permits to BLM −0.22∗∗∗ 0.02 0.11
(0.08) (0.08) (0.17)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.24∗∗∗ 0.00 0.04
(0.08) (0.08) (0.18)
Deny Permits to WN −0.08 −0.14∗ 0.22
(0.07) (0.08) (0.18)
Use Violence Against WN −0.15∗∗ −0.11 0.04
(0.08) (0.08) (0.17)
Constant 0.14∗∗∗ 0.05 −0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.12)
Observations 7, 200 6, 360 1, 440
Notes: Dependent variable is whether or not a profile was selected. Base-
line category: candidate supports everyone’s right to protest. Standard
errors clustered by respondent. ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, re-
spectively.
B.8.3 Main Results in Partisan Sub-Samples
Table B.29: Effect of Repression on Vote Share Among Democrats
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny Permits to BLM −0.23∗∗ −0.04 −0.31∗∗ −0.23∗ 0.19 −0.32∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.27) (0.12)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.32∗∗∗ −0.00 −0.20 −0.21 0.09 −0.42∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.27) (0.13)
Deny Permits to WN −0.05 −0.16 −0.10 −0.19 −0.27 0.05
(0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.29) (0.12)
Use Violence Against WN −0.14 −0.06 −0.18 −0.23∗ −0.14 −0.16
(0.10) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.30) (0.13)
Constant 0.15∗∗ 0.05 0.15∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.02 0.18∗∗
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.18) (0.08)
Observations 4, 000 1, 820 2, 580 2, 500 620 2, 880
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample
is DEMOCRATS who identify as BLM in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-
threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group / non-threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white
nationalists out-group / threatening (M6). ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively. Gray boxes represent
coefficients used for hypothesis tests.
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Table B.30: Effect of Repression on Vote Share Among Republicans
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny Permits to BLM −0.18 −0.12 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.04
(0.14) (0.20) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Use Violence Against BLM −0.12 −0.37 0.02 0.17 0.05 −0.09
(0.15) (0.23) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Deny Permits to WN −0.23 −0.10 −0.08 −0.03 −0.15 −0.30∗∗
(0.16) (0.25) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Use Violence Against WN −0.36∗∗ −0.37∗∗ 0.05 −0.06 −0.08 −0.09
(0.15) (0.19) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
Constant 0.18∗ 0.20 −0.01 −0.02 0.02 0.09
(0.10) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 1, 700 820 2, 060 3, 040 2, 600 2, 500
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respondent. Sample
is REPUBLICANS who identify as BLM in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group (M2), BLM out-group / non-
threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group / non-threatening (M4), BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white
nationalists out-group / threatening (M6). ***, **, * significant at .01, .05, .10, respectively. Gray boxes represent
coefficients used for hypothesis tests.
Table B.31: Effect of Repression on Vote Share Among Non-Partisans
In-Group Out-Group Out-Group
Non-Threatening Threatening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLM WN BLM WN BLM WN
Deny Permits to BLM 0.16 0.56 0.10 0.41∗ 0.06 −0.31
(0.34) (0.35) (0.23) (0.23) (0.46) (0.29)
Use Violence Against BLM 0.11 0.85∗∗ −0.17 −0.02 0.65 −0.08
(0.36) (0.39) (0.23) (0.29) (0.41) (0.27)
Deny Permits to WN 0.36 1.05∗∗∗ 0.13 0.32 0.24 −0.06
(0.31) (0.29) (0.25) (0.27) (0.50) (0.28)
Use Violence Against WN 0.09 0.43 0.09 0.26 −0.31 −0.24
(0.24) (0.29) (0.26) (0.24) (0.46) (0.29)
Constant −0.14 −0.56∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.20 −0.14 0.14
(0.21) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.29) (0.19)
Observations 420 160 800 600 220 680
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a candidate was selected. Standard errors clustered by respon-
dent. Sample is NON-PARTISANS who identify as BLM in-group (M1), white nationalists in-group
(M2), BLM out-group / non-threatening (M3), white nationalists out-group / non-threatening (M4),
BLM out-group / threatening (M5), white nationalists out-group / threatening (M6). ***, **, * sig-
nificant at .01, .05, .10, respectively. Gray boxes represent coefficients used for hypothesis tests.
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B.9 Survey Instrument
• Introductory Script: The purpose of this research study is to better understand indi-
vidual attitudes about social and political issues. For that reason, we will be surveying
individuals from the United States and asking them to complete a brief (approximately
15 minute) questionnaire. If you are willing to participate, our questionnaire will ask
about your background (e.g., age, race, years of education) and opinions. Survey par-
ticipants will receive compensation up to $4.50 in the form of cash payments, gift cards,
loyalty points, etc. This is an entirely anonymous questionnaire: your responses will not
be identifiable in any way and will remain confidential. Your participation is voluntary,
and you may withdraw from this project at any time. This study is being conducted by
Kelly Morrison, a researcher at the University of Pittsburgh. Please contact kellymorri-
son@pitt.edu if you have any questions.
• What is your gender? [male, female, other]
• Which of the following categories best describes your household income? [Less than
$25,000, $25,000-$49,999, $50,000-$74,999, $75,000-$99,999, $100,000-$124,999, $125,000
or more]
• What is the highest degree or highest level of schooling you have completed? [Less
than high school degree, High school degree or equivalent, Some college but no degree,
Bachelor’s degree, Graduate degree]
• What is your age? [18-34, 35-49, 50-64, 65+]
• Which race/ethnicity best describes you? (Please choose only one) [White, Black or
African American, Hispanic/Latino, Other]
• In what type of community do you live? [Rural area, Large city, Suburb near a large
city, Small city or town]
• In which state do you live? [Drop-down menu with all states and the District of Columbia]
• In which region do you live? [Midwest, Northeast, South, West]
• Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?
[Democrat, Republican, Independent, No preference, Other party, Don’t know]
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• In general, how would you describe your political views? [Very conservative, Conserva-
tive, Moderate, Liberal, Very liberal, Other]
• Please indicate whether you or someone close to you (a close friend or family member)
would consider themselves a member of the following groups:
– Republican Party [Yes, No]
– Democratic Party [Yes, No]
– Black Lives Matter [Yes, No]
– Antifa [Yes, No]
– Refugees [Yes, No]
– Islamic extremists [Yes, No]
– White nationalists [Yes, No]
– Anti-mask advocates [Yes, No]
– Animal rights activists [Yes, No]
– Communists [Yes, No]
• On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being the LEAST threatening and 10 being the MOST threatening,
how threatening do you perceive the following groups to be to U.S. society?
– Republican Party [1, 10]
– Democratic Party [1, 10]
– Black Lives Matter [1, 10]
– Antifa [1, 10]
– Refugees [1, 10]
– Islamic extremists [1, 10]
– White nationalists [1, 10]
– Anti-mask advocates [1, 10]
– Animal rights activists [1, 10]
– Communists [1, 10]
• In the next section, you will consider a choice between candidates for the governor of your
state. Some of these candidates will seem similar to actual candidates and others may
seem unusual. That’s okay. Just make the best choice about which candidate you would
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prefer. When making your choice, presume that both candidates are equally qualified to
hold office in terms of character, temperament, and other personal and moral qualities.
• CONJOINT TASKS 1-10. See Table 3.1 for all treatment attributes.
– On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates that you definitely WOULD NOT vote for
the candidate and 10 indicates that you definitely WOULD vote for the candidate,
how would you rate each of the candidates below? [Candidate A [1,10]; Candidate
B [1,10]]
– If you had to choose, which candidate would you prefer to vote for? [Candidate A,
Candidate B]
• Now, please share some information about how you made your choice to support one
candidate or the other and how you typically decide between candidates in a real election.
• Which candidate attributes did you CONSIDER when choosing between the two can-
didates. (Please mark all attributes that apply) [Party, Race, Gender, Current Job,
Position on Education, Position on the Economy, Position on Healthcare, Position on
Guns, Position on the Environment, Position on COVID-19, Position on Immigration,
Position on Protests, Position on Abortion]
• How important were each of the candidate attributes to your choice about who to vote
for?
– Party [Not important, Somewhat important, Very important, Extremely important]
– Race [Not important, Somewhat important, Very important, Extremely important]
– Gender [Not important, Somewhat important, Very important, Extremely impor-
tant]
– Current Job [Not important, Somewhat important, Very important, Extremely im-
portant]
– Position on Education [Not important, Somewhat important, Very important, Ex-
tremely important]
– Position on the Economy [Not important, Somewhat important, Very important,
Extremely important]
– Position on Healthcare [Not important, Somewhat important, Very important, Ex-
tremely important]
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– Position on Guns [Not important, Somewhat important, Very important, Extremely
important]
– Position on the Environment [Not important, Somewhat important, Very important,
Extremely important]
– Position on COVID-19 [Not important, Somewhat important, Very important, Ex-
tremely important]
– Position on Immigration [Not important, Somewhat important, Very important,
Extremely important]
– Position on Protests [Not important, Somewhat important, Very important, Ex-
tremely important]
– Position on Abortion [Not important, Somewhat important, Very important, Ex-
tremely important]
• Were there any candidate positions or qualities that made it impossible for you to support
the candidate? If so, please describe these problematic positions and/or qualities below.
• Which of the following statements reflect how you typically choose which candidate to
support? Please mark all that apply. [I consider how a candidates’ policies will affect
my personal well-being., I consider how a candidates’ policies will affect the well-being
of my family and friends., I consider how a candidates’ policies will affect the country
as a whole., I consider what party the candidate belongs to., I consider the candidate’s
position on one specific issue.]
• Now, please rank these statements from MOST IMPORTANT to LEAST IMPORTANT
in how you typically choose which candidate to support. [I consider how a candidates’
policies will affect my personal well-being., I consider how a candidates’ policies will
affect the well-being of my family and friends., I consider how a candidates’ policies will
affect the country as a whole., I consider what party the candidate belongs to., I consider
the candidate’s position on one specific issue.]
• Next, please share some information about civil liberties protections and protests in the
United States.
• Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: It is important that
the government protect citizens from threatening groups, even if it means violating civil
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liberties. [Strongly agree, Agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree or disagree, Somewhat
disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree]
• Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: Sometimes the gov-
ernment must violate civil liberties in order to maintain security. [Strongly agree, Agree,
Somewhat agree, Neither agree or disagree, Somewhat disagree, Disagree, Strongly dis-
agree]
• Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: It is important that
the rights of people with unpopular views be protected, including their right to protest.
[Strongly agree, Agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree or disagree, Somewhat disagree,
Disagree, Strongly disagree]
• Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: Individuals from
the Black Lives Matter movement often use violence at protests. [Strongly agree, Agree,
Somewhat agree, Neither agree or disagree, Somewhat disagree, Disagree, Strongly dis-
agree]
• Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: Individuals from
the Black Lives Movement often protest illegally. [Strongly agree, Agree, Somewhat
agree, Neither agree or disagree, Somewhat disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree]
• Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: White nationalists
often use violence at protests. [Strongly agree, Agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree or
disagree, Somewhat disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree]
• Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: White nationalists
often protest illegally. [Strongly agree, Agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree or disagree,
Somewhat disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree]
• Do you have any additional comments about this survey that you would like to share
with the researcher? If so, please leave your comments below.
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Appendix C Paper 3 Additional Material
C.1 Deviations from Pre-Registration
• In the pre-registered survey, the possible responses for the variable Leader1 were Very
supportive; Somewhat supportive; Slightly supportive; and Not at all supportive. I
changed to the new Likert scale before data collection for ease of interpretation.
• In footnote 7 of the pre-registration I said that I would code the variable Don’t Support AI
as 1 if the respondents ranked the organization at or above a 2 on the feeling thermometer.
This was a typo. I code the value as 1 if respondents ranked AI at or below a 2 on the
feeling thermometer.
• Lucid over-sampled from my request of 750 respondents. While the pre-registered version
of the survey specifies 750 respondents, the total sample included 758 respondents.
• For ease of presentation, I show results with two combined outcome measures, which are
the sum of support for human rights across the three outcome measures and the sum of
opposition to repressive leaders across the three outcome measures. In the pre-registered
version of the study, I planned to present the results separately. However, the results
were the same for each of the separate outcome measures, so I combined them to speed
interpretation.
• The measure I planned to use for lack of support for human rights required that all
respondents answer “bad” or “very bad” to the first question, “not at all important”
to the second question, and that international organizations primarily work for foreign
groups. After collecting the data, however, I found that only 15 respondents met all three
of these criteria. To increase the size of this group, I present results with an alternative
variable: respondents can also respond as “neutral” to the second question, and they
need only meet two of the criteria, rather than three. Ultimately, the results are the
same with both of these measures.
• I added “and oppose repressive leaders” to the hypotheses to better match the two
outcome variables that I re-registered.
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C.2 Survey Instrument
• Intro: The purpose of this research study is to better understand individual attitudes
about social and political issues. For that reason, I will be surveying individuals from the
United States and asking them to complete a brief (approximately 10 minute) question-
naire. If you are willing to participate, the questionnaire will ask about your background
(e.g., age, race, years of education) and opinions. Survey participants will receive com-
pensation up to $1.00 in the form of cash payments, gift cards, loyalty points, etc. This
is an entirely anonymous questionnaire: your responses will not be identifiable in any
way and will remain confidential. Your participation is voluntary, and you may with-
draw from this project at any time. This study is being conducted by Kelly Morrison, a
researcher at the University of Pittsburgh. Please contact kellymorrison@pitt.edu if you
have any questions.
• US location: Participants should only proceed with the survey if they are currently
located in the United States. Are you currently located in the United States? [Yes; No]
• Gender: What is your gender? [Male; Female; Other]
• Income: Which of the following categories best describes your household income? [Less
than $25,000; $25,000 to $49,999; $50,000 to $74,999; $75,000 to $99,999; $100,000 to
$124,999; $125,000 or more]
• Education: What is the highest degree or highest level of schooling you have completed?
[Less than high school degree; High school degree or equivalent; Some college but no
degree; Bachelor’s degree; Graduate degree]
• Age: What is your age? [18-34; 35-49; 50-64; 65+]
• Race: Which race/ethnicity best describes you? (Please choose only one) [White; Black
or African American; Hispanic/Latino; Other]
• Community: In what type of community do you live? [Rural area; Large city; Suburb
near a large city; Small city or town]
• State: In which state do you live?
• Region: In which region do you live? [Midwest, Northeast, South, West]
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• Party: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or
Independent? [Democrat; Republican; Independent; No preference; Other party]
• Ideology: In general, how would you describe your political views? [Very conservative;
Conservative; Moderate; Liberal; Very liberal; Other]
• Threat: On a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being the LEAST threatening and 10 being the MOST
threatening, how threatening do you perceive the following groups to be to U.S. domestic
security? [Republican Party; Democratic Party; Black Lives Matter; Antifa; Refugees;
Islamic extremists; White nationalists; Animal rights activists; Communists; Illegal im-
migrants]
• AI Familiar: Please rate your familiarity with the following organization: Amnesty
International. [Very familiar; Somewhat familiar; Not very familiar; I have never heard
of this organization]
• AI Thermometer: Please use the feeling thermometer to express your feelings about
Amnesty International on a scale of 0 to 10. Ratings above 5 degrees mean that you
feel favorable and warm toward the group, ratings at 5 degrees mean that you don’t feel
particularly warm or cool toward the group, and ratings below 5 degrees mean that you
don’t feel favorable toward the group.
• IO1: What kind of influence are international human rights organizations having on the
way things are going in the United States? [Very good, Good, Neutral, Bad; Very bad]
• IO2: How important do you think it is for international human rights organizations
to hold governments accountable for human rights issues? [Very important, Somewhat
important, Moderately important; Slightly important; Not at all important]
• IO3: Which of the following statements comes closest to your view: (1) International
human rights organizations are primarily dedicated to protecting the rights of people in
your country or (2) International human rights organizations are primarily dedicated to
promoting the interests of foreign groups? [1; 2; Neither; Don’t know]
• Vignette: Consider the following scenario. Black Lives Matter activists have been ac-
tively protesting in your state for the past several weekends against systemic racism and
discrimination. The governor, a Republican, orders the police to use tear gas and rubber
bullets against the protesters. He argues that the protests have begun to pose a threat
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to local businesses and the security of the state. Following a recent escalation in violence
as a result of these new policing tactics, the governor explains in an interview that the
measures are necessary to protect citizens, the local economy, and the safety of the rest of
the state. He hopes that the measures will deter future protests. [Treatment: In reaction
to these events, Amnesty International, an international advocacy organization, initiates
a campaign to criticize the governor. They shame the governor for using violence, ar-
guing that these actions represent a violation of the human rights of the protesters. The
campaign features accounts from multiple victims, who explain how police violence left
them with welts on their arms and legs and chemical irritants in their eyes. One ac-
tivist recounted how she was struck by a flash grenade while distributing food to other
protesters. She was transported via stretcher to a private car, which took her to the hos-
pital because no ambulance would come to help. At the hospital, she suffered multiple
cardiac arrests and was diagnosed with a concussion and whiplash. In the days since, she
has had difficulty breathing while standing and becomes easily fatigued.]
• HR1: Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement. The use
of tear gas and rubber bullets is an appropriate policing technique. [Strongly agree;
Somewhat agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat disagree; Strongly disagree]
• HR2: How upset do you feel about the governor’s use of tear gas and rubber bullets
against protesters? [Not at all upset; Slightly upset; Somewhat upset; Very upset]
• HR3: How likely are you to participate in a campaign to ban the use of tear gas and
rubber bullets by police officers? [Very unlikely; Somewhat unlikely; Neither likely not
unlikely; Somewhat likely; Very likely]
• Leader1: How would you describe your support for the governor’s reaction to these
protests? [Very supportive; Somewhat supportive; Neither supportive nor unsupportive;
Somewhat unsupportive; Very unsupportive]
• Leader2: Do you approve or disapprove of the way this governor is handling his job?
[Strongly approve; Somewhat approve; Neither approve nor disapprove; Somewhat Dis-
approve; Strongly Disapprove]
• Leader3: How likely would you be to reelect this governor in the next election? [Very
likely; Somewhat likely, Neither likely nor unlikely; Somewhat unlikely; Very unlikely]
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• Conclusion: The discussion of police violence in this survey draws from a recent report
from Amnesty International. To view the report, published in August 2020, click here or
visit amnestyusa.org to learn more about human rights in the United States. (Make
sure to return to this page to complete the survey). If you have any additional
comments about the survey that you would like to share with the researcher, please leave
them below.
C.3 Coding Rules for Demographic Control Variables
• Gender : male, other, female (omitted)
• Income: low (omitted: combines less than $30,000 and $30,000-$50,000), high (combines
$50,000-$74,999 and $75,000 or more)
• Education: less than college (omitted: combines less than high school degree, high school
degree or equivalent, some college but no degree), college (combines Bachelor’s degree
and Graduate degree)
• Age: young (omitted: 18-34), middle aged (combines 35-49 and 50-64), old (65+)
• Race: white (omitted), Black or African American, Hispanic/Latino, other
• Community : rural (omitted), large city, suburb near a large city, small city or town
• Region: Northeast (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Vermont, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania), Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota), South (omitted: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, District of Columbia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas), West (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon,
Washington)
• Party ID : Democrat (omitted), Republican, Independent, other (combines no preference,
other party, and don’t know)
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• Ideology : liberal (omitted: combines very liberal and liberal), moderate, conservative
(combines very conservative and conservative), other
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C.4 Descriptive Statistics
C.4.1 Variation in Outcome Variables








































How upset do you feel about the



















How likely are you to campaign to
ban tear gas and rubber bullets?
Notes: Variation in the first set of outcome variables, measuring support for human rights. Higher values imply greater
support for human rights and greater opposition to repression. N = 758.





















How supportive are you of the




















Do you approve of the way the





















How likely would you be to reelect
this governor in the next election?
Notes: Variation in the second set of outcome variables, measuring support for the leader who supported repression. Higher
values imply lower levels of support for the leader (higher levels of support for human rights protections. N = 758.
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C.4.2 Correlation Across Outcome Variables




































































Notes: Correlation coefficients across both sets of outcome variables. All coefficients were significant at the .95 level.
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C.4.3 Variation in Independent Variables
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Notes: Variation in threat perception of Black Lives Matter and party identification. N = 758.
















What kind of influence do







































Are HROs dedicated to your
country or foreign groups?
Notes: Variation in support for international organizations. N = 758.
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C.5 Alternative Measure of Support for HROs: Opposition to Amnesty
International







































































Notes: The effect of shaming on support for human rights by support for Amnesty International. Panel 1 represents results
for the first dependent variable (support for human rights) and panel 2 represents results for the second dependent variable
(opposition to the repressive leader). 90% confidence intervals. N = 758.
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C.6 Balance Check



















































Notes: Logit models. Dependent
variable is shaming. N = 758.
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